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This dissertation revolves around two main questions: How does financial development
affect poverty and informality? How can the government reduce tax evasion in a value-
added tax system? The first two chapters contain empirical studies on India addressing
the first question. Using time and state-level variation across Indian states, chapter 2
examines the effect of financial liberalization in 1991 on poverty and investigates the
underlying mechanisms. Chapter 3 studies the effect of financial deepening and bank
outreach on informality using micro data from the Indian manufacturing sector. For
answering the second question, my approach uses both theory and empirical examination
to find out the optimal enforcement strategies for minimizing value-added tax evasion at
the intensive and extensive margins. Chapter 4 addresses the problem of misreporting
by the registered traders. Chapter 5 models the role of inter-sectoral linkages on tax
evasion in an input-output framework and confirms the results using Indian data. The
remainder of this introduction sets out the structure of the dissertation by a brief review
of each chapter.
Financial liberalization has been controversial among academics and policymakers
as it is not clear whom the benefits of expanded credit allocation accrue to. Using
state-level data from India over the period 1983 to 2005, Chapter 2 gauges the effect
of financial deepening and outreach on rural poverty. Following the 1991 liberalization
episode, we find a strong negative relationship between financial deepening, rather than
financial inclusion, and rural poverty. Instrumental variable regressions suggest that
this relationship is robust to omitted variable and endogeneity biases. We also find that
financial deepening has reduced poverty rates especially among self-employed in the rural
areas, while at the same time it supported an inter-state migration trend from rural areas
into the tertiary sector in urban areas, consistent with financial deepening being driven
by credit to the tertiary sector. This suggests that financial deepening contributed to




Chapter 3 gauges the effect of financial deepening and bank outreach on informality
using micro data from the Indian manufacturing sector and exploiting cross-industry
variation in the need for external finance. In this chapter, we distinguish between two
channels through which access to finance can reduce informality: reducing the entry
barrier to the formal sector and increasing productivity of formal firms. We find that
bank outreach has a stronger effect on reducing the incidence of informality by cutting
barriers to entering the formal economy, especially for smaller firms, and thus diminishing
opportunistic informality. In comparison, financial deepening increases the productivity
of formal sector firms while it has no significant impact on informal sector firms.
The last two chapters concern tax evasion in the value-added tax (VAT) system.
Essentially, the VAT has an intrinsic third-party reporting feature making inter-firm
transactions less vulnerable to fraud and thus its enforcement design has additional
considerations. In a general framework, VAT evasion can be classified into two forms.
At the intensive margin, the registered trader under-reports the sale or over-reports the
purchase (misreporting fraud). At the extensive margin, the informal firm fails to register
and is hidden from the government (informality fraud). In high-income countries, the
major loss in VAT revenue is due to misreporting, while in developing countries, both
types of fraud seem to be extensive.
Chapter 4 looks into the misreporting fraud by linking the level of evasion to the de-
gree of convexity of the cost function of taxpayers and the level of transactions with final
consumers. In addition, it analyses the enforcement consequences of the new develop-
ments in information reporting and electronic invoicing, which enable the tax authority
to randomly cross-check the invoices. The results highlight the importance of taxpayer’s
subjective beliefs in shaping audit policy of the tax authority. The optimal audit rate
for firms with low cost convexity is an increasing function of transaction with final con-
sumers, but this relationship may turn to be negative when the cost function becomes
very convex. Moreover, the optimal level of invoice cross-checking on transactions of
each commodity is positively associated with the number of trading firms.
Chapter 5, in comparison, assumes no misreporting and addresses informality fraud
at a macro perspective by analyzing inter-sectoral linkages. Specifically, this chapter
models and empirically tests the self-enforcing feature of the VAT which is absent in the
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theoretical literature: An incentive that makes formal traders report their purchases to
the government for a deduction in their VAT bill. In addition, it explores how the govern-
ment can deploy this feature to reduce the size of shadow economy in the VAT system by
reallocating enforcement type and spending among different sectors. The results suggest
that the government should identify informal firms more strictly in the backwardly linked
sectors – which buy their inputs from the others – and focus on revealing within-firm
information. In contrast, in forwardly linked industries, the government should concen-
trate on cross-checking the input credit claims it receives by the corresponding VAT
payments. Empirical evidence from Indian service sector enterprises suggests a signifi-
cant increase in formality following the VAT adoption episode in 2003. This increment
is positively correlated with the sector’s forward linkage implying the existence of the
self-enforcement effect of the VAT.
Although the last two chapters both study VAT evasion, they have differences in terms
of objectives and assumptions. While chapter 4 addresses the intensive margin from a
micro perspective, chapter 5 focuses on the extensive margin from a macro perspective.
In the misreporting fraud, the government is aware about the existence of the firm, but in
the informality fraud, informal firms are hidden. As a result, the policy recommendation
of chapter 4 is based on firm’s characteristics, while it depends on sectoral linkages –
not firm-level factors – in chapter 5. Moreover, in chapter 5, the production decision
of informal sector is affected by the government policy and there is an optimal level of
enforcement based on cost-benefit analysis. Chapter 4, however, assumes that production
decision of a single firm is independent of the audit rate and they take their tax obligation
as given when deciding how much to misreport. This is a plausible assumption for the
registered traders in the VAT, since it is a tax on final consumers and does not distort




Finance and Poverty: Evidence
from India 1
2.1. Introduction
Finance as a fundamental driver of economic growth has been largely accepted after sev-
eral decades of research in this area.2 The debate today has shifted to the multifaceted
nature of financial development, specifically on the role of financial depth versus access.
While financial deepening has accelerated in emerging markets, it has not always been ac-
companied by increased use of financial services. Previous empirical evidence has shown
that financial deepening fosters economic growth and reduces income inequality (Beck,
Levine, and Levkov, 2010; Bruhn and Love, 2014), but the effects of financial access
are less understood, even as financial inclusion is being adopted as a top development
priority by policymakers worldwide.
This paper contributes to a better understanding of the role of financial access versus
depth by using annual household census data from India over the period 1983 to 2005.
Specifically, we exploit geographic and time variation in both financial depth (commer-
cial bank credit to SDP), and financial inclusion (bank branch penetration), to explore
the relative importance of financial depth and inclusion on changes in rural and urban
poverty and to explore the channels and mechanisms through which financial develop-
ment alleviates poverty.
There are two novel components to our empirical design. First, India offers the
perfect landscape to examine these issues because it has a long history of implementing
policies targeting financial breadth and has recently become the poster child for financial
inclusion with the Prime Minister making a bank account for each household a national
1 This chapter is coauthored with Meghana Ayyagri and Thorsten Beck.
2 See Levine (2005) for a review.
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priority.3 Furthermore there is large sub-national variation in socio-economic and in-
stitutional development, and significant policy changes over the sample period (Besley,
Burgess, Esteve-Volart, and Louise, 2007). By focusing on a specific country, using
data from a consistent data source and exploiting pre-determined cross-state variation in
socio-economic conditions, we alleviate problems associated with cross-country studies,
including measurement error, omitted variable and endogeneity biases.
Second, we incorporate the policy changes in our empirical design to address en-
dogeneity concerns. First, we follow Burgess and Pande (2005) and exploit the policy
driven nature of rural bank branch expansion across Indian states as an instrument for
branch penetration and thus financial breadth. Next we exploit the important watchdog
function of the relatively free and independent press in India (Besley and Burgess, 2002),
which has repercussions for corporate finance and governance, and ultimately financial
sector competition. We use the large cross-state variation in national English-language
newspaper penetration that deepens after India’s liberalization in 1991 as an instrument
for financial depth.4
We find that financial depth has a negative and significant impact on rural poverty
in India over the period 1983-2005. This is robust to using different measures of rural
poverty, controlling for time-varying state characteristics, and state and year fixed effects.
We find no effect of financial depth on urban poverty rates. The effect of financial depth
on rural poverty reduction is also economically meaningful. One standard deviation in
Credit to SDP (within-state, within-year) explains 17 percent of demeaned variation in
the proportion of the population below the poverty line (Headcount ratio). We also
find that over the time period 1983-2005, financial depth has a more significant impact
on poverty reduction than financial inclusion. Our measure of financial inclusion, rural
branches per capita, has a negative but insignificant effect on rural poverty over this
period.
Our micro-data also allows us to explore different channels identified by theory
through which financial development lowers rural poverty. On the one hand, better access
to credit enables the poor to pull themselves out of poverty by investing in their human
3 On August 28, 2014, the Prime Minister of India launched Jan Dhan Yojana, a national campaign for
financial inclusion under which 18 million bank accounts were opened during the first week alone.
4 English language newspaper circulation is highly correlated with economic newspaper circulation. In
placebo tests, we find no association between local language newspaper penetration and financial
depth. More details on the instruments are presented in sections 2.2.2.
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capital and microenterprises, thus reducing aggregate poverty (Aghion and Bolton, 1997;
Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 1993). On the other hand, more efficient
resource allocation by the financial sector (not necessarily to the poor, though), will
benefit especially the poor if – as a result – they are included in the formal labor mar-
ket. We find evidence for the entrepreneurship channel, as the poverty-reducing impact
of financial deepening falls primarily on self-employed in rural areas. We also identify
migration from rural to urban areas as an important channel through which financial
depth reduces rural poverty. In particular, there is inter-state migration of workers for
employment reasons towards financially more developed states, suggesting that poorer
population segments in rural areas migrated to urban areas. The rural primary and ter-
tiary urban sectors benefited most from this migration, consistent with evidence showing
that the Indian growth experience has been led by the services sector rather than labor
intensive manufacturing (Bosworth, Collins, and Virmani, 2007). We also find that it is
specifically the increase in bank credit to the tertiary sector that accounts for financial
deepening post-1991 and its poverty-reducing effect.
This paper contributes to the recent literature on the role of financial sector de-
velopment on poverty reduction. Theory makes contradictory predictions about which
income group should benefit most from financial sector deepening. Some studies argue
that credit constraints are particularly binding for the poor (Aghion and Bolton, 1997;
Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 1993) and that finance helps overcome
barriers of indivisible investment (McKinnon, 1973). Other studies have claimed that
only the rich can pay the“entry fee” into the financial system (Greenwood and Jovanovic,
1990) and credit is channeled to incumbents, not to entrepreneurs with the best opportu-
nities (Lamoreaux, 1986). In a cross-country setting, Beck et al. (2010) find that banking
sector development reduces income inequality and poverty.5 By contrast our paper looks
at the effect of financial sector development and rural poverty in a single country setting
allowing us to better address identification issues. Furthermore, we study the impact of
both financial depth and inclusion on poverty and find that financial depth has a greater
5 Other cross-country studies have studied the relationship between financial development and the
level of income inequality. Li, Squire, and Zou (1998) and Li, Xu, and Zou (2000) find a negative
relationship between finance and the level of income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient,
a finding confirmed by Clarke, Xu, and Zou (2006), using both cross-sectional and panel regressions
and instrumental variable methods. Honohan (2004) shows that even among societies with the same
average income, those with deeper financial systems have lower absolute poverty.
9
Chapter 2: Finance and Poverty: Evidence from India
impact on poverty reduction than financial inclusion. Most other papers only look at
the impact of either financial depth or inclusion (e.g. Beck et al., 2010; Bruhn and Love,
2014; Burgess and Pande, 2005). Our findings also contribute to the literature on the
channels through which finance should affect income equality and poverty ratios. Giné
and Townsend (2004) find for Thailand that financial liberalization benefited would-be
entrepreneurs but also resulted in wage increases through higher labor demand. Con-
sistent with this, Beck et al. (2010) find that the main effect of branch deregulation in
the United States on income inequality was through the indirect effects of higher labor
demand and higher wages for lower income groups. Our paper finds that financial sector
development reduces rural poverty in India both by fostering entrepreneurship in rural
areas and by facilitating migration of workers from rural secondary and tertiary sectors
to the urban tertiary sector.
Our paper also links to an increasing literature in banking and corporate finance
focusing on the role of media, in general, and the business press, in corporate finance
and governance.6 The media can serve as a watch dog for both banks and publicly held
companies as an information intermediary and provider of additional analysis. Several
papers have shown that media pressures can entice firms to change governance struc-
tures and business strategies (Bednar, 2012; Joe, Louis, and Robinson, 2009; Kuhnen
and Niessen, 2012) and can have an impact on firms’ financing structure and cost (Bush-
man, Williams, and Wittenberg-Moerman, 2013). While helping to reduce information
asymmetries between investors, on the one hand, and enterprises and banks, on the
other hand, it can also have an important impact on the competitive environment in
the financial and real sector. Specifically, by more information about specific firms but
also industries and sectors, in general, media can help reduce private information and
control rents, with a positive impact on the overall investment environment and resource
allocation in a country. Dyck and Zingales (2004) show that private control benefits
of majority shareholders are lower in countries with higher press penetration and thus
higher media pressure, while Perotti and Volpin (2014) show that newspaper penetration
explains cross-country variation in investor protection. Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2008)
show in a cross-country setting that a free media is correlated with lower barriers to
6 A recent finance literature has established the importance of the information content in news media
for trading in financial markets (Engelberg and Parsons, 2011) and stock market returns (Griffin,
Hirschey, and Kelly, 2011; Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock, Saar-tsechansky, and Macskassy, 2008).
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financial inclusion. Our paper adds to this micro- and macro-level literature by linking
media penetration to financial deepening across Indian states.
Finally, our paper also adds to a flourishing literature on economic development in
India, which has linked sub-national variation in historic experiences and policies to dif-
ferences in growth, poverty levels, political outcomes and other dependent variables (see
Besley et al., 2007 for an earlier survey). Specifically, researchers have focused on differ-
ences in political accountability (Besley and Burgess, 2002; Pande, 2003), labor market
regulation (Besley and Burgess, 2004; Dougherty, Robles, and Krishna, 2011; Hasan, Mi-
tra, and Ramaswamy, 2007), land reform (Besley and Burgess, 2000), trade liberalization
(Edmonds, Pavcnik, and Topalova, 2010; Topalova, 2010) and gender inequality (Iyer,
Mani, Mishra, and Topalova, 2012). Directly related to our paper, Burgess and Pande
(2005) relate a social banking policy on branching to differences in poverty alleviation
across states. Our paper adds to this literature by focusing on cross-state differences
in financial deepening after the 1991 liberalization episode and by comparing the effect
of two different dimensions of financial development – total credit volume and branch
penetration of financial institutions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents data and
methodology. Section 2.3 discusses our main results, documenting the relationship be-
tween financial development and poverty using both OLS and IV regressions. Section 2.4
explores different channels through which finance affects poverty. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2. Data, methodology, and summary statistics
In this section, we describe the data sources from which we construct our measures of
financial development and poverty, present summary statistics, and discuss the empiri-
cal research design used for examining the relationship between finance and the poverty.
Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the poverty measures, the financial devel-
opment indicators and the control variables. Panel A presents the summary statistics for
the whole of India while Panel B presents a state-wise breakdown. In Panel A, we present
mean, standard deviation as well as cross-state, cross-time and within-state-within-time
standard deviations.
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2.2.1. Data and descriptive statistics
We construct poverty measures across 15 Indian states7 covering 95% of India’s popula-
tion, using 20 rounds of the Indian household expenditure surveys. The Indian National
Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) has been conducting Consumer Household Expen-
diture surveys since the 1950s, eliciting detailed household level information on household
characteristics such as household size, education, socio-religious characteristics, demo-
graphic characteristics of household members and detailed expenditure patterns. Our
panel dataset extends from 1983 to 2005 and builds on the state-level aggregates, com-
plemented by data provided in Özler, Datt, and Ravallion (1996). In robustness tests
for our baseline regressions, we also use data for the period 1965 to 2005.8
We construct two measures of poverty. First, Headcount is the proportion of the pop-
ulation below the poverty line, as defined by the Planning Commission (1993)9 and ad-
justed yearly by price increases, and measures the incidence of poverty. Second, Poverty
Gap is the mean distance separating the poor population from the poverty line as a
proportion of poverty line. The calculation process of the poverty measures is described
in detail in the data appendix. We compute Headcount and Poverty Gap separately for
rural and urban areas.10 Figure 2.1 charts the average evolution of the Rural and Urban
Headcount ratios across the 15 states in our sample. The overall pattern suggests that
both measures of poverty declined over the sample period except for sharp fluctuation
in the early 1990s following economic liberalization.
Table 2.1 shows that mean Rural Headcount in our sample period is 31.9 percent
and larger than the corresponding Urban Headcount of 25.9 percent. While there is a
large variation in both rural and urban poverty levels across states and over time, there
is a smaller, although significant, variation within states over time. State level summary
7 The states are: Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.
They contained 95.5% of Indian population in the 2001 nationwide census. Where states split during
the sample period, we continued to consider them as one unit, using weighted averages for variables,
with population shares being the weights.
8 Detailed household survey data are not available before 1983 and we can therefore not run the channel
regressions of section 2.4 over longer time periods.
9 We test the robustness of our results to the new poverty line measures suggested by the Tendulkar
Committee of the Planning Commission of India. See data appendix for details.
10 The poverty line and price indices differs between rural and urban areas. Consistent with Topalova
(2010), we adjusted the measures for the schedule change in the survey. In addition, we controlled
for the seasonality bias due to different timing of the surveys. See data appendix for details.
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Figure 2.1: Rural and urban poverty in India over time –This figure shows the trend in Rural
and Urban Headcount ratios in India. Rural and Urban Headcount ratios are the percentage of rural and
urban population with monthly per capita expenditure less than the official poverty line respectively.
The vertical line represents the starting year (1991) of financial liberalization. The definitions and
sources of all variables are in the appendix.
statistics show that the mean Rural Headcount varies from 14.1 percent in Punjab to
49.5 percent in Bihar. We find Punjab to also have the lowest Urban Headcount of 9.8
percent11 while the highest Urban Headcount is in the state of Orissa with 37.9 percent.
In most states, we find urban poverty numbers to be lower than rural poverty except
in the case of Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Orissa. Assam in particular looks
unique given the large gap in the percentage of people below the poverty line in rural
areas (37.4 percent) compared to urban areas (11.6 percent). The average Rural Poverty
Gap in India is 7.5 percent and varies from 2.4 percent in Punjab to 12.6 percent in
Bihar. The Urban Poverty Gap varies from 1.9 percent in Punjab to 10.6 percent in
Orissa with an all-India average of 6.5 percent.
We use two different indicators of financial development at the state level, with un-
derlying data from the Reserve Bank of India. The first indicator, Credit to SDP, is the
ratio of total commercial bank credit outstanding to the Net State Domestic Product
and gauges the depth of financial development. The second indicator of financial devel-
opment is Branches per Capita, which is the total number of operating bank branches
per million persons in each state and is a measure of the extent of financial penetration.
11Historically the Punjab-Haryana region has been one of the richest regions in the country.
13
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Table 2.1 shows that the standard deviation of both measures over time is higher than
that across states, reflecting the upward trend in depth and trend reversal in inclusion
over the sample period. Commercial Bank Credit to SDP varies from 11.0 percent in
Assam to 58.5 percent in Maharashtra with a national average of 27 percent. Figure 2.2a
shows an upward trend of commercial bank credit over the sample period. On average
across the 15 states, commercial bank credit increased from 18.7 percent of SDP in 1980
to 50.3 percent in 2005. In our sample, Punjab has the highest number of branches per
million people (112) compared to Assam which has fewer than 50 branches per million
people. Figure 2.2b illustrates the evolution of branch opening per capita in India. The
data show trend breaks around 1990, which may be attributed to the suspending of the
1:4 branch license rule in 1990 according to which commercial banks were required to
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(b) Bank branches per capita
Figure 2.2: Financianl development in India over time —This figure shows the trend in the ratio
of total commercial bank credit outstanding to net state domestic product and the ratio of commercial
bank branches over population (in million). Commercial bank credit comprises term loans, cash credit,
overdrafts and bills purchased and discounted. The rural branch expansion program was in place up
to 1989. The vertical line represents the starting year (1991) of financial liberalization. The definitions
and sources of all variables are in the appendix.
In investigating the relationship between financial sector development and poverty,
we will control for several other time-varying state characteristics. The data appendix
details sources and provides extensive definitions. Specifically, we include the following
variables: SDP per capita, which is net state domestic product per capita and a proxy for
income levels, Rural Population Share, which is rural share of total population in each
state, Literacy Rate, which is defined as proportion of persons who can both read and
14
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write with understanding in any language among population aged 7 years and above, and
State Government Expenditure to SDP defined as total state government expenses over
SDP. As panel B of Table 2.1 shows, there is great variation in income levels across states
with SDP per capita ranging from 3,509 Rupee in Bihar to 14,968 Rupee in Punjab, with
a country-level mean of 8,781. The mean rural population share is 74 percent and ranges
from 88.5 percent in Assam to 60.6 percent in Maharashtra showing that over 60 percent
of the population in all states live in rural areas. The mean literacy rate in the country
is 56 percent and average government expenditures are 19.3 percent of SDP.
Table 2.2 presents correlations between our main variables of interest and the control
variables. The incidence and depth of poverty are highly correlated in both rural and
urban areas (correlation coefficient ≥ 0.96), but we also find a significant correlation
between the different rural and urban poverty measures: states with higher rural poverty
also tend to have higher urban poverty. We also find that both measures of financial
development are positively correlated with each other, with a correlation coefficient of
40.5%, and a negative correlation between the measures of financial development and
rural and urban poverty measures. The only association that is not significant is between
Urban Poverty Gap/Headcount and Credit to SDP. When we look at the control variables
we find that states with higher SDP per capita, greater government expenditures to SDP,
higher literacy rates and smaller rural populations have lower rural and urban poverty
and greater financial development. Critically, there is a high negative correlation between
the rural population share and Credit to SDP. All of our regression results are robust
to dropping rural population share. Similarly, we also run all of our regressions without
SDP per capita given the relatively high correlation with Credit to SDP and again all
our results hold without SDP per capita.
15
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2.2.2. Identification strategy
We are interested in using our state-level panel data on financial indicators and poverty
outcomes to examine whether financial development reduced poverty in Indian states
over the period 1983 to 2005. To control for reverse causation and omitted variable
bias, we utilize an instrumental variable approach using two instruments for financial
development. In this section, we first discuss India’s financial liberalization in the 1990s,
then explain our instruments and specify the estimation methodology.
India’s financial liberalization experience
Prior to financial liberalization in the 1990s, India’s financial system was characterized
by nationalized banks and directed credit that led to a complex structure of administered
interest rates. There was detailed regulation of lending and deposit rates so as to main-
tain the spread between cost of funds and return on funds (Reddy, 2002). Thus India’s
public banks lacked proper lending incentives and had a high number of non-performing
loans.12
Following a severe balance of payments crisis in 1991, there was a substantial liber-
alization of India’s financial sector as part of an economy-wide liberalization process to
move towards a market economy and increase the role of the private sector in develop-
ment. The Government of India set up the Committee on the Financial System which
released the Narasimhan Committee Report I that outlined a blueprint for financial re-
form in 1991. Following its recommendations, the government reduced the volume and
burden of directed credit so as to increase the flow of credit to the private sector. The
statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) and cash reserve ratio (CRR) that were previously main-
tained at high levels of 38.5 and 15 percent respectively to lock up bank resources for
government use were reduced so as to allow greater flexibility for banks in determining
lending terms and increase productivity (Reserve Bank of India, 2004). A second major
component of the banking sector reforms was de-regulation of interest rates. Government
controls on interest rates were eliminated and the concessional interest rates for priority
sectors were phased out to promote financial savings and growth of the organized finan-
cial system. There was also greater competition introduced into the banking system by
12See Sen, Vaidya, and Sen (1997) and Hanson (2001) for further details on the state of India’s banking
sector in the pre-liberalization period.
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granting licenses to new private banks and new foreign banks and easing of restrictions
on foreign banks’ operations.
The financial liberalization was also accompanied by strengthening bank regulation
and supervision, such as setting minimum capital adequacy requirements for banks
(the Basel Accord was adopted in April 1992) and tightening the classification of non-
performing loans. Several of the public sector banks were recapitalized and also partially
privatized. They were also given more autonomy to enhance competitiveness and effi-
ciency. Given the large proportion of non-performing loans that the public sector banks
were saddled with following restrictive policies prior to liberalization, special debt recov-
ery tribunals were set-up in 1993 to streamline the legal procedures and ensure speedy
adjudication and recovery of debt (Visaria, 2009). A second committee was established
in 1998 that released the Narasimhan Committee Report II, reviewing the banking re-
form progress and outlining further reforms for strengthening the financial institutions
of India.
It is important to note that – unlike the branching policy described below – these
reforms were implemented over several years after 1991. In addition, we do not expect
any immediate effect of individual policy measures on lending, as banks have to adjust
their lending policies and risk management systems to the new regulatory framework.
Role of media
We link cross-state variation in the effects of financial liberalization on financial deepening
to cross-state variation in the media environment. The finance literature has explored
the role of a free and independent media both on the micro-level for corporate finance
and governance, as well as on the macro-level in fostering competition in financial and
real sector and ultimately in improving resource allocation. Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de
Silanes, and Shleifer (2003) find that countries with greater state ownership of media (in
particular, newspapers) have less free press, fewer political rights for citizens, inferior
governance, less developed markets, and do little to meet social needs of the poor. In the
Indian context, Besley and Burgess (2002) show that governments are more responsive
to natural calamities in states with more developed media presence such as greater
newspaper circulation.
Following this literature, we argue that the media in India play an important role in
19
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financial sector development. The information flows resulting from a free media should
result in better informed citizenry that stimulates competition in the financial sector
leading to greater financial sector deepening. A free media not only makes customers
more financially savvy in evaluating financial products and banks but also makes banks
better informed leading to better resource allocation overall.
Following Besley and Burgess (2002), we use per capita newspaper circulation as a
proxy for media development. The Indian newspaper industry is one of the largest in
the world with more than 74,000 newspapers in 22 languages and a readership of 325
million.13 Newspapers in India are published in a number of languages to cater to the
linguistic diversity of the country and most are concentrated in circulation to particular
states and cover more localized events. By contrast, English language newspapers have
greater national coverage and more business and financial news coverage and are thus
more likely to influence financial sector development. There are a number of economic
newspapers among which, The Economic Times, published in English, has been the
dominant publication.14 First published in 1961, it is the world’s second-most widely
read English-language business newspaper (after the Wall Street Journal), and is sold in
all major cities in India. Its main content is based on the Indian economy, international
finance, share prices, prices of commodities as well as other matters related to finance.
Based on the decision makers survey,15 on average 76% of all decision makers (including
Chairmen, CEO, MD) in auto industry, consumer durable industry, telecom industry,
financial sector list The Economic Times as their media habit.
Unlike circulation of English newspapers, the state-wise data on circulation of The
Economic Times in 1991 is not available. However, we find a very strong (88%) correla-
tion between circulation of The Economic Times and circulation of non-economic English
language newspapers in 2005-2009. Therefore, we proxy media coverage of economic and
business news in 1991 by per capita circulation of English language newspapers.16
13M&E newsreel, Ernst & Young, February 2011; “More than 74,000 newspapers are registered in India,”
The Pak Banker Daily, 29 July 2009, via Dow Jones Factiva 2009, Right Vision Communications
Private Limited.
14The circulation of the four major economic and business newspapers of India in 2010: The Economic
Times (642,443), Hindu Business Line (170,749), Business Standard (141,725), Financial Express
(31,000).
15The Decision Makers’ Survey conducted in 2006 by AC Nielsen ORG-MARG covered senior executives,
GM’s and above, across 500 private sector, 100 public sector and 100 financial companies. The study
looks at the media habits and lifestyles of corporate decision makers in India.
16The correlation is the same, if instead of The Economic Times, we use total circulation of the 4
major economic newspapers in India. The registrar of newspapers for India publishes circulation of
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Figure 2.3: English newspaper circulation across India —This figure shows the variation in
English newspaper circulation per 1000 persons in 1991 across the different states of India.
Figure 2.3 shows the variation across states in the circulation of English language
newspapers per 1,000 people, with the highest levels in Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and
Maharashtra, and lowest levels in Rajasthan, Bihar, Orissa, and Assam. Figure 2.4 illus-
trates the variation over time – we divide the states into two groups, above (represented
by circles in the figure) and below (represented by crosses in the figure) the median (=2)
of English language newspaper circulation per 1,000 people and then draw the trend of
Credit to SDP in them. It can be clearly seen that the growth in Credit to SDP is more
or less the same before liberalization, but afterwards it appears steeper in states with
higher level of newspaper circulation, a difference that is statistically significant. More-
over, the growth rate accelerates as the distance from the starting point of liberalization
becomes bigger. Hence, we use the cross-state variation of per-capita circulation of En-
glish newspapers in 1991 multiplied by a time trend to capture the differential impact of
the media across time after liberalization in 1991 as an instrument for financial depth. In
robustness tests, we provide a placebo test using local language newspaper penetration,
which should not be significantly positive in predicting cross-state variation in financial
depth over time.
all newspapers in India according to their title, place and the language of publication. The data from
2005 onwards is available at http://rni.nic.in/
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Figure 2.4: Effect of newspaper circulation on financial depth—This figure shows the effect of
English newspaper circulation on Bank Credit. The circles (•) show states that had above the median
(=2) English newspaper circulation per 1000 persons. The crosses (×) show the rest of states that
had below the median circulation of English newspapers per 1000 persons in 1991. The vertical line
represents the starting year (1991) of financial liberalization. Prior to 1991, the fitted lines have slopes
0.0055 and 0.0059 for the below and above median groups, but afterwards the slope of the below median
is 0.012 and above median is 0.025. The definitions and sources of all variables are in the appendix.
India’s social banking experiment
Following independence in 1949, India went through a wave of bank nationalization in
1969 which brought the fourteen largest commercial banks under the direct control of the
Indian central bank. Shortly thereafter, the government launched a social banking pro-
gram with the goal of opening branches in the most populous unbanked rural locations.
To further facilitate rural branch expansion, the RBI announced a new licensing policy
in 1977 whereby, to obtain a license for a new branch opening in an already branched lo-
cation (one or more branches), commercial banks had to open branches in four unbanked
locations. This rule remained in effect for thirteen years until it was revoked officially
in 1990. Burgess and Pande (2005) show that between 1977 and 1990, rural branch ex-
pansion was relatively higher in financially less developed states while it was the reverse
before 1977 and after 1990. Thus, following Burgess and Pande’s approach, we use the
resulting trend reversals between 1977 and 1990 and post-1990 in how a state’s initial
financial development affects rural branch expansion as instruments for branch openings
22
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Figure 2.5: Year effects of initial financial development on branch penetration —This
figure plots the ηk coefficients obtained from the regression (2.1). The definitions and sources of all
variables are in the appendix.
in rural unbanked locations. Figure 2.5 illustrates this trend reversal in bank branches
across states and over time, based on the following regression (Burgess and Pande, 2005).
For state i in year t,
Branchesit = η0 + η1(Bi60 ×D60) + η2(Bi60 ×D61) + · · ·+ η46(Bi60 ×D05)
+ si + yt + ϵit, i = 1, . . . , 15; t = 1960, . . . , 2005 (2.1)
where Dt equals 1 in year t and zero otherwise, Bi60 is the initial level (in 1960) of branch
penetration in that state, and si and yt are state and year dummies.
Figure 2.5 graphs the ηk coefficients for the number of branches per million persons
as dependent variable. We can see two clear trend reversals in 1977 and 1990. Prior
to 1977, the ηk coefficients have an upward trend suggesting that financially developed
states provide a more profitable environment for the new branches. With the imposition
of the 1:4 rule in 1977, the trend overturns and slopes downward until the rule was
repealed in 1990. After 1990, the ηk coefficients are almost unchanging and just slightly
grow over time. This reflects that more or less all states were equally likely to attract
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new rural branches after the rural branch expansion ended.17 When we examine the
effect of rural branch expansion on overall banking development by estimating equation
(2.1) for bank credit, we find no evidence of similar trend reversals, consistent with Joshi
and Little (1996) who point out that although the number of bank branches increased
over the period 1969-1991, many banks were inefficient and unsound due to poor lending
strategies under government control.
In sum, the results from sections 2.2.2 imply that after financial liberalization in
1991, financial deepening increased considerably in states with higher English newspaper
penetration. The rural branch expansion policy had a significant impact on the number
of bank branches and increased the access of rural areas to banking but did not affect
the depth of the banking sector.
Empirical strategy
Following section 2.2.2, we use the following set-up for our instrumental variable speci-
fication to address endogeneity issues in the relationship between financial sector devel-
opment and poverty. The first stage regression of our instrumental variable specification
is as follows:
FDit = λ0 + θ(Mi91 × [t− 1991]×D91) + δ1(Bi60 × [t− 1960])
+ δ2(Bi60 × [t− 1977]×D77) + δ3(Bi60 × [t− 1990]×D90) + λXit
+ si + yt + εit, i = 1, . . . , 15, t = 1983, . . . , 2005 (2.2)
where FDit is Credit to SDP or Branches per capita, Dyear is a dummy which equals
one post-year, Mi91 is the state-wise per capita circulation of English newspapers in
1991, Bi60 is the state-wise per capita rural branches in 1960, Xit is the set of control
variables and includes SDP per capita, rural population share, literacy rate and state
government expenditure to GDP. si and yt are state and year fixed effects to control for
any unobserved heterogeneity across states and years.
The main coefficients of interest are θ and δi, where θ measures the relationship
17Panagariya and Mukim (2014) and Kochar (2011) argue that India had a policy of linking urban branch
expansion to rural branch expansion well before bank nationalization and 1977 is not a sharp break
from the prior period in terms of the branch expansion rule. This does not concern our estimations
since 1977 is not a trend break in our sample period of 1983-2005.
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between media freedom interacted with a post-liberalization time trend and financial
development and the δi’s check for trend breaks due to the 1:4 licensing rule. The
coefficient δ1 measures the trend relationship between initial financial development in
1960 and FD (specifically branch expansion). The trend reversals in this relationship are
given by δ2 and δ3. In the estimations that cover the time period 1983-2005, we skip the
first trend dummy, δ1, since it would be collinear with δ2.
To analyze the relation between finance and poverty across Indian states, we estimate
the following second stage regression:
Povertyit = β0 + β1Creditit−1 + β2Branchesit−1 + β3Xit−1 + si + yt + εit (2.3)
where Povertyit is a measure of poverty in state i and time t and is one of the four
poverty indicators – Rural Headcount, Rural Poverty Gap, Urban Headcount, Urban
Poverty Gap. Bank Credit and Branches are the predicted values from the first stage
regressions in (2.2) and the remaining variables are also the same as in (2.2). The
coefficients of interest are β1 and β2 which measure the effect of financial deepening and
broadening access on poverty, respectively. We use one-period lags of all the explanatory
variables.
All the regressions have a difference-in-difference specification where by including
state and time dummies we control for omitted variables that might drive the dependent
variable over time or across states. We thus focus on the within-state, within-year
variation in the relationship between finance and poverty alleviation, controlling for
other time-variant state characteristics. We apply double clustering,18 both within states
and within years to resolve the problem of underestimated standard errors arising from
serial correlation of the error terms in difference-in-difference estimations as suggested
by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004).19 In further regressions and to disentangle
the channels through which finance affects rural and urban poverty levels, we use different
dependent variables, as we will discuss in detail below.
18Our results are materially similar when we cluster only at the state level.
19The significance levels we obtain with this method should be treated as conservative because Cameron,
Gelbach, and Miller (2008) suggest that when the number of clusters is less than 50, standard errors
may be biased and need small sample correction such as the wild boostrap-t procedure. However,
as reported by Angrist and Pischke (2008, page 323), Hasan et al. (2007) shows that the clustered
standard errors reported by the software program Stata is reasonably good at correcting for serial
correlation in panels even when the number of clusters is small.
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2.3. Empirical results
In this section, we examine if there is a causal relationship between financial development
and poverty using two instruments for financial development, the trend reversals induced
by the rural branch expansion program and the differential English newspaper circulation
across states after financial liberalization. We first present and discuss the first-stage
regressions, before moving to the second stage estimations.
2.3.1. Finance, media and branching policy: first stage results
Table 2.3 presents the first stage regressions following model (2.2). Specifically, we regress
Credit to SDP and branch penetration on (i) the interaction between per capita English
language newspaper circulation in 1991, a post-liberalization dummy that takes the value
1 for the years 1992 and beyond, and a time trend, (ii) the interaction between bank
branches in 1960, a post-1977 dummy and a time trend, and (iii) the interaction between
bank branches in 1960, a post-1990 dummy and a time trend. We also control for other
time-variant state characteristics included in the second stage, namely SDP per capita,
literacy, government expenditures to SDP and the rural population share.
The results in column (1) of Table 2.3 show that states with higher English-language
newspaper circulation post-1991 have higher levels of Credit to SDP. The relationship
is not only statistically significant, but also economically meaningful: one additional
English newspaper per 1,000 persons in 1991 translates into an increase in Credit to
SDP by 0.1 percent per year after liberalization. This compares to an average of English
newspaper circulation of 5.51 per 1,000 people and a standard deviation of 8.72. On the
other hand, the trend reversals in branch penetration associated with the social banking
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The results in column (2) of Table 2.3 show that both English-language newspaper
circulation and the social banking policy can explain cross-state, cross-year variation in
branch penetration. Again, the results are not only statistically, but also economically
significant. One additional English newspaper per 1,000 people in 1991 is associated
with 9.5 more branch establishments per million population annually after liberaliza-
tion. Moreover, one additional branch per million capita in 1960 translates to 0.139
fewer annual branches per million people during the rural branching expansion, but
after the program, it is associated with 0.05 (0.144-0.139) branches more per million
persons annually. The Cragg-Donald F-statistic test, with critical values complied by
Stock and Yogo (2005), a weak identification test for the excluded exogenous variables,
is highly significant. This test is essential when the number of endogenous variables is
more than one and the standard F-test may not truly reflect the relevance of instruments
(for details see Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman, 2007). We also report the Angrist-Pischke
first-stage F-statistics, which are highly significant, indicating that our instruments are
relevant (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).20 In summary, we find that the differential English
newspaper across states explains financial depth better than trend instruments while the
reverse is true for branch penetration.
In columns (3) and (4), we conduct a placebo test by checking whether circulation of
non-English newspapers, which are less likely to report economical and financial news,
explains financial development. We find that the coefficients are mostly insignificant for
credit to SDP suggesting that the circulation of non-English newspapers is not associated
with financial sector development. This also suggests that the relationship between
newspaper penetration and financial depth is not spurious and not driven by positive
impact that more vibrant media have on government accountability and thus possibly
indirectly on competition and depth in the financial system. We do however find a
strong positive relationship between circulation of non-English newspapers and branch
penetration. Finally, in columns (5) to (8), we show the robustness of our first-stage
results to using the 1965 to 2005 sample period.21
20Unlike other F-statistics, which test the first stage regression as a whole, the Angrist-Pischke first-stage
F-test gauges the relevance of each endogenous variable.
21Over this period we have three missing points for Assam so the number of observations is 597.
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2.3.2. Finance and poverty: second-stage results
We present both OLS and IV regressions of the relationship between financial develop-
ment and indicators of the incidence and extent of poverty in rural and urban areas.
While the OLS regressions do not control for endogeneity and simultaneity bias, we still
present them for purposes of comparison.
Table 2.4: Finance and Poverty: OLS estimations —The regression equation estimated
is: Povertyit = β0 + β1Credit to SDPit + β2Branches per capitait + β3Log (SDP per capita)it +
β4Literacy Rateit+β5Government exp./SDPit+β6Rural populationit+si+yt+eit where si and yt are
state and year dummies. Poverty is one of four measures Rural Headcount, Urban Headcount, Rural
Poverty gap, and Urban Poverty gap. All explanatory variables are entered with one year lag. All re-
gressions are estimated by ordinary least squares and with time-variant independent variables all lagged
by one period. Standard errors clustered at state and year level are in parentheses. The definitions and











(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag of Credit to SDP -0.082 -0.081*** 0.034 -0.010
(0.051) (0.029) (0.061) (0.025)
Lag of Branches per capita -0.220 -0.070 -0.129 -0.053
(0.182) (0.100) (0.110) (0.042)
Lag of Log(SDP/capita) -0.664 0.082 -7.075 -2.015
(5.395) (3.575) (4.782) (1.489)
Lag of literacy rate 0.309*** -0.014 0.344 0.061
(0.105) (0.114) (0.244) (0.092)
Lag of rural population ratio 0.243 -0.080 0.781** 0.222
(0.507) (0.219) (0.370) (0.152)
Lag of Gov. exp. / SDP -0.048 -0.007 -0.269** -0.093**
(0.180) (0.075) (0.121) (0.042)
Constant 33.430 24.142 32.318 11.982
(52.666) (33.875) (48.542) (16.350)
Observations 345 345 345 345
R-squared 0.896 0.857 0.894 0.855
The results in Table 2.4 show a negative relationship between Credit to SDP and the
incidence and extent of rural poverty, although the estimate only enters significantly in
the case of the rural poverty gap. The relationship between Credit to SDP and urban
poverty is not only statistically insignificant but also enters with different signs in the
urban Headcount (positive) and urban Poverty Gap (negative) regressions. While branch
penetration enters negatively in all four regressions, it does not enter with a significant
coefficient. When excluding the rural population share, however, we find that Credit
to SDP enters negatively and significantly in both the Rural Headcount (though only
at the 10% level) and the Rural Poverty Gap regressions. The difference in significance
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between controlling and not controlling for the rural population share can be due to
multi-collinearity between credit to SDP and rural population share with correlation
coefficient -0.757. Credit to SDP continues to enter insignificantly in the regressions of
Urban Headcount and Urban Poverty Gap, while Branches per Capita does not enter
significantly in any of the regressions. The insignificant effect of credit to SDP on urban
poverty can be a first indication of a possible migration channel through which Credit
to SDP impacts poverty. Columns (3) and (4) suggest that urban poverty is negatively
associated with Government expenditure as a share of SDP. In all regressions except
rural poverty gap, SDP per capita has a negative but insignificant association with
poverty measures which can be due to the price adjustment of poverty line overtime.
Finally, literacy rate appears with positive and significant coefficients in rural headcount
regressions even though according to Table 2.2 they are negatively correlated. This may
be due to the multi-collinearity between literacy rate and SDP per capita.
The IV regressions in Table 2.5 show a negative and significant relationship between
Credit to SDP and rural poverty whereas there is no significant relationship between
branch penetration and rural poverty. As in the case of the OLS regressions, neither
Credit to SDP nor branch penetration enter significantly in the regressions of the urban
poverty measures. The relationship between Credit to SDP and rural poverty is not only
statistically but also economically significant. Specifically, the point estimates in columns
(1) and (2) imply that one within-state, within-year standard deviation in Credit to SDP
explains 17 percent of demeaned variation in the Headcount and 30 percent of demeaned
variation in the Poverty Gap.22 The Hansen over-identification tests reported in columns
(1) to (4) are not rejected suggesting that the instruments are valid instruments.
The insignificant results on branch penetration are due to restrictions of the sample
period to 1983 to 2005. As the results on branch penetration are in contrast to the
finding by Burgess and Pande (2005), we try to reconcile our results with their findings in
columns (5) and (6) by expanding the sample period back to 1965. We find that branch
penetration enters negatively and significantly in the regressions of Rural Headcount
and Rural Poverty Gap. The insignificant relationship between branch penetration and
poverty, found above, is thus due to the shorter time span that does not include the
22The effect of credit/SDP on rural headcount and poverty gap are calculated as -0.18*4.87/4.95 =
-0.17, and -0.111*4.87/1.82 = -0.30, respectively.
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Table 2.5: Finance and Poverty: Instrumental Variable results –This table presents the
second stage of instrumental variable regressions estimated by LIML method. The regression equation
estimated is: Povertyit = β0+β1Credit to SDPit+β2Branches per capitait+β3Log (SDP per capita)it+
β4Literacy Rateit+β5Government exp./SDPit+β6Rural populationit+si+yt+eit where si and yt are
state and year dummies. Poverty is one of four measures Rural Headcount, Urban Headcount, Rural
Poverty gap, and Urban Poverty gap. The instrumented values are obtained from first stage regressions
in Table 2.3. All independent variables are lagged by one period. Standard errors clustered at state and
year level are in parentheses. The definitions and sources of all variables are in the appendix. The OID
test is the Hansen J statistic over-identification test of all instruments. *, **, and *** shows significance
at 10%, 5% and 1% level.
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag of Credit to SDP -0.176** -0.111*** 0.013 -0.025 -0.402** -0.178**
(0.084) (0.039) (0.100) (0.036) (0.174) (0.081)
Lag of Branches per
capita
-0.273 -0.107 -0.045 0.008 -0.310*** -0.118**
(0.198) (0.096) (0.144) (0.089) (0.083) (0.055)
Lag of Log(SDP per
capita)
-1.594 -0.222 -7.249 -2.142 -5.667 -0.401
(4.299) (3.124) (4.419) (1.432) (8.132) (3.797)
Lag of Literacy rate 0.265*** -0.039 0.386* 0.091 0.394* 0.127
(0.091) (0.098) (0.234) (0.100) (0.225) (0.143)
Lag of Rural
population
0.115 -0.109 0.695* 0.159 -0.403 -0.138
(0.461) (0.181) (0.390) (0.167) (1.066) (0.391)
Lag of Gov.
exp./SDP
-0.071 -0.019 -0.252** -0.080** 0.184 0.056
(0.159) (0.063) (0.099) (0.034) (0.409) (0.160)
Observations 345 345 345 345 597 597
R-squared 0.010 0.046 0.003 -0.000 -0.014 0.036
OverID test 0.932 0.326 0.610 0.075 1.227 0.981
OID P-value 0.334 0.568 0.435 0.785 0.268 0.322
starting point of rural branching program. Even over the longer time period, however,
Bank Credit to SDP continues to enter negatively and significantly in the regressions of
Rural Headcount and Rural Poverty Gap.
To compare the economic effect of depth with breadth, we take a look at de-trended
standard errors and use the longer sample period over which both financial depth and
inclusion are shown to have a significant relationship with rural poverty gauges. Be-
tween 1965 and 2005, the within state and year standard deviations of rural poverty,
credit to SDP and branches per capita are 5.910, 7.715, and 5.339 respectively. Using
the coefficient estimates from columns (5) and (6) we compute that one standard devi-
ation increase in credit to SDP reduced Rural Headcount by 3.10, while a one standard
deviation in branch penetration reduces Rural Headcount by 1.65. Thus, over the pe-
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riod 1965 to 2005, variation in branch penetration explains 28 percent of rural poverty
reduction in India which is lower than the contribution of credit to SDP (52 percent).23
Over the longer time period, financial depth was more important than financial inclusion
in reducing poverty, while in the more recent sample period, after 1983, only financial
deepening can explain reductions in rural poverty.
In further sensitivity tests, available in the Appendix 2.C, we control for additional
time-variant state factors, most of which, however, are not available for the whole sample
period. First, we include the state government development expenditures as ratio to SDP,
which might explain variation in poverty rates across states and over time. While this
variable enters negatively and significantly, it does not change the economic or statistical
significance of Credit to SDP. Second, we include an indicator to gauge the degree to
which a state is open to trade with other countries, with annual data available for the
period 1980 to 2002 (Marjit, Kar, and Maiti, 2007). While trade openness does not enter
significantly, Credit to SDP continues to enter negatively and significantly.
Third, we control for an indicator of labor market regulation, based on Besley and
Burgess (2004) and Gupta, Hasan, and Kumar (2009) that indicates whether labor mar-
ket regulation in a given state and year can be considered flexible, neutral or inflexible. As
the labor market indicator does not vary after 1991, we also interact it with a time trend
to test whether states with initially more flexible labor market regulation experienced
faster poverty reduction post-1991 liberalization. While the labor market index enters
negatively, it does not enter significantly and our financial depth indicator continues to
enter with a negative and significant coefficient. Fourth, we control for two indicators of
physical infrastructure; specifically, the log of unit costs of electrical power supply, which
we have available for the period up 2001 and after 2007, with data from the Planning
Commission. We extrapolate for the period in between with linear extrapolation. We
also control for road density, measured by the total length of roads in km per 1000 km2,
with data for 1990 to 1996 from Ghosh and De (2005) and for 1998 to 2008 from the
Central Statistics Organization. While both indicators show a negative but insignificant
relationship with rural poverty, our main findings are confirmed. Fifth, since poverty has
convergence characteristic, we include the lag of the dependent variables in the second
stage regressions. Although the lag of the dependent variables appears with positive
23The effect of credit is -0.402*7.715/5.910=-0.52, and for branches it is -0.310*5.339/5.910=-0.28.
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and significant sign in the regressions, the coefficient of credit to SDP remains negative
and significant. As an additional check to gauge whether the increasing importance of
communication technology might not drive both financial deepening and reductions in
poverty, we add phone penetration time trend defined as “Telephone Subscribers share
in 1991 × (year-1991) × D92” in the control variables of all IV regressions and do not
observe any change in the qualitative results.
Finally, we control for two political variables. Specifically, we include (i) the share of
votes won by the ruling coalition and (ii) the share of seats won by the ruling coalition.
Lower values of the share of votes or share of seats won are likely to represent competitive
districts where the ruling and opposition parties have won a similar share of votes. While
both indicators show an insignificant relation with rural poverty, we find that controlling
for political competition financial depth continues to have a negative and significant
impact on rural headcount ratios.
Overall, this shows that even when controlling for development expenditures, trade
openness, infrastructure and political structure, some of which are also significantly cor-
related with financial depth, Credit to SDP instrumented by newspaper circulation in-
teracted with a post-1991 time trend, continues to be negatively and significantly as-
sociated with rural poverty. As the tests of overidentifying restrictions are notoriously
weak, we also reran the Table 2.4 regressions including newspaper penetration as addi-
tional explanatory variable. It never enters significantly in the rural poverty regressions,
suggesting that there is no direct impact of a thriving English-language media on rural
poverty reduction other than through financial deepening or any of the other explanatory
variables.
Overall, IV and OLS results suggest that higher levels of financial depth are associated
with both a lower incidence and depth of rural poverty but not with incidence or depth of
urban poverty. Financial inclusion, as gauged by branch penetration, is not significantly
associated with lower poverty level unless we consider a longer sample period including
the period before the social banking policy. These initial regressions thus show that
financial deepening is more robustly related to poverty reduction than financial inclusion
in recent periods. We next turn to the channels and mechanisms through which financial
deepening is related to poverty reduction.
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2.4. Finance and poverty: channels
So far the results show that financial deepening since the liberalization in 1991 has
helped reduce rural poverty in India. However, understanding the underlying channels is
as important for policy makers who try to maximize the benefits of financial development.
In this section, we explore different channels through which financial development helped
reduce rural poverty. Specifically, we explore whether financial depth helped reduce rural
poverty by enabling more entrepreneurship, by fostering human capital accumulation, or
by enhancing migration and reallocation across sectors.
2.4.1. Financial depth and entrepreneurship
Theory and empirics have shown that financial imperfections represent particularly severe
impediments to poor individuals opening their own businesses for two key reasons: (i) the
poor have comparatively little collateral and (ii) the fixed costs of borrowing are relatively
high for the poor (Banerjee and Newman, 1993; De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff, 2008).
The microfinance movement has been built on the premise that enabling the poor to
become entrepreneurs will allow them to pull themselves out of poverty.
To assess whether higher entrepreneurship among the poor can account for the signif-
icant relationship between financial depth and rural poverty identified in section 2.3, we
test whether financial depth, instrumented by English newspaper penetration interacted
with a post-liberalization time trend, can explain reduction in poverty among different
occupational groups. Specifically, we distinguish between (i) self-employed in agricul-
ture, (ii) self-employed in non-agriculture, (iii) agricultural labor, (iv) other labor and
(v) a residual group, which comprises economically non-active population not fitting in
the above categories. While we focus our discussion on IV regressions, our findings are
robust to using OLS regressions. We also focus on Credit to SDP as our main indica-
tor of financial sector development. Robustness tests including branch penetration yield
similar findings for credit depth, while the financial sector outreach measure does not
enter significantly in any of the regressions. We focus on rural areas since this is where
we found a negative and significant relationship between financial depth and poverty in
the previous section.
The results in Table 2.6 show that Credit to SDP is negatively and significantly
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associated with the Headcount and the Poverty Gap among the rural self-employed in
non-agriculture and in agriculture. Financial depth does not enter significantly in any of
the other regressions.24 Notably, financial deepening cannot explain variation in Head-
count or Poverty Gap among laborers or employed workers; while the coefficients enter
negatively, the standard errors are far from standard levels of significance. Together,
these results suggest financial deepening after the liberalization in the 1990s was as-
sociated with a reduction in both the share of the poor and the poverty gap in the
population segment of self-employed in the rural areas. Overall, this provides evidence
for the entrepreneurship channel, as the reduction in poverty rates fell on self-employed.
2.4.2. Financial depth and human capital accumulation
Financial imperfections in conjunction with the high cost of schooling represent par-
ticularly pronounced barriers to the poor purchasing education, perpetuating income
inequality (Galor and Zeira, 1993). An extensive empirical literature has shown a re-
lationship between access to finance and child labor, both using country-specific house-
hold data25 and cross-country comparisons (Flug, Spilimbergo, and Wachtenheim, 1998).
Theory and previous empirical evidence would thus suggest that financial reforms that
ease financial market imperfections will reduce income inequality and poverty levels by
allowing talented, but poor, individuals to borrow and purchase education or parents
to send their children to school rather than forcing them to earn money to contribute
to family income. We test these hypotheses with our data focusing on different educa-
tional segments of the rural population across Indian states and gauge whether financial
deepening is associated with an increase in the educational attainment in rural India.
Specifically, we distinguish between (i) illiterates, (ii) population with primary educa-
tion, (iii) population with middle school education and (iv) population with high school
degree or higher. Unlike in the previous regressions, we also test for longer-run trends
by running regressions with five and ten-year lags.
24In unreported regressions, we also look into the share of each occupational group in total population
and witness, credit to SDP is positively associated only with the share of self-employed in agriculture.
25Specifically, survey data for Peru suggest that lack of access to credit reduces the likelihood that poor
households send their children to school (Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997), while studies for Guatemala,
India and Tanzania point to households without access to finance as being more likely to reduce their
children’s school attendance and increase their labor if they suffer transitory income shocks compared
to household with more assets (Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti, 2006; Guarcello, Mealli, and Rosati, 2010;
Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997).
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Financial sector deepening that results in more human capital accumulation cannot be
expected to have an effect immediately but rather after a certain time lag. Testing for
the relationship across different lag structures also allows gauging whether any significant
relationship is spurious or not.
The results in Table 2.7 do not show any consistent and significant impact of financial
deepening on human capital allocation. The regression results do not show any increase
in educational attainment, either immediately or after a five or 10 year lag from financial
deepening. Rather, we find that the five-year lag of Bank Credit to SDP is positively and
significantly associated with the share of illiterates, while it is negatively and significantly
associated with the share of population with a high school education or higher. We also
find that the 10-year lag of Bank Credit to GDP is negatively associated with the share
of middle school graduates. Overall, these results suggest that financial deepening has
not led to increases in educational attainment in rural India.26
2.4.3. Financial depth, migration and reallocation across sectors
In a world with perfect factor mobility, workers and entrepreneurs would migrate to re-
gions or sectors with better opportunities. Market frictions, however, might prevent such
reallocation. Financial deepening can thus also contribute to poverty alleviation by help-
ing households move to areas and sectors with higher earning opportunities. Giné and
Townsend (2004) show that financial liberalization in Thailand has resulted in important
migration flows from rural subsistence agriculture into urban salaried employment and
ultimately in lower poverty levels, while Beck et al. (2010) show that financial liberaliza-
tion in the U.S. in the 1970s and 80s has helped tighten income distribution by pulling
previously unemployed and less educated into the formal labor market. In both countries,
financial liberalization broadened opportunities for entrepreneurs, both incumbent and
new ones, who in turn hired more workers. If we apply the same argument to the Indian
context, we should therefore observe an increase in migration with financial deepening
and sectoral reallocation of labor.
As we want to gauge whether finance provided enough incentives for migration within
India, we obtain migration data from the NSS surveys for the following years: 1983, 1987-
26In unreported regressions, we also limited our sample to children below the age of 18 years to gauge
whether financial deepening increases schooling and thus literacy in this specific group and find no
effect. Results are available on request.
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88, 1993, 1999-00, and 2007-08. These surveys have comprehensive data on migration
including data on household migration, characteristics of migrants, years since migration,
whether they are short-term migrants or out-migrants,27 reasons for migration, employ-
ment type and the sector from and into which they migrate. We divide households in
each state in each year into six groups based on region (rural or urban) and occupational
sector (primary, secondary, or tertiary).
As a first step, we present summary statistics on migration in India in panel A of
Table 2.8. The migration rate is computed as the ratio of the number of households
that migrated to state s in year t to the total number of households sampled in state
s. Intra-state migration is computed as the fraction of people who migrated within the
state, either between or within the districts and inter-state migration is computed as the
fraction of people migrating from another state to this state. For each year, we used the
closest survey to estimate the rates. Specifically, we used round 38 in 1983 for estimating
the rates in 1980-82, round 43 in 1987 for estimating the rates in 1983-86, round 49 in
1993 for estimating the rates in 1987-92, round 55 in 1999 for estimating the rates in
1993-98, and round 64 in 2007 for estimating the rates in 1999-2005. The estimations
start from 1980 because if the migration occurred further past the survey year, it is
usually not reported precisely. For instance, immigrants from over 10 years ago tend to
report years since migration as multiples of five or ten, creating a peak in migration rate
of those years.
The data show that, while overall migration, both inter- and intra-state, is at 1.4 per-
cent of a state’s population, on average, per year, it is dominated by intra-state migration,
which constitutes about 80 percent of overall migration. Assuming one migration per
household, during the period 1983-2005, around 30% of population experienced a migra-
tion.28 When we look at the migration between rural and urban sectors, we find that, as
expected, urban to rural migration is the smallest and accounts for an average of 0.2%
of total population through the years. Rural to urban migration is the highest though
we find that there is comparable amount of migration from urban to urban areas and
27Short-term migrants are persons who had stayed away from the village/town for a period ≥ 1 month
but ≤ 6 months during the past year for employment. Out-migrants are former members of a house-
hold who left the household any time in the past to stay outside the village/town (and are still alive
on the date of survey).
28In the migration surveys just the earliest migration is reported. The number is computed as 1.373×
22 = 30.2.
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since 2000, there has also been a comparable share of rural to rural migration. When
we look at occupational sectors, we find that migration into the tertiary sector has been
the largest. In unreported charts of migration trends over time, we find that while the
primary sector used to be smallest target sector, it overtook the secondary sector in most
years after financial liberalization.
Next, we explore the finance and migration channel in more detail with regression
analysis. In panel B of Table 2.8, we regress overall migration, intra-state, and inter-state
migration on Credit to SDP, instrumented by English newspaper penetration interacted
with a post-liberalization time trend and including our other control variables. To be
consistent with the benchmark regression we estimate it for the period 1983-2005. Panel
B shows that while financial deepening is not significantly associated with overall mi-
gration or intra-state migration, there is a significant impact of financial deepening on
inter-state migration. The economic size of this effect is reasonable, with one demeaned
standard deviation in Credit to SDP explaining around 30 percent of variation in de-
meaned variation of inter-state migration.29 In the following, we therefore focus on
inter-state migration. Specifically, we use household-level data for inter-state migrants
to gauge the impact of financial development on (i) sectoral migration decisions and
(ii) reasons for migration. We have data available for around 28,000 inter-state migrant
households across the four surveys described above.
29The demeaned standard errors of credit and inter-state migration are 0.049 and 0.001 respectively, so
the number will be 0.049*0.006/0.001= 0.294.
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In Table 2.9, we focus on inter-state migration and explore how financial development
influences migration into different occupational sectors – primary, secondary, and tertiary.
Migrant households can choose between six alternatives – rural primary, rural secondary,
rural tertiary, urban primary, urban secondary, and urban tertiary sectors which we group





Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary
We estimate our model as sequential logit model, first testing to which extent the
decision to move into urban or rural areas depends on differences in Credit to SDP across
origin and destination states and, second, gauging whether the decision to work in the
primary, secondary or tertiary sector depends on these differences and controlling for the
decision to move into the rural or urban area. Unlike in the previous regressions, we thus
focus on differences in financial development and other state-level variables rather than
levels at the year of migration. Hence, they compare the level of variables between the
destination and origin states when the households decided to migrate. We also control
for two household characteristics, household size and per capita expenditure, that might
influence migration decisions. We also control whether the migrant household used to
live in an urban or rural area.
Table 2.9 shows that financial depth is significantly associated with inter-state mi-
gration flows into the rural primary and urban tertiary sectors. The results in columns
1 show that a higher difference in Credit to SDP between destination and origin state
increases the likelihood that migrants move into urban areas though this is not statisti-
cally significant. We also find that a higher difference in SDP per capita and government
expenditure and a lower difference in literacy is associated with a higher likelihood of
inter-state migrants moving into urban areas. In addition, richer and smaller migrant
households coming from urban areas are more likely to move into urban areas in the des-
tination state. Considering interstate migrants into urban areas, we find that a higher
difference in Credit to SDP between destination and origin states results in a higher
likelihood that migrants allocate into the tertiary sector and a lower likelihood that mi-
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grants allocate into the secondary sector. We also find that interstate migrants into the
rural areas are more likely to allocate into the primary sector, the higher the difference
in Credit to SDP between origin and destination state. Thus the primary rural sector
and the urban tertiary sector were the sectors that benefitted most from the inter-state
migration associated with financial deepening.
In Table 2.10, we explore the reasons for inter-state migration for a smaller sample
of inter-state migrant households, for which we have such data available. Here, we
use multinomial logit regressions and report marginal effects. We find that a higher
difference in Credit to SDP between destination and origin states is associated with
a higher share of migrants that state “search for employment”, “under transfer”, and
“parents migration” as reason for migration and a lower share of migrants that state
“search for better employment” as reason for migration. As in Table 2.9, these findings
are robust to controlling for other state-level differences and characteristics of the migrant
households. This suggests that higher financial development in the destination state (as
compared to the origin state) is associated with migration due to search for employment,
though not with the search for better employment. In a further test, available upon
request, we re-estimate Table 2.10 for the sample of inter-state migrants below poverty
line who emigrated from rural area to urban tertiary. The only reason of those migrants
which is positively associated with the difference in credit to SDP between destination
and origin is search for employment.
2.4.4. Sectoral credit and reallocation across sectors
In a final step, we relate the relationship between financial deepening and geographic-
sectoral migration trends to the sectoral credit portfolio of the Indian banking system.
Specifically, which sector drives the cross-state variation in financial deepening observed
after the 1991 liberalization? And can we link this through to the poverty-reducing effect
in rural areas documented in section 2.3?
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Figure 2.6 graphs the trends of sector-wise credit to SDP over time. For this purpose,
we construct credit to SDP measure in the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors by
dividing RBI’s sector-wise credit data with the corresponding net state domestic product
in that sector. The detail of the source and construction of these measures are described
in Appendix 2.B. It can be clearly seen that credit to SDP in the tertiary sector started
to grow sharply a few years after liberalization, but this pattern does not exist in the
other sectors and there is even a downward trend in credit to the secondary sector.
Table 2.11: Sector-wise financial development. — The estimated regression equation estimated
is the same as Table 2.3. All regressions are estimated by ordinary least squares and with time-variant
independent variables all lagged by one period. Standard errors clustered at state and year level are
in parentheses. AP-chi2 is Angrist and Pischke (2009) test of weak instruments. Weak ID test is
Stock-Yogo weak identification test. *, **, and *** shows significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level.








Percapita circulation of english
newspapers in 1991 × (year-1991) × D92
8.425 0.152 156.396***
(7.657) (27.025) (28.891)
(year-1977) × D60 × D77 -0.075** 0.008 -0.011
(0.034) (0.066) (0.044)
(year-1990) × D60 × D90 0.142*** 0.011 0.067
(0.046) (0.092) (0.060)
Constant 104.724** 236.989* 110.347
(44.591) (138.616) (96.320)
Observations 270 270 270
R-squared 0.840 0.693 0.866
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
AP-chi2 1.085 2.397 74.656
P-value 0.781 0.494 0.000
Weak ID test 1.061 1.701 72.687
Table 2.11 confirms in a regression framework that our findings so far are driven by
credit to the tertiary sector. Using the same first-stage specification as in Table 2.3, we
see that it is just Credit to SDP in the tertiary sector that is strongly associated with
newspaper penetration and its interaction with a post-1991 time trend.30 There is no
significant relation between bank credit to primary or secondary sector and newspaper
penetration. Not surprisingly, primary credit to SDP (and thus rural credit) is signifi-
cantly associated with trend breaks of rural branching program, while neither credit to
the secondary nor the tertiary sectors are. Overall, this suggests that financial liberal-
ization after 1991 resulted in financial deepening benefitting mostly the tertiary sector.
30Compared to the regressions in Tables 2.3 and 2.5, we lose 5 years of data, because our sectoral credit
data is not available in 1984-1986, 1988 and 1995.
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1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
year
 Primary sector  Secondary sector  Tertiary sector
Figure 2.6: Sectoral credit to SDP in India over time —This figure shows the trends in sector-
wise credit to SDP. The primary sector consists of agriculture, fishing, forestry, mining and quarrying;
the secondary sector is composed of manufacturing, construction, electricity, gas and water; and the
tertiary sector is all services including trade, hotels and restaurants, transport, communication, storage,
banking, insurance, real estate, ownership of dwelling, business services, public administration, and
other services. The definitions and sources of all variables are in the appendix.
Table 2.12: Poverty and Tertiary sector credit. —This table presents the second stage of
instrumental variable regressions estimated by LIML method. The estimated regression equation is the
same as Table 2.5. The instrumented values are obtained from first stage regressions in Table 2.11. All
independent variables are lagged by one period. Standard errors clustered at state and year level are in











(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag of Tertiary Credit to SDP -0.147** -0.083** -0.008 -0.023
(0.075) (0.035) (0.065) (0.025)
Lag of Branches per capita -0.159 -0.086 0.043 0.067
(0.175) (0.074) (0.056) (0.059)
Observations 270 270 270 270
R-squared -0.051 -0.078 -0.006 -0.056
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Over ID test 0.624 0.173 0.489 0.092
OID P-value 0.430 0.678 0.484 0.761
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In Table 2.12, we replicate the Table 2.5 regressions, using tertiary Credit to SDP
rather than overall Credit to SDP, instrumented by English newspaper penetration in
1991 interacted with a post-1991 time trend. Our Table 2.5 results are confirmed using
this sectoral credit measure. Tertiary Credit to SDP enters negatively and significantly
in the regressions of Rural Headcount and Rural Poverty Gap, but not in the regressions
of the Urban Headcount or Poverty Gap. As in Table 2.5, branch penetration does
not enter significantly. The coefficient sizes of Tertiary Credit to SDP are only slightly
smaller than those of overall Credit to SDP in Table 2.5.
While we provide statistically and economically strong evidence on the relationship
between financial deepening following the 1991 liberalization, geographic-sectoral migra-
tion trends and reductions in poverty rates, we have to be careful on our interpretation.
Our results do not imply that the increase in credit to the tertiary sector is purely
supply-driven. Rather, we interpret our findings as suggesting that financial deepen-
ing has supported growth opportunities in the tertiary sector by providing credit to
enterprises in this sector, which in turn through labor market effects resulted in the
geographic-sectoral migration documented above.
2.5. Conclusion
Academics and policy makers disagree on the effect of financial liberalization and deep-
ening on poverty levels. While some argue that the benefits of liberalization accrue to
the upper income segments, others point to pro-poor effects of financial liberalization,
by fostering entrepreneurship, human capital accumulation or important labor market
effects. Our findings speak directly to this debate.
Using state-level indicators on financial depth, branch penetration and poverty for
1983 to 2005 across 15 Indian states, we show a negative relationship between financial
deepening post-1991 and rural poverty. Exploring different channels, we find evidence
that the poverty reduction effects of financial deepening fell on the self-employed in rural
areas. We also find evidence that financial liberalization resulted in inter-state migration
towards states with deeper financial systems, benefiting the rural primary and urban
tertiary sectors. Together, these results suggest two related effects of financial deepening
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in rural areas: fostering entrepreneurship and migration of the poorest towards financially
more developed states. Consistent with the migration trend into the urban tertiary sector
we also find that the pro-poor effects of financial deepening are associated with credit to
the tertiary sector only.
Our findings suggest that financial deepening can have important structural effects,
including through structural reallocation and migration, with consequences for poverty
reduction. The pro-poor effects of financial development are multi-faceted and can arise
through different channels. There is some evidence that financial development can reduce
poverty through fostering entrepreneurship, although this does not necessarily happen
through more inclusive but rather more efficient systems. We also show that financial
deepening can result in important labor market and migration effects. These effects are
consistent with findings by Beck et al. (2010) for the U.S. and Giné and Townsend (2004)
for Thailand. On the other hand, we cannot find significant evidence for a human capital
channel of financial deepening on poverty reduction.
Our paper has important policy repercussions. The pro-poor effects of financial deep-
ening do not necessarily come just through more inclusive financial systems, but can also
come through more efficient and deeper financial systems. Critically, the poorest of the
poor not only benefit from financial deepening by directly accessing financial services,








using NSSO surveys +
Datt et al (1996)
Proportion of the population below the poverty line in rural
areas
Rural Poverty gap
Mean distance of the poor from the poverty line –normalized
by poverty line– in rural areas
Urban Headcount
Proportion of the population below the poverty line in urban
areas
Urban Poverty gap
Mean distance of the poor from the poverty line –normalized
by poverty line– in urban areas
Credit to SDP
Burgess & Pande
(2005) + Besley &
Burgess (2004) + up-
dates from the Reserve
Bank of India (RBI)
(http://dbie.rbi.org.in)
Credit given by scheduled commercial banks over net state
domestic product. Credit data is taken from Burgess & Pande
(2005) till 2000 and updated to 2005 using RBI’s data. Net
state domestic product is provided in Besely & Burgess (2004)
till 2002 and is available at EOPP website. For the remaining
years it is updated using RBI’s data.
Branches per capita
RBI’s publications Di-
rectory of Bank Offices
(http://dbie.rbi.org.in)









Net state domestic product per person.
Rural population
EOPP + updates from
Indian census
Share of rural population to total. Constructed using census
data from the five censuses for 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001.
Between any two successive censuses, the state-sectoral popu-
lations are assumed to grow at a constant rate, derived from
the respective census population totals.
Government exp. /
SDP
EOPP + updates from
RBI
Total state government expenditures over net state domestic
product
Literacy rate
EOPP + updates from
Indian census
Proportion of persons who can both read and write in any lan-
guage among population aged 7 years and above. Constructed
using census data from the five censuses for 1961, 1971, 1981,
1991, 2001. Between any two successive censuses, the state-
sectoral populations are assumed to grow at a constant rate,




EOPP + updates from
indiastat.com




EOPP + updates from
indiastat.com
Circulation of non-English newspaper over total population
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Variable Source Definition




of Banks and Banking
Statistics 1972-2002 .
Credit given by scheduled commercial banks to the primary
sector over net state domestic product of primary sector (agri-
culture, fishing, forestry, mining and quarrying). The data is
from RBI’s online publications Basic Statistical Returns of
Banks and Banking Statistics 1972-2002. The data is on an
annual basis under the heading Occupation-wise Classification
of Credit, but not available for the full sample period and has
some missing value in between. The classification of occupa-
tion is different from NSDP, so we divide them to three main
groups to construct the depth measures: primary (agriculture,
mining and quarrying), secondary (industry excluding mining
and quarrying, electricity, gas, and water) and tertiary (the
rest minus personal loans).




of Banks and Banking
Statistics 1972-2002
(http://dbie.rbi.org.in)
Credit given by scheduled commercial banks to the secondary
sector over net state domestic product of secondary sector
(manufacturing, construction, electricity, gas and water). The
classification of occupation is different from NSDP, so we di-
vide them to three main groups to construct the depth mea-
sures: primary (agriculture, mining and quarrying), secondary
(industry excluding mining and quarrying, electricity, gas, and
water) and tertiary (the rest minus personal loans).




of Banks and Banking
Statistics 1972-2002
(http://dbie.rbi.org.in)
Credit given by scheduled commercial banks to the tertiary
sector over net state domestic product of tertiary sector (trade,
hotels and restaurants, transport, communication, storage,
banking, insurance, real estate, ownership of dwelling, busi-
ness services, public administration, and other services). The
classification of occupation is different from NSDP, so we di-
vide them to three main groups to construct the depth mea-
sures: primary (agriculture, mining and quarrying), secondary
(industry excluding mining and quarrying, electricity, gas, and
water) and tertiary (the rest minus personal loans).












Proportion of the population below the poverty line among
(1) self-employed in non-agriculture
(2) self-employed in agriculture
(3) agricultural labors
(4) other labors
(5) non-active population which not fitting in the above four
categories
Proportion of
illiterates / up to
primary / middle




Share of illiterates / literate people who at most have a pri-
mary school degree / a middle school degree / high school
degree and above in total population
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(2) state s in year t from the same states to the total number
of households sampled in state s.
(3) Inter-state
migration
(3) state s in year t from other states to the total number of
households sampled in state s.
(4) Migration from
rural to rural
(4) rural areas of state s in year t from rural areas (either the




(5) urban areas of state s in year t from rural areas (either the




(6) rural areas of state s in year t from urban areas (either the




(7) urban areas of state s in year t from urban areas (either the




(8) primary sector of state s in year t to the total number of
households sampled in state s.
(9) Migration to
secondary
(9) secondary sector of state s in year t to the total number
of households sampled in state s.
(10) Migration to
tertiary
(10) tertiary sector of state s in year t to the total number of




Reason for migration of immigrants is one of the following cat-
egories: search for employment, search for better employment,










Monthly expenditure of household over household size
Development
exp./SDP
EOPP + updates from
RBI
State government development expenditures over net state do-
mestic product
Trade openness Marjit et al. (2007)
A time varying index to measure the openness of states to
trade with other countries. It is available from 1980 to 2002.
Labor regulation Gupta et al. (2009)
States are divided into flexible, neutral, and inflexible labor
regulation. The categories are based on Besley and Burgess
(2002).




Percentage of votes received by the ruling coalition in the fed-
eral election. It is available from 1991-2009 at the state level.




Percentage of seats received by the ruling coalition in the fed-
eral election. It is available from 1991-2009 at the state level.




Unit cost of electric power supply in Paise/kwh. The data
is drawn from two reports on the working of state electricity
boards and electricity department (2001-02 and 2011-12), pre-
pared by Planning Commission, (Power & Energy Division),
Government of India. The first report in 2001-2 includes data
between 1974 and 2001 and the second one covers 2007-2010.
For 2002-2006 we generate data using linear interpolation.
Road density
Ghosh & Prabir (2005)
+ updates from CSO
Total length of roads in km per 1000 km2. It includes
both surfaced and unsurfaced roads. Data is available in
Ghosh & Prabir (2005) for 1990-96. Updates for 1998-
2008 are drawn from infrastructure statistics published by
Central Statistical Organization (CSO) and available at:
http://www.transportindia.org, and http://mospi.nic.in/
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2.B. Construction of poverty and migration variables
Poverty and migration measures are calculated using socioeconomic surveys of India. The
National Sample Survey Office or NSSO is the largest organization in India conducting
regular socio-economic surveys. The schedule 1.0 of each round is a survey of household
consumer expenditures which has been carried out in India since 1950s. However, prior
to 1990s, they were not evenly spaced and sampled. The “thick” (large-sample) rounds
are conducted about every five years and some “thin” rounds are in between. Datt et al.
(1996) provides the time series of state-wise headcount and poverty gap measures from
1951-1992. Since 1986, NSSO has started to conduct and make available “thin” surveys
on an annual basis and thick surveys every five years. We obtain the data of 20 rounds
(38, 43, and 45 to 62) and among them; the thick surveys are 38th, 43th, 50th, 55th,
and 61th rounds. For the missing years, we make use of Datt et al. (1996) data.31
round time span round time span round time span round time span
38 1983 48 Jan-Dec1992 53 Jan-Dec1997 58 July-Dec2002
43 July87-June88 49 Jan-June1993 54 Jan-June1998 59 Jan-Dec2003
45 July89-June90 50 July93-June94 55 July99-June2000 60 Jan-June2004
46 July90-June91 51 July94-June95 56 july2000-june01 61 July04-June05
47 July-Dec1991 52 July95-June96 57 July2001-June02 62 July05-June06
The NSSO’s household expenditure survey has a variety of data at household level. It
provides information on expenditure patterns, employment (self-employed, labor, etc.),
education, occupation, and some other characteristics of households and individuals
which enable us to compute a variety of within group measures. It covers all Indian
states and follows the Indian Census definition of urban and rural areas. To be classified
urban, an area needs to meet several criteria regarding size and density of the population,
and the share of male working population engaged in non-agricultural pursuits. However,
the surveys are not quite the same and to make comparable indices over time, we make
two adjustments: one for a methodology change and the other for seasonal effects.
There was a change in recall period of surveys in 51th to 54th rounds. Until the round
50 and after the round 55 food, tobacco and intoxicant items were asked and reported by a
30-day recall period, but in the rounds 51 to 54 two sub-samples are defined: one with 30-
31The data is available at: http://go.worldbank.org/YMRH2NT5V0. We use their data for 1960-82 and
1984-87.
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day and the other with 7-day recall period for those items.32 Deaton (2003) and Tarozzi
(2007) show that there is an upward bias in total expenditures when the recall period is
shorter. To achieve comparability, they suggest using the goods with unchanging recall
period to find the true distribution of total expenditures. With plausible assumptions,
Tarozzi (2007) shows that if τ represents survey type, and v is the bundle of goods that
have the same recall period (non-food items), the distributions of income y in the two
sub-samples have the following relation
f(y|τ = 1) = f(y|τ = 0)× E
[P (τ = 1|v)P (τ = 0)
P (τ = 0|v)P (τ = 1)
∣∣∣y, τ = 0] (2.4)
Where P (τ |v) is estimated by a logit regression. Using this approach, we impute the
correct poverty measures of the rounds 51 to 54.
The second adjustment is done for removing seasonal bias. The timing of NSS rounds
shows that the surveys are not distributed evenly across time. Moreover, most rounds
are conducted in two adjacent years. Therefore, poverty estimation using each survey
separately poses two problems: First, it is not for one exact year, but the rest of variables
in the paper are year-specific. Second, some surveys do not cover four seasons (like rounds
47), so the expenditures have a seasonal bias in them. To control for these problems,
we estimate the indices for each season (sub-round) and then average them over each
specific year. Before 1987, we just have data of 1983, but after 1987 the missing points are
fewer (14 of 78), so we interpolate seasonal data after 1987 using Cubic Spline method.
This method is a common way to impute high-frequency data from low-frequency (like
seasonal from annual). If we have n point and n-1 space in between, this method assigns
a cubic polynomial for each space to connect the two points and forces all first and second
derivatives to be continuous at margins.
In order to estimate state-level headcount and poverty gap, we utilize the same
poverty line as Özler et al. (1996) because our measures are updated for 1960-82 and
1984-87 using their data. The poverty line is recommended by the Planning Commis-
sion in 1993 based on calorie intake and adjusted for other years using price indices (for
details, see notes of Özler et al., 1996). The Planning commission also has separate
estimates of poverty line based on calorie intake in 1983, 1987, 1999, and 2004. As an
32In the round 55 these items were asked with both of the recall periods independently and we used the
30-day data.
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Table 2.B.1: Headcount ratio using different poverty lines.
Headcount ratio our estimations (2004)
official estimations
(2004-05)









Andhra Pradesh 9.51 8.20 32.08 7.5 32.3
Assam 14.21 14.72 34.21 17 36.4
Bihar 29.94 31.34 50.30 32.9 55.7
Gujarat 14.87 12.54 37.70 13.9 39.1
Haryana 7.20 6.63 20.91 9.2 24.8
Karnataka 13.92 11.22 31.68 12 37.5
Kerala 8.16 8.40 16.48 9.6 20.2
Madhya Pradesh 23.17 25.64 46.93 29.8 53.6
Maharashtra 19.16 16.36 40.08 22.2 47.9
Orissa 28.28 35.24 56.29 39.8 60.8
Punjab 4.60 4.60 18.70 5.9 22.1
Rajasthan 18.12 11.73 33.20 14.3 35.9
Tamil Nadu 14.19 14.33 33.47 16.9 37.5
Uttar Pradesh 18.90 21.88 35.83 25.3 42.7
West Bengal 12.97 18.42 30.82 24.2 38.2
alternative, we take these measures and interpolate the line using price indices for the
years in between and re-estimate headcount and poverty gap. Our results are robust to
this adjustment with a slight change in the level (not significance) of the coefficients.
More recent poverty lines for 1993-04 and 2004-05 are presented in Radhakrishna, Sen-
gupta, and Tendulkar (2011). Compared to the older lines their estimates are based on
normative expenditure on food, education, and health and are higher than calorie intake
lines. Nevertheless, applying these lines (price adjusted for the other years) results in a
parallel increase in the poverty measure across states with no change in the qualitative
results of our regressions. Table 2.B.1 shows the state-level headcount measures in 2004
using the two new poverty lines and compares it with official estimates. The small differ-
ence between the two groups is mainly due to seasonal adjustment because our estimates
for 2004 includes the first half of 2004-05 and the second half of 2003-04 surveys. Table
2.B.2 presents our main IV regressions with the poverty estimates by the two new lines
which show that the poverty-reducing effect of credit is robust to different poverty lines.
The migration surveys has been conducted in 5 rounds by NSSO since 1980 including
1983 (round 38, schedule 10), 1987-88 (round 43, schedule 10), 1993 (round 49, schedule
1.2), 1999-2000 (round 55, schedule 10), 2007-08 (round 64, schedule 10.2). Using these
surveys the migration measures are estimated.
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Table 2.B.2: IV results of Table 2.5 using different poverty lines.
Poverty line Planning commission Radhakrishna et al.
Rural HC Rural PG Rural HC Rural PG
Lag of Credit to SDP -0.188** -0.082** -0.614** -0.295**
(0.083) (0.036) (0.270) (0.137)
Lag of Branches per capita -0.050 -0.094 0.412 0.200
(0.246) (0.107) (0.711) (0.293)
Observations 345 345 345 345
R-squared -0.004 0.009 0.220 0.172
Over ID P-value 0.332 0.427 0.509 0.416
2.C. Additional robustness tests
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Informality and Access to
Finance: Evidence from India33
3.1. Introduction
A large share of private sector activity in developing countries takes place outside the
formal economy. On the one hand, working in informality implies lower regulatory and
tax burden. On the other hand, informal firms have limited access to formal services
like the legal system and they are less likely to hire skilled labor (LaPorta and Shleifer,
2014). Critically, informality is often associated with lack of access to formal sources
of external finance, as both theory and empirical work has shown (Beck, Lin, and Ma,
2014; Straub, 2005). It is not clear, however, whether this relationship is a causal one
and, if yes, what the driving factor is. Does lack of access to formal finance discourage
entrepreneurs from entering the formal economy or does informality prevent them from
accessing formal finance? How different is the effect of financial deepening on formal and
informal firms? This paper exploits state-year variation within Indian manufacturing to
disentangle the relationship between different types of informality and different dimen-
sions of financial sector development, notably financial depth (commercial bank credit
to SDP) and financial outreach (branch penetration). Following the seminal work by
Rajan and Zingales (1998), we exploit cross-industry variation in the need for external
finance to control for endogeneity biases, as well as instrumental variables.
Informality has different dimensions and can be voluntary or involuntary. From one
perspective, some firms or workers exit from the formal sector based on a private cost-
benefit analysis of formality, while others are excluded from state benefits because of
high registration costs and regulatory burden (Perry, 2007). From a different angle,
informality has both inter-firm and intra-firm margins. At the inter-firm margin, some
33This chapter is coauthored with Thorsten Beck.
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firms, working “underground”, completely hide from the state. Others, at the intra-firm
margin, are partly formal and partly informal which usually happens in the form of
misreported sales and hidden workers. In this paper, we focus on the inter-firm margin
of informality, i.e. the exclusion of enterprises from the formal economy, be it voluntarily
or involuntarily.
Previous research has shown important links between access to finance and the inci-
dence of informality. On the theoretical level, Straub (2005) presents a comprehensive
model of a firm’s decision between formality and informality, which includes the deci-
sion to tap formal or informal financial markets and shows how the different constraints
discussed in the empirical literature affect the threshold size of a company indifferent
between formality and informality. In this paper, we use a similar conceptual framework
for addressing different dimensions of informality. Consider an economy in which firms
(or entrepreneurs) are heterogeneous in initial capital k and can work in either formal or
informal sector. The productivity is higher in the formal sector, due to access to formal
services; however, firms have to pay an entry cost to overcome the barrier of formality.
This barrier includes registration costs, indivisibility of investment and formal property
claims, where the latter enables entrepreneurs to use her assets as collateral and thus
gain access to formal finance. Figure 3.1 plots the production versus initial capital of a
firm in the formal and the informal sector. The marginal production of capital is decreas-
ing and given the real rental price, the profit maximization in the informal sector yields
the optimal use of capital as k∗. The intersection of the iso-profit line of k∗ and formal
production curve gives the level of initial capital k̄ above which firms decide to work in
formal sector. Based on the firm’s decision, three different regions can be distinguished.
In the right area, firms become formal and have the highest production and profitabil-
ity. In the middle, although formality is possible, the optimal choice is producing in the
informal sector; entrepreneurs thus voluntarily self-exclude from formality. The left area
stands for firms not possessing enough capital to work formally and therefore excluded
from the formal sector.
In this setting, better access to financial services helps reduce informality through
two different channels:
(A) Increase transparency : Access to finance makes the operation of the enterprise












Figure 3.1: forced and voluntary informality of firms.
problems between lender and borrowers, thus facilitating the use of formal finance
and other formal services. In this way, financial development helps the firm to
overcome the barriers of formality shifting the formal sector production curve to
the left (Figure 3.2a).
(B) Enhance productivity : By facilitating transactions using short-term credit and
funding long-term investment, financial development shifts the productivity of
formal firms upwards, while it has no significant effect on informal firms, thus
increasing the benefits of producing in the formal sector (Figure 3.2b).
The transparency channel helps credit constrained firms increase their credibility to
overcome barriers into the formal sector and thus reduces the incidence of informality.
In contrast, the productivity channel has two effects on informality: (i) it increases
the production of the formal sector for a fixed level of initial wealth; (ii) it reduces
the opportunistic informality and the number of firms that voluntarily produce in the
informal sector. We expect a differential importance of these channels across firms of
different sizes: Channel (A) is the main mechanism through which finance affects small
firms, which the literature has shown to be most likely to be credit constrained (e.g.
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2006; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2005).
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Figure 3.2: Two effects of financial development on informality: (a) reducing barriers to
formality, (b) increasing productivity
In contrast, the impact of financial development on firms possessing large fixed assets
is through Channel (B). Moreover, we expect both channels to be stronger in industries
that are more dependent on external finance.
We examine these hypotheses using Indian manufacturing data. After examining
the overall effect of financial development on the incidence of informality, we inspect
whether it helps removing formality barriers, by focusing on small firms that are more
likely to be excluded from the formal sector. To control for endogeneity biases related
to reverse causation and omitted variables, we follow the seminal work by Rajan and
Zingales (1998) and exploit cross-industry variation in the need for external finance.
Using a difference-in-difference set-up, we gauge whether firms in industries more reliant
on external finance are more likely to be formal in states and years with higher levels of
financial development. This allows us to control for demand-side effects and for other
factors co-varying on the state-year level with financial deepening.
We gauge the effect of financial development on both intensive and extensive mar-
gins of the formal sector, i.e. the number of firms and the total production share, and
thus both channels discussed above, and focus on two different dimensions of financial
development, namely depth, proxied by Credit to SDP, and outreach, proxied by branch
penetration. Financial depth relates to the overall credit volume in the economy, in-
dependent of which enterprises have access to credit. A high credit volume could thus
be mapped to different loan size distributions, including loans mainly to large firms.
Financial or bank outreach relates to the ease of access to financial services, including
credit. Given the importance of geographic proximity in lending relationships especially
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of smaller firms (Degryse and Ongena, 2005), we conjecture that small firms stand to
benefit more from financial outreach than large firms. Although these dimensions are
not mutually exclusive, the emphasis of one over the other can lead to different policy
recommendations.
Our results suggest that both dimensions of financial development are important for
increasing the share of formal production in manufacturing. Financial outreach helps
reduce formality barriers and thus increases the number of formal firms (channel A),
whereas financial depth mainly affects informality through channel (B), increasing pro-
ductivity of industries dependent on external finance. We also find that this effect is
stronger for small firms in the case of financial outreach while financial depth is associ-
ated with the incidence of formality of larger firms.
This paper contributes to several literatures. First, we add to the literature on infor-
mality. An extensive literature has shown that informality almost always has negative
consequences on the aggregate level. In addition to lack of access to formal services,
hiding from the government increases distortions and reduces productivity (Gordon and
Li, 2009). On the other hand, informality can indirectly hamper firm growth through
lack of infrastructure caused by deficits in the government revenue (Kleven, Kreiner, and
Saez, 2009). Based on the World Bank Enterprise Surveys, LaPorta and Shleifer (2014)
find high levels of informality in developing countries. One of the important differences
between formal and informal enterprises is that around 44 percent of informal enterprises
list access to financing as the main obstacle of doing business, whereas this number is 21
and 14 percent for small and large formal enterprises, respectively. They also document
a large productivity gap between formal and informal firms. In line with this, Hsieh
and Olken (2014) show sharp differences in productivity and human capital of managers
between formal and informal firms. Our paper investigates how variation in financial
sector development across states and over time within India can explain incidence of
informality and productivity differences between the formal and informal sectors.
This paper is also related to a small but growing literature on the determinants of
informality, most of which focus on specific factors that can explain the incidence and
extent of informality. The literature has focused on different areas to explain informality
and tax evasion. First, high tax rates and other burdensome regulations increase cost
and reduce benefits of formality (De Soto, 1990; Loayza, 1996; Schneider, Buehn, and
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Montenegro, 2011; Schneider and Enste, 2000), although low taxation combined with
deficient public services can result in similar effects (Dabla-Norris, Gradstein, and In-
chauste, 2008; Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton, 2000; Johnson, Kauf-
mann, McMillan, and Woodruff, 2000). The relationship between labor market rigidities
and informality, on the other hand, seems to be relatively robust (Botero, Djankov,
Porta, and Lopez-de Silanes, 2004; Loayza, 1996), as is the effect of entry regulations
(Djankov et al., 2003; Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan, 2006). Second, weak institutions
that allow rent seeking and predatory behavior by government officials drive firms into
informality, an explanation often applied to post-transition economies in Eastern Europe
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993, 1994). A third explanation is that firms try to hide their
profits from criminal gangs (Frye and Zhuravskaya, 2000). Fourth, deficiencies in the
legal framework (Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton, 1998) reduce the benefits of
formality – being able to enforce contracts through the court system and thus being
able to deal with a broader set of trading partners at arms-length. In our empirical
assessment, we thus have to discriminate between legal system deficiencies and financial
sector development not related to the legal system. Finally, several empirical papers
have shown the importance of financial constraints in explaining variation in informality.
A recent cross-country study shows that firms are more likely to produce in the formal
sector in countries with more effective credit registries and higher branch penetration,
an effect that is stronger for smaller and geographically more remote firms and firms in
industries with a higher dependence on external finance (Beck et al., 2014). Compared to
this literature, we exploit within-country variation in financial development and compare
the effect of two different dimensions of financial development, depth and outreach.
Second, we add to a large literature on the real effects of financial deepening. Starting
with King and Levine (1993), a large literature using different aggregation levels and
measures of financial depth has shown a positive relationship between financial depth
and economic growth, a relationship that goes more through productivity growth than
capital accumulation (e.g., Beck, Levine, and Loayza, 2000). While the recent crisis and
recent studies have shown important non-linearities (e.g., Arcand, Berkes, and Panizza,
2012), there seems a wide-spread consensus in the literature on a strong effect of financial
deepening on economic growth for developing countries, such as India. The literature
has also related financial development to financing obstacles of small and medium-sized
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enterprises, showing that obstacles are lower in countries with higher levels of financial
development (Beck et al., 2006) and that these obstacles are less growth constraining
in countries with deeper financial systems (Beck et al., 2005). Our paper adds to this
literature by relating within-country variation in financial development to the incidence
of formality, thus another important channel through which financial sector development
can impact the level and structure of GDP. Unlike previous papers, we also distinguish
specifically between the two dimensions of financial depth (focus of most of the finance
and growth literature) and financial outreach.
Finally, our paper also adds to a flourishing literature on economic development in
India, which has linked sub-national variation in historic experiences and policies to dif-
ferences in growth, poverty levels, political outcomes and other dependent variables (see
Besley et al., 2007 for an earlier survey). Specifically, researchers have focused on differ-
ences in political accountability (Besley and Burgess, 2002; Pande, 2003), labor market
regulation (Besley and Burgess, 2004; Dougherty et al., 2011; Hasan et al., 2007), land re-
form (Besley and Burgess, 2000; Iyer and Banerjee, 2005), trade liberalization (Topalova,
2010) and gender inequality (Iyer et al., 2012). Directly related to our paper, Burgess
and Pande (2005) relate a social banking policy on branching to differences in poverty
alleviation across states. Ayyagari, Beck, and Hoseini (2013) explore the relationship be-
tween financial deepening post-1991 liberalization and poverty-levels. Our paper adds to
this literature by focusing on cross-state differences in financial deepening after the 1991
liberalization episode and by comparing the effects of two different dimensions of finan-
cial development – total credit volume and branch penetration of financial institutions –
on the incidence of informality.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data
we will be using and section 3.3 the methodology. Section 3.4 discusses our results and
section 3.5 concludes.
3.2. Data
This section describes the different data sources and variables we use to gauge the re-
lationship between the incidence of informality and access to formal sources of external
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finance. Specifically, this section describes (i) the indicators of informality, (ii) the indi-
cators of financial depth and outreach, and (iii) the industry characteristics that allow
us to gauge the differential impact of financial sector development on the incidence of
informality across different industries.
3.2.1. Gauging the incidence of informality
We use firm-level surveys for the formal and informal sectors to construct gauges of
the incidence of informality on the state-industry level. Specifically, we have available
data for the Indian manufacturing sector for 5 years: 1989-90, 1994-95, 2000-01, 2005-
06, and 2010-11. Each year has two data sources: (i) the annual survey of industries
(ASI) and (ii) the national sample survey on unorganized manufacturing sectors (NSS).
The ASI covers factories employing above 10 employees using power and those with 20
employees or more without using power. In each year, all factories with more than 100
employees plus at least 12% of the rest are sampled. The sample is representative at
the state and 4-digit NIC code levels.34 The second data source is the NSS enterprise
survey which covers small manufacturing units that are not covered by ASI. Its sampling
strategy is based on the number of enterprises in each village/town which is computed
using the most recent Economic Census.35 Sample weights which show the number of
firms the sample represents are provided for both surveys. Table 3.1 shows the number
of observations for each ASI and NSS surveys across the five waves.36
Table 3.1: list of surveys and the number of samples
year 1989-90 1994-95 2000-01 2005-06 2010-11
No. sample in ASI 49,323 57,908 37,055 49,637 46,843
No. sample in NSS 123,321 192,029 222,529 80,637 99,243
To gauge the incidence of informality, we use two dummy variables at the enterprise
level. The first one refers to general registration and indicates whether the enterprise is
34Up to 4-digit level, the NIC code is identical in structure to International Standard of Industrial
Classification (ISIC). In the additional digits, it incorporates the national characteristics.
35Economic Census is a complete count of all economic units in the country synchronized with the house
listing operations of the Population Census. The 6 rounds Economic censuses in India are conducted in
1977, 1980, 1990, 1998, 2005, and 2012. NSS surveys of manufacturing enterprises in the unorganized
sector are conducted as a follow up of each Economic Census. The detailed information about the
sample design of each survey is available at http://mospi.nic.in/.
36Given the variation in NSS coverage, we are concerned that the surveyed firm population might vary
significantly over time. When comparing the share of firms in externally dependent industries across
the five survey waves, however, we cannot any significant trend correlation with NSS coverage.
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registered under any act or authority. The second one is tax registration and indicates
whether the firm is registered with the tax authorities or not. All sampled firms in ASI
are registered under the Factories Act and are taxpayers. The NSS sample surveys have
information about registration under any act or agency. We can find out about tax
registration by checking whether the firm pays any sales tax (distributive expenses) or
not. Thus, a firm is registered for tax if it is in ASI or it is in NSS and has nonzero
distributive expenses. We do not have information about tax registration or payment in
NSS 89, and therefore, we use this year just for the regression of general registration.
One concern regarding the validity of formality measures is whether firms truth-
fully state their registration status. To control for such a bias, both ASI and NSS are
conducted independent of tax purposes and no information about the identity of the
enterprise is passed to other agencies.37 In addition, although the honesty of firms can
be questioned for tax registration, there is no meaningful incentive to overstate the reg-
istration status under other agencies. In the NSS surveys, there are at least ten listed
authorities under which the firm can be registered,38 most of which are designed to help
SME growth and provide a variety of services and facilities such as training, technological
and financial assistance, etc. Hence, the general registration index is less vulnerable to
misreporting bias and measurement error and we will focus on it for the most part of
our empirical work.
We use the information on firms’ registration status to construct six different indi-
cators of informality on the aggregate level. Panel A of Table 3.2 shows the weighted
averages of the different registration indices in each year. The first two rows show general
and tax registration rate among firms. Each observation is weighted with the number of
firms it represents. The general registration rate increased from 8 percent to 12 percent
between 1989 and 1994, declined in 2000 and 2005 to 10 percent, before it went up again
to 15 percent in 2010. The tax registration rate slightly increased till 2005 but doubled
from 2005 to 2010, when around 3 percent of firms were registered with tax authorities.
Considering the value-added share of formal and informal firms instead of the numbers
37It is highlighted in the questionnaires that “according to the Collection of Statistics Act, violation of
any of the confidentiality and secrecy of the information by statistics officer or field staff is prosecuted
by or with the consent of appropriate agency.”
38Some examples are District Industries Centre as Small Scale Industry (SSI), Khadi and Village In-
dustries Commission, Council for Technological Upgradation, Small Industries Development Bank,
Development Commissioners of handicraft/handloom/jute, Coir/Silk Board.
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gives a somewhat different picture. In rows (3) and (4) we present the weighted sum of
the value-added of registered firms divided by the weighted sum of the value-added of
all firms. The numbers indicates that although the number of registered and tax-paying
firms is small, they comprise a big and growing slice of the value added in the manufac-
turing sector, reaching 91 and 78 percent in 2010, respectively. Finally, the numbers in
rows (5) and (6) are employment shares of formal firms which equal the weighted sum
of the number of workers of registered firms over the weighted sum of the workers of all
firms. The trends in the value-added and employment is similar to the number of firms,
first dropping and then increasing again.
Table 3.2: Panel A – Summary of informality measures (weights are applied)
name Description 1989 1994 2000 2005 2010
(1) Reg percentage of registered under any act 7.72 11.78 10.63 10.30 15.05
(2) Treg percentage of registered under tax 1.34 1.65 1.71 3.21
(3) Vreg VA share of registered under any act (%) 80.80 83.76 79.94 85.54 91.48
(4) Vtreg VA share of registered under tax (%) 75.77 69.86 78.13 78.05
(5) Ereg employment of registered under any act (%) 24.58 33.83 32.49 32.407 45.42
(6) Etreg employment of registered under tax (%) 21.62 18.91 20.27 31.31
Panel B – Comparison of informality measures with official estimations.The base year for
the first three rows is 2005. The last row is to be compared with row (4) in the Panel A.
1989 1994 2000 2005 2010
Official Manufacturing GDP 38.9 49.3 72.8 100 160.6
Gross output 33.4 50.4 65.6 100 178.1
Gross value added 35.8 47.5 59.5 100 193.1
Official Registered Man. GDP (%) 63.2 61.6 67.5 69
To examine the robustness of our measure, we cross-check the overall numbers with
comparable GDP estimations of Indian manufacturing sector published by Central Sta-
tistical Office (CSO), Government of India. Panel B of Table 3.2 compares the official
estimation of net manufacturing GDP in India versus our estimations of gross output
and value-added, using 2005 as the base year. The official estimations are at constant
price and account for depreciation. We also normalize our estimated values by state
level price indices,39 but our measures are in gross terms. There are several reasons
for differences across the different variables. First, they might be due to differences in
price adjustment and depreciation. In addition, the CSO publishes net GDP data on
registered and unregistered manufacturing. Compared to our methodology, the CSO’s
39The price index is published by Labour Bureau as “consumer price index for industrial workers”.
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estimation is based on labor input and production per labor, counting just firms in ASI
as the registered sectors.40 Since we also take into account registered enterprises in the
NSS that are not covered in ASI, our estimates of formal production tend to be higher.
Nevertheless, we observe parallel trends in the value-added share of firm registered under
any act and in similar estimations by CSO.
Appendix Table 3.A.1 provides the average share of registered firms across industries,
both using general and tax registration and across the three dimensions of (i) share of
firms, (ii) share of value added and (iii) share of employees, as well as the number of firms
these averages are based on, averaged over the five survey waves. We note a substantial
variation across industries in the incidence of informality. While in petroleum refineries
81% of activities are undertaken in registered companies, only 3% of companies in the
tobacco industry are registered under any act and less than 0.5% are registered with tax
authorities, even though their share in total employment is over 11% and their share in
value added over 58%.
Appendix Table 3.A.2 provides similar information on the incidence of informality
across states, again averaging over the five survey waves. While over 40 percent of firms
are registered in Goa, only one percent are registered in Orissa. Figure 3.3a provides
graphical illustration of cross-state variation of registration average over time and indus-
tries and Figure 3.3b shows the average trend of registration rate over time.
We use these indices of informality on the firm-level to compute gauges of the in-
cidence of informality on the state-year-industry level. Specifically, we combine the
firm-level data of ASI and NSS and then collapse them at state-year-industry level us-
ing sample weights. Since our index of financial dependence is drawn from Rajan and
Zingales (1998), we aggregate our measures to the same industry categories that they
suggest. Our indicators of formality are based on the share of firms, share of value added
and share of employees, both for general registration and tax registration. Overall, we
have 35 states, 5 years, and 34 industries, but the number of observations is only 3,335
because smaller states do not host all industries. In the regressions, we have fewer ob-
servations because of missing data on some of the independent variables in some states,
industries and years. Table 3.3 Panel A provides the descriptive statistics on our indica-
40The methodology of CSO’s is described at: http://mospi.nic.in/Mospi_New/upload/brochure_
2004-05.pdf
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year
General registration rate Credit to SDP
Branches per capita
(b)
Figure 3.3: (a) registration rate across states. (b) registration rate, credit to SDP and
Branches per capita over time. The two vertical lines show two financial reforms in India in 1991
and 2006. Registration rate is scaled between 0 and 1 for better illustration.
tors. On average, 10.6 percent of firms are registered under any act, but only 2 percent
for tax authorities.
3.2.2. State level indicators of financial development and control variables
We construct several time-variant indicators of financial and economic development as
well as tax enforcement on the state-level. Panel A of Table 3.3 provides descriptive
statistics of the time-variant state-level variables. Appendix Table 3.A.2 provides state-
level averages of the different variables.
First, we use two indicators of financial sector development, capturing the two di-
mensions of financial depth and financial outreach. Specifically, Credit to SDP is the
outstanding amount of credit utilized in each state divided by State Domestic Product.
It corresponds to a standard cross-country indicator, Private Credit to GDP, which has
been extensively used in the finance-growth literature (e.g. Beck et al., 2000). Our mea-
sure of financial outreach is Branches per capita and is the number of bank branches
per 10,000 people in each state and year. Average Credit to SDP varies from 0.11 in
Nagaland and Manipur to 1.42 in Chandigarh, while branches per capita is 0.42 in Bihar
ranging up to 3.28 in Goa. Figure 3.3b shows that Private Credit increased rapidly after
1995, while branch penetration picked up after 2005. We will come back to these time





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In investigating the link between financial development and informality, we also con-
trol for other time-varying state characteristics. State Government Expenditure to SDP
is total state government expenses over SDP and tax enforcement per firm is the com-
ponent of state government expenditure on collection of taxes and duties divided by
the estimated number of firms in the state. Better public service provision and higher
tax enforcement might reduce the informality of enterprises. Government expenditures
average 19 percent of SDP, ranging from 0.071 in Delhi to 1.119 in Sikkim. Enforcement
expenditures per firm range from 0.052 in Maharashtra to 5.571 in Delhi. We also control
for SDP per capita which is the net state domestic product per capita at constant price
and a proxy for income levels, but since it is highly correlated with financial develop-
ment measure, we drop it in the main regressions, but confirm our findings in robustness
tests including it. SDP per capita ranges from 9146 in Bihar to 88845 in Chandigarh.
Finally, to control for the quality of state’s infrastructure for manufacturing establish-
ment, we control for unit cost of power defined as cost of electricity in Paise/KWH. The
data source for unit cost of power is Planning Commission’s two reports on the working
of state electricity boards and electricity department (2001-02 and 2011-12). All other
state-level control variables are drawn from Reserve Bank of India’s Data Warehouse.
3.2.3. Industry characteristics
To explore the differential effect of state-level policies on informality in different indus-
tries, we use an industry characteristic that captures the need for financial services and
thus the potential benefit of access to formal finance or opportunity costs of informal-
ity. Specifically, we use the RZ index of financial dependence which is from Rajan and
Zingales (1998) and equals the median of firm level measure “(capital expenditures cash
flow)/capital expenditure averaged over 1980s” for 34 industries. This indicator, com-
puted for a group of large listed enterprises in the U.S., for which the supply curve can
be expected to be almost perfectly elastic, is supposed to indicate the need for external
finance based on inherent industry characteristics and is exogenous to the actual use of
external finance by firms in India. As our sample period spans the 1990s and 2000s in
India and this measure is computed for the U.S. in the 1980s, concerns on different tech-
nologies in both countries might not be as critical. The level of dependence on external
finance shows the potential benefits for firms from being formal and having access to
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formal financial services. Appendix Table 3.A.1 shows that external dependence ranges
from -0.45 in tobacco to 1.49 in drugs.
In addition, we employ another industry-level index to capture the exogenous varia-
tion in tax compliance. The Indian taxation of enterprises comprises direct and indirect
taxation on both central and state level. While direct taxes are mainly levied by the
central government, the main source of states’ tax income is their sales tax. Union excise
duties on all manufacturing products and service tax on services are also levied by the
central government. Excise duties, covering all manufacturing products, turned to the
VAT – named MODVAT – in 1985 and expanded to ad-valorem rates in 1993 for the
majority of products. Hoseini (2014b) shows that under the value-added tax system,
upstream industries that are forwardly linked to others have higher risk of detection and
thus are more likely to be formal. As over the period of our study, the manufacturing
sector of India has been under the value-added tax, we measure the forward linkages
of each industry to capture the exogenous variation in the risk of noncompliance in the
value-added tax system. The forward linkages index, based on Hoseini (2014b), is the
row sum of Leontief inverse matrix of Indian economy reflecting the flow of products
going to other industries rather than final consumers. This index is calculated for each
industry using the input-output tables of the Indian economy. The I-O tables are avail-
able for 1993-94, 1998-99, and 2003-04 and we use the average of the index over time.
The indicator ranges from 0.27 in tobacco products to 2.57 in non-ferrous metals.
Panel B of Table 3.3 presents correlations across the different state-industry level vari-
ables. We find that the share of firms registered under any act or under tax authorities is
positively correlated with both financial sector indicators, with both industry character-
istics, with SDP per capita and with enforcement expenditures per firm and negatively
with government expenditures to SDP. Credit to SDP and branch penetration are posi-
tively correlated with each other, with a correlation coefficient of 58 percent. However,
other state-level variables are also significantly correlated with financial development.
Finally, external dependence and forward linkages are positively and significantly corre-
lated with each other, with a correlation coefficient of 0.5.
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3.3. Ocular econometrics and methodology
Before presenting regression results on the relationship between financial development
and informality, this section provides some preliminary facts about this relationship using
Indian manufacturing data and explains our methodology to identify the significance of
each channel.
3.3.1. Ocular econometrics
Figure 3.4 plots the general and tax registration rates versus our two financial develop-
ment variables across states. It can be seen that both financial variables have a positive
relationship with general and tax registration rates, but the observations of branches per
capita and tax registration are more concentrated along the fitted line, compared to the
other three relationships. Both relationships are significant at the 1 percent level for
branches per capita and at the 5 percent level for credit to SDP.
As shown in Figure 3.2a, theory suggests that one effect of access to finance on
informality is cutting the barrier to formality and enabling firms to overcome the costs
of formality. To identify this mechanism, we focus on the sample of smaller firms that
are more likely to be excluded from the formal sector. Figure 3.5 plots registration rates
versus our financial development indicators for the sample of smaller firms, defined as
establishments with fixed assets less than the 25th percentile of the respective industry
in each year. The figure suggests a positive relationship between formality and branches
per capita, with a higher slope than in the overall sample (significant at the 1 percent
level), while the relationship with credit to SDP is insignificant.
The second channel through which finance can alleviate informality is increasing
productivity of the formal sector (Figure 3.2b). As mentioned above, this channel has
two effects: reducing opportunistic informality and boosting the production of formal
sector firms. In order to identify this channel, we employ the exogenous variation in
the dependence on external finance among industries. In Figure 3.6, we compare the
registration and financial outreach relationship between two groups of industries: above
the 75th and below the 25th percentiles of the RZ index of financial dependence. It
can be clearly seen that the positive relationship is stronger for industries with larger
need for external finance suggesting less opportunistic informality in these industries.
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Figure 3.4: Registration rate vs. financial breadth and depth averaged over states
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Figure 3.5: Registration rate vs. financial breadth and depth averaged over states for
the Sample of firms with fixed assets below 25th percentile
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Figure 3.6: Registration rate, financial dependence and financial penetration averaged
over states
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Figure 3.7: Production, financial dependence and financial deepening in formal sector
(registered under any act) and informal sector (not registered for any act), averaged over
states.
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In Figure 3.7, we use the same structure to compare the link between production and
financial depth in the formal and informal sector. This figure shows that in the formal
sector, production of industries more reliant on external finance is highly sensitive to
credit to SDP (significant at 1 percent level), while this sensitivity is much less for other
industries. One the other hand, this pattern is much weaker and insignificant in the
informal sector.
3.3.2. OLS and difference-in-difference regressions
To formally estimate the overall effect of state-level financial development on registration
rates, we use different methodologies. First, we use the following difference-in-difference
setting as the baseline.
Infist = ai + bs + ct + α1FDst + α2Xst + εist (3.1)
where Infist is one of the informality indices in industry i, state s and year t. ai, bs , ct are
industry, state and year fixed effects, respectively, FDst is one of our two financial devel-
opment indicators in state s and year t, and Xst is a vector of control variables including
government expenditure to SDP, unit cost of power, and enforcement expenditure per
firm in state s and year t.
Because our regressions are for the whole of India, in each regression, we use the esti-
mated number of firms in state s, year t, and industry i as weights for the observations. In
addition, to control for the underestimated standard error in the difference-in-difference
setting, as suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004), we cluster our estimation at the state
level.
To estimate the differential effect of state-level financial development and enforcement
activity on the incidence of informality across firms with different needs for external
finance, we utilize the following difference-in-difference setting for estimation.
infist = ai + bs × ct + β1RZi × FDst + β2RZi ×Xst + β3FLi × Yst + εist (3.2)
where RZi is the Rajan-Zingales index of external dependence for industry i, and FLi is
forward linkage for industry i, Yst is a vector of state-level log of enforcement per firm,
and the rest of variables are the same as equation (3.1). By saturating the model with
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Figure 3.8: Comparison of the pattern of financial development and concentration of
externally dependent industries
industry and state-year fixed effects, we focus on the relative effect that time-variant
state-level variables have on the incidence of informality on the state-industry-year level.
In order to examine the productivity-enhancing effect of finance on the formal sector, we
use the same regression setup as (3.2), but instead of the incidence of formality, we use
the levels of production and value-added in formal and informal sectors as the dependent
variable.
One concern of using Rajan and Zingales methodology is the agglomeration of ex-
ternally dependent industries in the states with higher level of financial development
which reduces state-industry variation. To check whether industries more dependent on
external finance choose states with higher levels of financial development, in Figure 3.8,
we map the distribution of credit to SDP and share of externally dependent industries
across different states. The comparison of two figures suggests no local concentration of
externally dependent industries in financially developed states. The correlation between
external dependence on the state level (weighted by number of firms per industry) and
credit to SDP is 10 percent.
3.3.3. Instrumental variable strategy
In further analysis of the relationship between informality and access to finance, we em-
ploy an instrumental variable approach using two instruments for financial development
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in India. This enables us to better control for reverse causation and omitted variable
bias. In the period of our study, the financial sector of India experienced two major
reforms, though with important differences across Indian states. The first one is the
financial liberalization in 1990s which led to a rapid financial deepening in India, and
the second is the post-2006 financial inclusion reform. In the following, we first explain
the two policy changes, then specify the instruments and estimation methodology.
Indian Financial Liberalization
As documented in Ayyagari et al. (2013), following a severe balance of payments cri-
sis in 1991, there was a substantial liberalization of India’s financial sector as part of
an economy-wide liberalization process. These reforms included de-regulation of inter-
est rates, reduction in the volume of directed credit and entry of new privately-owned
financial institutions. Reforms of the regulatory and supervisory framework and the
contractual environment also supported financial deepening in the subsequent decades.
Figure 3.3b shows the trends of financial depth and outreach before and after the lib-
eralization. Although branches per capita almost remain constant for around 15 years
after 1991, Credit to SDP, after an initial fall in 1994, substantially increased for the
next years. As documented by Ayyagari et al. (2013), however, this financial deepen-
ing process was uneven across different Indian states. This heterogeneity over time and
across states provides us a rich identification tool that we can relate to variation in the
incidence of informality.
Following to Ayyagari et al. (2013), we link cross-state variation in the effects of
financial liberalization on financial deepening to cross-state variation in the media envi-
ronment. Free media and press help reduce information asymmetries between investors,
as well as enterprises and banks, in addition to its impact on the competitive environ-
ment in the financial and real sectors. To proxy for state-level media environment at the
time of financial liberalization, we use the same measure as Ayyagari et al. (2013) which
is per capita English newspaper circulation in 1991. According to Besley and Burgess
(2002), compared to other media, newspapers in India are relatively free and indepen-
dent. Indian newspapers are published in 22 languages among which English language
newspapers have greater national coverage and are more business and financial news
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Figure 3.9: Media environment at the time of liberalization and financial depth. The lines
show the weighted average of credit to SDP in the states in the respective quartile of per capita English
newspaper circulation.
oriented.41 Figure 3.9 illustrates the trend of Credit to SDP among different quartiles of
English newspaper circulation in 1991. The variation in the initial media environment is
strongly associated with the degree of financial deepening following to financial liberal-
ization and in the two top quartiles the slope is increasing over time. As a result, similar
to Ayyagari et al. (2013), we multiply the cross-state variation of per-capita circulation
of English newspapers in 1991 with a post-1991 time trend to capture the differential
impact of the media across time after liberalization in 1991 and use it as an instrument
for financial depth.
Financial Inclusion Reform in 2006
Providing access to finance for the poor has been a longstanding objective of the Indian
government. In 2006, the government of India introduced an ambitious reform aiming
at providing formal finance for every Indian citizen based on suggestions made by the
41Ayyagari et al. (2013) find a high correlation (88%) between circulation of English language newspaper
and business-oriented newspapers among Indian states in 2005-09. However, state-level data of cir-
culation of business-oriented newspapers is not available for 1991 and thus they use English language
newspaper circulation.
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Committee on Financial Inclusion (Rangajaran Committee),42 which recommended to
introduce correspondent banking system. The goal of correspondent banking was to
enable banks to use a third party agent to provide banking services on their behalf. This
meant banks were no longer required to open costly branches in less populated locations
and new branches could be established where the demand for service is enough. As
highlighted in the Recommendations of the Committee on Financial Inclusion, “Adoption
of appropriate technology would enable the branches to go where the customer is present
instead of the other way round.” Figure 3.3b shows that following to this reform branches
per capita sharply increased in the whole country between 2005 and 2010. In order to
use this trend break as an instrument, we need to find the cross-state heterogeneity in
the effectiveness of the reform. Since the emphasis on demand side factors was a main
pillar of reform in 2006, we expect more branch expansion in state that had higher initial
demand for credit. To measure the demand for credit at the time of the reform, we use
credit to SDP in 2005. Figure 3.10 graphs the growth rate of branches per capita in
2000-05 and 2005-10 across states versus initial demand for credit before 2006 reform.
The figure suggests that the rise in branch penetration in 2010 is higher in states that
had higher credit to SDP in 2005. This positive association, however, is much weaker
for 2000-2005, where the average growth rate is negative.43 Hence, we exploit this trend
break by interacting credit to SDP in 2005 with the year dummy of 2010 – the only
available year after the reform – as our instrument for branch penetration.
3.4. Empirical Results
This section reports the regression results. We will first discuss OLS regressions captur-
ing average effects across industries, before presenting difference-in-difference regressions
that gauge the differential effect of financial development on informality on industries
with different needs for external finance. We then report instrumental variable regres-
sions before turning to the effect of financial development on overall production.
42To see the details of recommendations visit http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=
35141
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Figure 3.10: Branches expansion before and after the financial inclusion reform and
demand for credit in 2005. Each observation represents one state. The growth rate is defined
as (yt+1 − yt)/yt in percentage term. The size of the observations is proportional to the number of
enterprises in the state in 2005. For better illustration states with less than 50,000 firms (estimated
using sample multiplier) are not shown in the graph.
3.4.1. OLS regressions
The results in Table 3.4 show the overall effect of financial development on the share of
firms registered under any act or tax authorities. While we find a significant relation-
ship between branches per capita and the share of formal enterprises registered under
tax authorities, Credit to SDP does not enter significantly in the two regressions. The
economic effect of the relationship between branch penetration and tax registration is
also significant. Specifically, the standard deviation of branches per capita de-trended
for state and year effects is 0.045 and this variation explains 0.045×8.411=0.38 percent-
age point in tax registration accounting for 15% of the standard deviation of the tax
registration de-trended for state, year and industry which is 2.57.
In Appendix Table 3.A.3, we estimate the same equation, but for sub-samples of firms
with smaller/bigger fixed assets to capture the effect of financial development on firms
that are more/less likely to be excluded from the formal sector. Specifically, we select
firms whose total fixed assets are below and above the 25th percentile of their industries in
85
Chapter 3: Informality and Access to Finance: Evidence from India
each year, and re-compute the informality measures and the sample weights.44 Columns
(1) to (4) show that for the sample of smaller firms the effect of financial outreach is
significant for both general and tax registration. Moreover, financial depth is positively
associated with tax registration but not significantly with general registration for smaller
firms. In terms of the economic size of the relationship, financial outreach has more
explanatory power for the incidence of informality than financial deepening. For instance,
for the sample of firms below 25th percentile, one de-trended standard deviation increase
in branches per capita and credit to SDP increases tax registration rate by 0.045×14.58
= 0.656 and 0.047×4.21 = 0.198 percentage point, respectively. In column (5) to (8) of
Table 3.A.3, however, we do not find a significant impact of financial outreach on general
registration rate of bigger firms with fixed assets more that 25th percentile and instead
credit to SDP becomes significant at 10% level.
Table 3.4: Financial depth vs. breadth and barriers to formality – state, year, and industry
fixed effects are included in all regressions. Number of firms is applied as weight in all regressions and






(1) (2) (3) (4)




Government exp./SDP 20.588 18.775 0.456 -0.362
(19.851) (18.787) (4.343) (4.166)
Unit cost of energy -36.525 -21.465 2.391 0.761
(30.673) (32.946) (7.793) (7.895)
Forward linkages 1.205 1.218 1.365*** 1.355***
(1.111) (1.086) (0.445) (0.437)
Enforcement exp./No. firms 1.041 0.631 0.119 -0.084
(1.419) (1.292) (0.417) (0.440)
FL × Enfor. exp./No. firms -1.024* -1.093** 0.383 0.370
(0.522) (0.474) (0.270) (0.278)
Constant 6.040 22.688* -6.308 -0.012
(18.497) (11.070) (4.371) (2.770)
Observations 3160 3160 2778 2778
R-squared 0.573 0.573 0.487 0.485
Overall, these estimations suggest that financial development reduces exclusion from
the formal sector by reducing entry barriers to the formal sector, a relationship stronger
for smaller firms; we also find that broadening access through increasing geographic
44The results are robust to using the percentiles just within industry or irrespective of the industry.
They are stronger for smaller percentiles.
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proximity between borrowers and lenders plays a more important role to increase reg-
istration rate than financial deepening, i.e. a higher credit volume.45 These results,
however, are based on average estimations across industries with different needs for ex-
ternal finance. The estimates are also subject to endogeneity biases, related to reverse
causation (a higher share of formal firms demanding more formal finance and thus in-
creasing both credit volume and outreach by financial institutions) and omitted variables
that might drive both reduction in informality and financial deepening and broadening.
In the following, we will therefore explore the differential relationship between financial
development and the incidence of informality across industries with different needs for
external finance.
3.4.2. Difference-in-difference regressions
The results in Table 3.5 show that the positive association of financial development and
the share of firms registered under any act is stronger in industries that rely more on
external finance. In columns (1) and (2), we interact the two financial development vari-
ables on the state-year level with external dependence on the industry level, including
state-year and industry fixed effects. Both interaction terms enter positively and signif-
icantly at 1% level. To control for the fact that financial development and formality are
correlated with public good provision and tax enforcement intensity, we also include an
interaction term of external dependence with the government expenditures to SDP and
unit cost of power, and an interaction term of forward linkages with the enforcement ex-
penditure per firm. While the interaction term of public good provision enters positively
and significantly in the regression including the interaction between Credit to SDP and
external dependence, it enters insignificantly in the regression including the interaction
of external dependence and branches per capita. The interaction term of unit cost of
power is insignificant and the tax enforcement intensity appears with negative sign in all
regressions.46
While column (1) and (2) of Table 3.5 considers only the share of firms operating
in the formal sector, we now turn to alternative indicators of informality as dependent
45Given the high correlation between the two financial sector variables, we only include one of them at
a time. If we include both at the same time, we find that just outreach is significant in Table 3.4.
We also ran regressions with SDP per capita confirm our findings. Given its high correlation with
financial development, we do not include it in the main regressions to avoid multi-colinearity.
46Tax enforcement intensity becomes positive if we use the respective shares of tax registered firms as
dependent variables.
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variables. In columns (3) and (4), we use value-added and employment share of formal
firms in total as dependent variables. Specifically, we present results with (i) share of
value added produced by firms registered under any act (columns 3 to 4) and (ii) the share
of employment in firms registered under any act (columns 5 to 6), with the interaction
of financial development and external dependence as the main explanatory variable of
interest.
The results show that while financial depth is positively and significantly associated
with the share of value added produced by formal firms and the employment share
of formal firms, there is no significant impact of branch penetration on the share of
value added and a less robust impact on the employment in formally registered firms.
Specifically, the interaction term between Credit to SDP and external dependence enters
positively and significantly at the one percent level for both of these dependent variables,
while the interaction of branch penetration and external dependence does not enter
significantly in column (3) and is significant at 10% level only in column (5). These
findings suggest that while financial outreach is negatively associated with the incidence
of informality by pushing informal firms into the formal sector, it does not significantly
affect informality at the intensive margin i.e. total value-added produced by the informal
sector. In comparison, financial depth reduces informality at both margins.
The results of Table 3.5 are not only statistically, but also economically significant.
The difference-in-differences estimation suggest that going from a state at the 25th per-
centile of branches per capita (Jharkhand = 0.55) to a state at the 75th percentile
(Kerala = 1.14) and an industry at the 25th percentile of the RZ external dependence
index (basic metals = 0.03) to an industry at the 75th percentile of external depen-
dence (motor vehicles = 0.39) results in an increase in registration under any act by
25.937×0.59×0.36=5.51 percentage points. The 25th and 75th percentiles of credit to
SDP are Uttar Pradesh (0.19) and Andhra Pradesh (0.36); the differential effects for
Credit to SDP are therefore 2.66 percentage points. This compares to a mean regis-
tration rate of 11.3 percent. As in Table 3.4, the economic effect is thus larger for
financial outreach than for financial depth on the extensive margin. Note, however, that
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The results reported Appendix Table 3.A.4 show that the effect of financial outreach
is stronger for smaller firms, while we only find an effect of financial depth for larger
firms. Here, we split the sample into firms below and above the 25th percentile of
fixed assets for a specific industry and year. The relative economic size of the effects of
financial depth and outreach is confirmed. In the case of firms above the 25th percentile,
only the interaction of external finance with our measure of financial depth, Credit to
SDP, enters positively and significantly in all regressions. The economic size of the
impact also suggests a stronger impact of credit to SDP on firms above – compared to
below – the 25th percentile. This suggests larger firms in industries relying on external
finance do not benefit from higher branch penetration as much as small firms, but rather
from overall financial depth, as captured by credit volume on the state level.47 This is
consistent with smaller firms depending more on geographic proximity to lenders for the
cost-benefit trade-off to tip towards formality than larger firms (Beck et al., 2014).
One concern regarding the impact of financial development on informality is the
reverse causation in the sense that lower informality leads to higher demand for financial
services, especially in industries with higher need for external finance. To control for this
effect, in Appendix Table 3.A.5, we re-estimate Table 3.5 for the sample of industries
that are below the median of production level in the respective state and year. The
results suggest that even if we exclude the larger industries in each state that can create
such a demand effect, the interaction of RZ with both financial penetration and financial
deepening are positively associated with registration rates.
3.4.3. IV regressions
To further control for the endogeneity problem, we estimate the impact of financial
outreach and depth on different margins of informality using instrumental variable ap-
proach. Table 3.6 and 3.7 present both first-stage and second-stage estimation results
for the regression equations (1) and (2), respectively.
In column (1) of Table 3.6, we regress the braches per capita on credit to SDP in 2005
(to capture the state-level demand for financial services), and a time dummy for 2010.
Consistent with Figure 3.10, we observe a significant impact of financial inclusion reform
47If we include both financial outreach and depth in a single regression in Table 3.5, for the sample of
small firms (fixed asset < 25th percentile), branches per capita is positive and significant while credit
to SDP becomes insignificant. In contrast, when the sample contains large firms (fixed asset > 25th
percentile), credit to SDP is significant, while branches per capita is not.
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on branch establishment in state with higher financial depth. The first-stage F-statistics
indicates that our instrument for branches per capita is relevant. Column (2) presents
the first stage estimation for the interaction term of financial depth instrumented by per
capita circulation of English newspaper in 1991 (to capture business and economic news
penetration at the time of liberalization), and a time trend for the post-liberalization
years. Similar to column (1), the instrument is positively and significantly associated
with the endogenous variable and F-statistics confirms its relevance.
The rest of Table 3.6, reports the second stage regressions examining the impact of
financial inclusion and deepening on extensive and intensive margins of informality. In
comparison to Table 3.4, branches per capita appears with a positive and significant
coefficient when the dependent variable is the proportion or employment share of firms
registered under any act. However, similar to Table 3.4, we do not observe any significant
impact of credit to SDP.
Table 3.7 presents the IV estimation results for the differential effect regressions. In
column (1), we regress the interaction term of branches per capita on the interaction of
RZ, credit to SDP in, and a dummy for 2010. In column (2), we instrument financial
depth by the interaction between RZ, per capita circulation of English newspaper in
1991, and a trend dummy for the post-liberalization years. Similar to Table 3.6, the
instruments are positively and significantly associated with the endogenous variables
with high relevance. The second stage results for the impact of financial outreach and
depth on extensive and intensive margins of informality are consistent with the OLS
estimations. Therefore, all results of Table 3.5 are confirmed by using an IV approach.
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3.4.4. Production and value-added
So far, we have focused on the relative importance of formal and informal sectors within
manufacturing. We now turn our attention to production and value added in the formal
and informal sectors as an additional test of the second channel outlined above, i.e. the
higher productivity of firms in the formal sector. We therefore use as dependent variable
total production or total value added on the state-industry level for registered firms and
unregistered firms. Specifically, Table 3.8 illustrates the result of estimation of equation
(2) for log of production and value-added.
The results in column (1) to (4) of Table 3.8 show that production in registered firms
increases with Credit to SDP in industries that depend more on external finance, while
total production of unregistered firms is negatively associated with the interaction of
external dependence and Credit to SDP, suggesting a positive (negative) and significant
impact of financial deepening on total formal (informal) production. On the other hand,
the interaction term of branches per capita does not enter significantly in any of the
specifications. The results in column (5) to (8) show the same pattern for total value-
added: the value-added of registered firms increases across industries with a higher need
for external finance as financial systems deepen, while value-added of informal firms
decreases with the interaction of Credit to SDP and external dependence. Comparing
the 75th and 25th percentiles, the economic effect of credit to SDP interacted with
RZ on the value-added of firms registered is 1.454×0.17×0.36=0.089, accounting for
16% of de-trended standard deviation (0.55). As in total production, the interaction
terms of branch penetration and external dependence do not enter significantly when the
dependent variable is total value-added. In Appendix Table 3.A.6, we test the robustness
of the finding of Table 3.8 in IV specification and observe the same results for the impact
of financial depth on formal and informal production. In column (1) of Table 3.A.6, we
however find a positive impact of the interaction term of branches per capita on total
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3.5. Conclusion
This paper explores the relationship between financial sector development and the rel-
ative importance of formal and informal manufacturing in India. Previous work and
theory suggest an impact of financial development on both extensive and intensive mar-
gins, i.e. pulling more firms into the formal sector and increasing total production of
the formal sector. Our results provide evidence for both channels, but also distinct roles
for financial depth, as proxied by Credit to SDP, and financial outreach, as proxied by
branch penetration. Specifically, exploiting variation within state-years and industries
with different needs for external finance, we find that financial outreach is positively as-
sociated with a higher share of formal enterprises, especially in industries with a higher
demand for external finance, i.e. where firms benefit more from access to formal finance.
While we also find a positive effect of financial depth on the share of formal firms, al-
though this effect is of a smaller size. In terms of production efficiency, on the other
hand, we find a positive and significant role for financial depth, especially in industries
more reliant on external finance, while no significant effect for branch penetration.
Our empirical findings suggest an important impact of financial sector development on
the incidence of formality. This impact works through different channels, with different
dimensions of financial sector development dominating specific channels. Specifically,
branch penetration is associated with a lower incidence of informality mainly through
the extensive margin by helping or persuading informal firms to enter the formal sector.
Overall credit volume, on the other hand, increases the productivity of formal sector
and reduces informality mainly through the intensive margin, i.e. expanding the formal
economy at the expense of the informal economy.
Together, these results suggest an important role for finance in reducing informality,
though with important differences across industries. They also suggests that policies
aimed at deepening the financial system as much as policies aimed at increasing out-


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Misreporting in the Value-added
Tax and the Optimal Enforcement
4.1. Introduction
One of the most important concerns of tax administrations is choosing a simple and effi-
cient enforcement procedure to reduce the risk of tax fraud and evasion. The value-added
tax (VAT) is nowadays the preferred form of indirect tax and is believed to facilitate en-
forcement through its invoicing system. For tax administrators, each VAT invoice gener-
ates a piece of information on a transaction, verifiable in case of inter-firm trade with the
corresponding invoice issued by the other party. This type of third-party reporting in the
VAT increases the risk of hiding transactions for firms and thus reduces evasion (Pomer-
anz, 2013). However, this deterrence mechanism breaks down in transactions with final
consumers who do not report the invoice to the government. Consequently, an approach
to identify the VAT evasion potential among different taxpayers becomes critical for tax
administrators. On the other hand, modern VAT systems involve extensive information
reporting to achieve a high level of compliance, but the consequences of such transition
are almost neglected in the tax evasion literature. This paper analyzes firm’s behavior
to evade the VAT and the optimal strategy of the tax administration in this respect by
linking noncompliance with the level of final consumption and the subjective costs of
each taxpayers. In addition, it studies the role information reporting, which enables the
tax administration to cross-check the VAT invoices, on firm’s VAT evasion and discusses
its efficient implementation.
Broadly, VAT evasion can be classified into two forms. At the intensive margin, a
registered seller gains from under-reporting the sale, while a formal buyer benefits from
over-reporting its purchase. I use the generic termmisreporting to refer to noncompliance
by registered traders. In comparison, informality represents the extensive margin, i.e.
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evasion by firms working in the shadow economy and failing to register with tax agencies.
In the high-income countries, the loss in VAT revenue due to misreporting is much larger
than failure to register. For instance, in 2001-02, non-compliance by registered traders in
UK resulted in loss of £6.7-9.75 billion compared to £400-500 million loss from traders
not registering for the VAT (Keen and Smith, 2006). However, in developing countries
both frauds seem to be extensive, where according to Schneider et al. (2011) the informal
sector comprises around 40% of GDP on average (ranging up to 70%). The extensive
margin of VAT evasion is studied in Hoseini (2014b) in detail, and the focus of this paper
is on modeling misreporting problem in the VAT system and how the government can
reduce it.
The previous evidence suggests a negative relationship between final consumption
and VAT compliance of a sector. Tait (1991) indicates that the mark up ratio of the
VAT, defined as reported sales divided by reported purchases in a period, is less in retail
and wholesale sectors. In a randomized experiment on Chilean firms, Pomeranz (2013)
presents the most compelling evidence for this relationship. She observes that firms
respond more to an increase in audit probability on transactions with final consumers,
where there is no paper trail, suggesting more ex-ante evasion on these transactions.
The basic reason for this effect is that unlike business-to-business transactions, no third-
party reported invoice exists in business-to-household sales and thus they are less risky
for VAT misreporting. Consequently, sectors with more inter-firm transactions (fewer
sales to final consumers) have intrinsically more VAT collection efficiency. In this paper,
I pinpoint how the difference in the risk of misreporting affects the optimal enforcement
policy of the government.
The model of the paper is based on the standard theoretical model for analyzing tax
evasion. The tax administration seeks to minimize VAT evasion given the tax base and
the cost of audit. The tax base is composed of firms heterogeneous in VAT obligation, cost
of evasion and the type of customers. There are two enforcement instruments available
for the administration: (i) audit staff visit the enterprise and check the transactions
(visiting audit); (ii) a number of reported business-to-business transactions are cross-
checked for correspondence with the other party (invoice cross-checking). The second
enforcement method is much easier for the administration, but it is limited to inter-firm
transactions and needs infrastructure on information reporting.
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The results of the model show that the optimal invoice cross-checking rate among
different commodities is positively associated with the number of firms in the market
of that commodity. If the cross-checking policy is not chosen optimally, it motivates
firms to shift their misreporting to the commodity that generates the lowest risk. In
addition, the model intuitively imply that the optimal visiting audit rate negatively
depends on the taxpayer’s cost convexity with respect to tax evasion gamble. The degree
of cost convexity depends on a variety of firm’s characteristics such as size, ownership,
accounting system and the risk-premium of the manager. In practice, large enterprises
are less likely to engage in gross evasion, such as making uninvoiced transactions, because
their accounting systems would not permit this and having numerous employees makes
their collusion to unreport tax fragile (Kleven et al., 2009; Tait, 1991). In addition, risk-
aversion and other subjective beliefs of the manager can change the degree of convexity
of the cost function. Naturally, managers with low risk premium are more involved in
tax evasion and need to be audited more frequently.
The relationship between optimal visiting audit rate and the level of final consumption
of a firm is however more complicated. Since transactions with final consumers are
unverifiable, on the one hand, they persuade firms to evade more, on the other hand,
they reduce the expected return of a visiting audit. With low cost convexity, the optimal
audit rate is an increasing function of sales to final consumers. In comparison, more
unverifiable transactions do not sharply change the evasion of a firm with strict cost
convexity, but it makes the detection of the fraud harder. As a result, for a firm with a
very convex cost of evasion, the optimal audit rate is first increasing but after some point
decreasing in sales to final consumers. Therefore, given high degree of cost convexity
of large enterprises, VAT collections may improve if audit is also directed to medium
and small enterprises which are more risky taxpayers. This result is at odds with the
conventional perception in many developing countries that the audit should primarily be
devoted to larger taxpayers having higher additional tax assessment per visiting audit
(Gordon and Li, 2009).
This paper contributes to several aspects of tax enforcement literature. Most studies
about the optimal design of the VAT presume that it is collected costlessly, however,
VAT evasion may create a critical impact on its optimality versus other taxes like tariff
(Emran and Stiglitz, 2005). To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper modeling
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VAT misreporting with an important policy implications for tax administrators in both
developed and developing countries.
Despite the limited research on the VAT specific aspects of tax enforcement, the broad
concept of tax compliance has attracted a lot of attention in the literature. As a general
classification, Slemrod and Gillitzer (2014) categorize tax evasion models based on their
assumption about ethical factors, though the two groups are not mutually exclusive. The
‘deterrence’ models presume the actions of taxpayers are not set by morality or social
norms, but are based on the possibility of audit and punishment. This branch of literature
can be traced back to the seminal formulation of Allingham and Sandmo (1972), assuming
that, to understate their income, risk-averse taxpayers are constrained by a possible
penalty and the expected payoff determines the level of evasion. In comparison, ‘non-
deterrence’ models (e.g. Gordon, 1989) focus on the behavioral aspects of tax evasion
arguing that Allingham and Sandmo (1972) cannot fully explain the compliance rates,
especially in the developed world (for a survey see Hashimzade, Myles, and Tran-Nam,
2013). This growing branch of the literature mainly studies the effect of social norms
and ethical parameters such as regret, shame, or delight at cheating on the behavior of
taxpayers. Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998) indicate that, by tax evasion, people
may fear social stigma or damage to reputation suggesting that factors such as a moral
obligation to be truthful, or the social consequences of being a known cheater, may add
further compliance incentives that are not accounted for in the standard models. In the
paper, using a simple deterrence framework, I explain how the subjective beliefs of a
taxpayer are reflected in his cost function and analyze their role in shaping the optimal
audit policy.
The paper also contributes to the literature emphasizing the importance of different
forms of third party reporting in the tax enforcement. Johns and Slemrod (2010) show
that in the U.S., only 1 percent of wages and salaries is misreported, but in a sharp
contrast, an estimated 57 percent of self-employment business income, which is based
on self-assessment, is not reported. In a field experiment on the individual income tax
in Denmark, Kleven, Knudsen, Kreiner, Pedersen, and Saez (2011) show that income
tax evasion is low, except for the fraction that is self-reported. Directly relevant to this
paper, Pomeranz (2013) uses a randomized experiment on Chilean firms to investigate
the effect of the third party reported paper trails in the VAT on the tax compliance. She
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shows that in transactions with final consumers, in which the VAT paper trail is absent,
the response of firms to an audit letter message is stronger. This difference in evasion
opportunity of the two types of transactions builds the micro foundations of the model
of this paper.
The results of the paper also add to the recent and growing literature investigating
the effect of new developments in information reporting systems on tax compliance. As
a general definition, information reporting are the requirements that certain transactions
causing tax obligation be reported by the third party to the tax administration (Shaw,
Slemrod, and Whiting, 2010). By adding information reporting into the standard tax
enforcement framework, Paramonova (2014) models how tax administration can affect
the accuracy of information about taxpayers and determines the optimal tax audit rule
for a given information accuracy. This paper also models the consequence of information
reporting system, but in a VAT setting, and characterizes the optimal way of using such
a system.
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on predictive analytics and subjec-
tive audits in tax enforcement. In the deterrence models, the audit is usually assumed
to be random; however, the majority of audits conducted in practice are risk-based
and not completely random. Some papers model the optimal audit strategy as a func-
tion of reported income and the dynamics of taxpayer’s behavior (e.g. Andreoni et al.,
1998; Reinganum and Wilde, 1985). Another important factor determining tax fraud
is taxpayer’s risk attitude. The effect of risk aversion on tax evasion is traced back to
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) who predict, ceteris paribus, risk-averse individuals evade
less than others. Considering all of these factors, some papers suggest simulation-based
approaches to predict the compliance incentive of each taxpayer, and consequently, its
optimal audit rate (e.g. Engel and Hines Jr, 1999; Hashimzade, Myles, and Rablen,
2014). Analyzing the evasion risk of taxpayers, helps overcome the asymmetric informa-
tion problem the tax administration faces. This paper shows that such analysis is very
important in increasing collection efficiency of visiting audit and must be an essential
element of VAT enforcement.
After this introduction, I explain the practical VAT enforcement issues and then
model the behavior of a single firm when it decides between misreporting the transactions
with other firms and final consumers. The difference between the two is that the former
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is more risky for misreporting and easily detectable in case of audit, but the detection of
fraud in the latter is harder, especially when misreporting comprises a small fraction of
total final consumption. Next, in sections 4.4 and 4.5, respectively, I study the optimal
policies in the presence and absence of an information reporting system which enables
the administration to perform random invoice cross-checking. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2. VAT audit in practice
In the VAT system, firms are required to charge tax on their output and in return deduct
taxes paid on inputs from their VAT bill. The input credit is given against VAT payment
as a refund and thus just VAT-payers can obtain it. The implementation of the VAT in
almost all countries, except Japan48, is based on invoice-credit form, which is the focus
throughout the paper. In this method, registered sellers issue an invoice corresponding
to the VAT charged on sales to each customer, who if registered, can use the invoice
to get refund on inputs. Like any other tax, VAT is vulnerable to evasion and the
governments must choose an auditing strategy. According to Ebrill, Keen, Bodin, and
Summers (2001), in general, there are three audit methods for the VAT:
Simple self-assessment without invoice reporting Each enterprise calculates its
own tax liability (usually per month or quarter) and sends the aggregate tax return forms
to the tax administration. It does not have to send the invoices, but has to keep them for
some years and is subject to a possible visiting audit by the tax administration. During
the audit, the administration checks the book of accounts and extensively cross-checks
all of the invoices with the corresponding reports of the firm’s suppliers and business
clients. The auditors also use other possible information like bank accounts to find out
the violation in other transactions. In 2001, around half of countries with the VAT apply
this method of VAT administration (Ebrill et al., 2001).
Self-assessment with invoice reporting Firms calculate their own tax liability,
but also send additional documents such as invoices to the tax administration. The
administration then can audit the firm in person or just by cross-checking the invoices.
48In Japan, each trader is taxed on the difference between sales and purchases.
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This method is applied in many countries and is growing because of the new developments
in information technology.
Direct government audit The taxpayer files a return in the tax office, then the
administrators audit and assess the tax obligation of the firm. The method is not common
nowadays and broadly was conducted in 1990s in some former Soviet Union states.
There is a trade-off between enforcement method and compliance cost of taxpayers.
The advocates of the first method argue that it has the least compliance costs and is
more efficient. Ebrill et al. (2001) indicate that self-assessment procedures with com-
plex requirements place excessive compliance costs on taxpayers and can be a serious
impediment to detection of delinquent taxpayers. Without invoice reporting, however,
cross-checking is not possible. The early attempt of heavy cross-checking was done in
South-Korea in 1980s. Overall, it was unsuccessful due to complexity of the work and
the lack of IT technology. At the same time, some countries like Bolivia and Chile con-
ducted cross-checking on a random basis, but the processes were done manually by tax
auditing staff and was very time-consuming (Tait, 1991). Nevertheless, the development
of information technology nowadays has increased tax enforcement performance consid-
erably and e-auditing is now growing all over the world. With the assistance of electronic
invoicing and data mining – a methodology to identify specific information from rough
data via computing technology – tax administrations can collect the third party informa-
tion much easier to perform data matching and finding evasion cases (Wu, Ou, ying Lin,
Chang, and Yen, 2012). Currently, many countries49 are adopting integrated electronic
invoicing system which enables the government to randomly cross-check the invoices.
Dealing with the huge volume of invoices might be impossible and even if the list of all
unmatched transactions is available by data mining methods, identifying the fraudulent
party – seller or buyer – and the arrangements of proper penalty need auditing staff.
Therefore, in reality, tax authorities are able to investigate a fraction of the suspicious
transactions for further auditing because of limited staff resources and have to prioritize
between different commodities or sectors. Nevertheless, if such a system is developed,
its variable cost for cross-checking a firm is much less than the cost of a visiting audit
for the tax administration.
49some examples are Brazil, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Cote d’Ivoire, Indonesia, Poland and South
Korea.
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In any types of assessment, if a fraud is detected, the fraudulent firm has to pay
the misreported tax plus an extra penalty. Tait (1991) indicates that when a taxpayer
misreports a small amount, the purpose of the penalty is to dissuade him so that he does
not repeat the violation. But when the fraud goes beyond the violation and falls into
the realm of crime, harsh penalties, including jail sentences, may apply. In practice, the
level of penalty is different across countries. For instance, in UK it is changing from 20%
to 100% of the fraud based on its magnitude but in Argentina and Bolivia the fraudulent
firm has to pay from 2 to 10 times of the misreported tax. Almost in all countries large
scale fraud leads to closing of the business and also years of imprisonment. Hence, in
practice the penalty is an increasing and convex function of the level of evasion.
4.3. The basis of the model
In order to model misreporting and optimal enforcement in the VAT, I follow the standard
model of tax evasion and extend it by differentiating between two types of transactions.
Consider an economy comprising firms heterogeneous in risk-aversion and type and level
of tax obligation. Based on the type of activity, each firm makes two types of transactions:
with other formal businesses (b), with final consumers (c), imposing yb and yc as VAT
obligations respectively. As a result, each firm decides about two types of evasion eb and
ec based on the nature of the obligation. The difference between b and c comes from
their transparency to the tax administration. The administrator can realize the exact
amount of yb – and thus eb – by cross-checking the invoices, but yc has no corresponding
third-party reported information and small amount of ec may be unrealizable. Detection
of ec is possible only by visiting audits when the auditor checks information such as
bank accounts, total turnover, size, location etc. The probability that the audit detects
ec depends on the relative extent of the fraud. If the evasion comprises a very small
fraction of the tax obligation, the detection would be very hard, but the probability
increases when the relative extent of fraud increases. Therefore, I assume, when an
auditor conducts a visiting audit, the probability that he detects the fraud on sale to
final consumers is ec/yc.
There are two enforcement methods for the tax administration. The first one involves
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random cross-checking and needs infrastructure on information reporting. The second
one is self-assessment without invoice reporting. In the first method, the administration
has two separate tools for each type of evasion. It randomly cross-checks a share of inter-
firm transactions to detect eb, but ec can be detected only by visiting audit. In the simple
self-assessment system, no random invoice cross-checking is possible and if a visiting audit
takes place, the auditors thoroughly checks all VAT invoices for correspondence to find
yb, and also collects other information for better estimation of yc. As a results, the fraud
in transactions with formal firms (eb) is for certain detected, but the probability that the
auditor detects the fraud on sale to final consumers is ec/yc.
If a fraud is detected, a penalty is applied by the administration which is always
greater than the amount of evasion. If the detected evasion is near zero the penalty
approaches to the principal of unpaid obligation. Based on the facts explained above,
I assume θ(e), an increasing and convex function of the detected evasion e with the
following characteristics, determines the penalty for the firm:
θ(0) = 0, θ′(0) = 1, ∀e > 0 : θ(e) > 0, θ′(e) > 1, θ′′(e) > 0, θ′′′(e) ≥ 0 (4.1)
These conditions yield θ(e) ≥ e.50 Consequently, by defining eb and ec as above and
assuming the tax administration conducts a visiting audit with probability λ, the ex-
pected cost of evasion for business and final transactions will be λθ(eb) and λec/ycθ(ec)
respectively. However, as a pure deterrence model, these expected amounts just reflect
the monetary punishment of a risk-neutral taxpayer with no other constraint on eva-
sion.51 In practice, firms can have extra restrictions on tax evasion due to the structure
of the company or factors like risk aversion of manager and social norms. In below,
when discussing the optimal visiting audit policy, I take this cost variation into account
by considering heterogeneity in the cost function θ(.). Prior to that, the results does not
depend on the functional form of θ(e).
For modeling the enforcement policy, I assume that the tax administration faces an
economy with heterogeneous firms and I intermediate goods. The administration is not
fully informed about the heterogeneity of the firm, but using predictive analytics can
50The assumption about the third derivative of θ is made to have a smooth cost function and simpler
calculations in Lemma 4.1, but the general results does not depend on that.
51As I discuss in section 4.4.4, this is a reasonable assumption for formulating cross-checking policy,
where the administration audit invoices not firms.
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categorize them into S different clusters based on the type of activity, the estimated
amount of VAT obligation, and characteristics of the firm.52 Each intermediate good
is produced by one activity and is used as an input by a number of activities. In the
presence of invoice reporting, the policy vector of the government includes µi which is the
ratio of transactions of each commodity i to be cross-checked and λs which is the audit
rate in each cluster s. In the self-assessment without invoice reporting, cross-checking
is not available and the only policy instrument is λs. The aim of the tax administrator
is finding the optimal allocation of λs and µi across clusters and commodities based on
aggregate and firm-level factors.
In this paper, although the decision of firm for evasion (ec and eb) depends on the
enforcement strategy of the tax administration, production and tax obligation yb and yc
are held fixed. This is the common assumption in models for analysis of tax evasion, like
the seminal formulation of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) which has been the dominating
theoretical model in this literature. This assumption is especially plausible for the VAT
evasion, since the VAT is essentially a tax on final consumption and it does not distort
the profit maximization of firms. Hence, one can reasonably assume that the decisions
about production and VAT evasion are orthogonal. Besides, the aim of this paper is
characterizing the optimal audit strategy for the tax administration and the determinants
of the tax base is not the subject of discussion.53
In order to find the optimal visiting audit policy, the paper seeks to find the audit
rate as a function of the estimated tax obligation on sales to final consumers and risk-
aversion of the firm. Moreover, as it will be discussed in section 4.4.4, the optimal policy
for invoice cross-checking is independent of tax obligation and depends on the number
of firms in the economy. In the following, for better mathematical tractability, I first
analyze the firm’s decision and the optimal policy, when an invoice cross-checking system
is available for the tax administration, and then study the model in the absence of such
system (simple self-assessment).
52The factors to help predict the heterogeneity are discussed in section 4.4.2.
53Minimizing evasion per se is an important objective from normative point of view, since it reduces
the tax inequality between compliant and non-compliant taxpayers. Moreover, unequal tax burden
intensifies tax distortion at the aggregate level.
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4.4. The model with random invoice cross-checking
In this part, I model the consequences of having an integrated invoice system that enables
the government for random cross-checking. As mentioned above, such a system is now
more feasible with the advancements in information technology and is growing all over
the world. In general, there are two types of invoices in the VAT system: (1) sales
invoice shows the tax payment by the seller, (2) purchase invoice is used by the buyer
to get credit on inputs. Sales can be understated in the form of not reporting a number
of sales invoices by the seller, in comparison the buyer can create some fake purchase
invoices to overstate the credit due on its input. Therefore, when the tax administration
accumulates all reported invoices in one place, some sales invoices are missing and some
extra purchase invoices are generated by the buyers. For performing cross-checking, after
random selection of n purchase invoices, the administration cross-checks them with the
corresponding sales invoice. The number n is a policy variable determined by the cost
of cross-checking and total number of purchase invoices N in the economy.
The strategy of the tax administration after drawing and cross-checking n purchase
invoices is finding the firms that made the violation. I assume, after detection of a viola-
tion, the administration cross-checks all other invoices of the suspicious firm, reimburses
the principal tax, and charges an extra penalty. I also assume that, in a firm’s view,
invoice cross-checking is conducted independent of visiting audits and it optimizes the
evasion on inter-business transactions eb and final consumer sales ec in two separate prob-
lems. This assumption enables me to find the analytic solutions of eb and ec by separating
the effects of the two enforcement tools. In Appendix 4.A, I relax this assumption by
assuming the two types of evasion are jointly determined in one optimizations problem
and show that in practical circumstances the two problems become very similar.
Before analyzing the general random invoice cross-checking problem, I study a simple
market of one intermediate good in which an upstream sector u sells the good to one
downstream sector d. The optimization problem of a single firm in sector u (d) is how
many sale (purchase) invoices to misreport given the risk of detection. Each invoice
represents a unit of transaction with value α based on the type of the intermediate
good.54 If a firm misreports k invoices of the intermediate good, its evasion in this
54α shows the average value of one invoice of the good. This assumption is made to distinguish between
commodities with high value per unit (e.g. Steel bar) and others (e.g. bread).
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market will be eb = αk, and the probability that no misreported invoice is cross-checked
becomes (1 − k/N)n where, N and n are the total number and the number of cross-
checked invoices in the market of the intermediate good.55 In practice, the number of
reported invoices in a market is so large that a single firm cannot change it and takes
it as given,56 therefore I assume that k << N and thus k/N ≈ 0. As a result, we can
use first order approximation and write (1− k/N)n = 1− kn/N , which means that the
probability of detection of at least one misreported invoice by the tax administration
and getting fined is kn/N , where k = eb/α. Then, the optimization problem of a single







where µ = n/N is the share of invoices that are cross-checked by the tax administra-
tion (the policy variable) and the second term represents the expected cost of detection






Because θ is a strictly increasing and convex function, one can easily show that eb de-
creases when n/N goes up. Therefore, when the administration cross-checks a larger
share of invoices, inter-firm misreporting reduces.
On the other hand, the tax administration conducts visiting audits aiming at detec-
tion of evasion on unverifiable transactions yc. As a consequence, the firm faces another







where λ stands for the share of firms that are randomly audited by the tax administration
and ec/yc is the probability of detection of the unverifiable fraud. Then the choice of
55The probability that a random invoice is not one of the misreported by the firm is 1− k/N , therefore
the probability that none of the n draws are misreported by the firm is the multiplication of n single
probabilities 1− k/N which becomes (1− k/N)n.
56For instance, around 26 billion VAT invoices are reported in Germany in 2006 (Baldwin, 2007).
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Proposition 4.1. In the presence of invoice cross-checking, total evasion eb + ec is
decreasing in visiting audit rate λ and invoice cross-checking rate µ and increasing in
VAT obligation on final consumption yc.
Proof. Appendix 4.B. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4.1 indicates that if the government utilizes the cross-checking technol-
ogy there is a negative relationship between final consumption and VAT compliance.
Moreover, total evasion is decreasing in visiting audit and cross-checking rates. In the
following, after explaining the role of subjective measures in evasion and the methods
for measuring them, I determine the optimal visiting audit rate in cluster s of firms (λs).
Then, I find the optimal policy for the cross-checking rate of the invoices of commodity
i (µi).
4.4.1. Objective versus subjective costs of fraud
So far, I discussed the role of sectoral characteristics on firm’s evasion and the assump-
tions about cost of detection in (4.1) just reflect the pure monetary cost of penalty for a
risk-neutral taxpayer. This assumption is reasonable for formulating the optimal cross-
checking policy, because in practice, the variable cost of cross-checking is small and as
I will show in section 4.4.4, Proposition 4.3, this approximately yields the same cost
function for all firms (θ(e) ≈ e). In addition, in the cross-checking process, the tax
administration just deals with invoices not firms, and in his view, the invoices are just
heterogeneous in terms of the activity and commodity not their issuers. Thus, it is not
possible to make distinction between the cost function associated with each invoice.
For finding optimal visiting audit rate, however, the administration is in direct contact
with the firm. In reality, regardless of the third-party reported business-to-business
transactions, firms are heterogeneous in terms of detection probability in a visiting audit
due to the other subjective costs of tax evasion. According to (4.4), the expected cost
of evasion ec is λ × ec/yc × θ(ec) where λ is visiting audit probability and ec/yc reflects
the firm’s advantage in unverifiability of the sales to final consumers. In this context,
117
Chapter 4: Misreporting in the Value-added Tax and the Optimal Enforcement
the other factors that determine the evasion cost and shape the decision of the firm are
reflected in the cost function θ(ec). Hence, the form of cost function plays an important
role in determining the expected return of the auditing case for the administration. As
discussed in section 4.2, in reality, the monetary penalty after detection is a convex
function of the level of detected evasion. In this framework, any increase in the expected
cost of evasion, which is not due to monetary penalty, can be translated into an increase
in the convexity of the cost function. There are a number of firm-level factors that can
cause extra evasion costs and raise the degree on convexity of θ(.). These factors can be
classified as follows
1. Enterprise structure: Ownership, size, and the accounting system of the enterprise
play important roles in shaping its tax evasion decision. In the incorporated com-
panies, shareholders, the CEO, and the tax manager do not necessarily have similar
preferences and objectives regarding tax compliance. Kleven et al. (2009) argue
that the firm’s employees must collude to unreport tax and such a collusion is frag-
ile in large enterprises with numerous employees. In this context, there are fewer
opportunities to evade VAT in incorporated companies rather than sole traders
and small partnership firms. In addition, a stringent and transparent accounting
system (e.g. electronic invoicing, external accountants, etc.) acts as another con-
straint for tax evasion. All of these restrictions on evasion opportunities can also
be interpreted as an increase in the chance of detection and the risk of evasion for
the enterprise which is not due to higher audit rate λ or more evasion on final sales
ec/yc, rather they are reflected in the cost function θ(.) by increasing its convexity.
2. Risk attitude: This factor reflects the risk preference of the manager and becomes
more important for unincorporated enterprises, with one decision maker about tax
compliance. In general, managers do not have similar impressions about the cost of
evasion and their subjective views about risk and social norms differentiates their
attitudes toward tax fraud (Andreoni et al., 1998). For some people, conviction
for tax evasion is unimaginable, but a habitual criminal may think about it just
as a worst case scenario. Therefore, the cost convexity also depends on the risk
preference of the manager, especially in smaller firms, such that the degree of
convexity is higher for a firm with a risk-averse manager. In this context, Gordon
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(1989) assumes that in addition to the pecuniary cost, tax evasion generate a
“stigma cost” for taxpayers that can be interpreted as an increase in the convexity
of the cost or the concavity of the expected payoff from evasion.
3. Future considerations: Fear of stigma and damage of reputation may also be trans-
lated into a monetary cost. If the detection of evasion results in loss of reputation
which, in turn, leads to market losses in the future, the cost convexity increases.
This extra cost might be higher for larger companies in competitive sectors.
In short, in the model, psychological and cultural aspects of taxpayers such as risk
aversion, tax morale, patriotism, guilt, and shame, plus all other factors that limit evasion
opportunities by raising detection probability or causing extra monetary cost for evasion,
increase the convexity of cost function θ(.). In order to specify a measure for these
subjective costs, first, I find evasion as a function yc and λ.




g : R+ → R+ is a strictly increasing and concave function and ∀x ≥ 0, 0 < g′(x) ≤ 1
2
.
Proof. Appendix 4.C. Q.E.D.
According to Section 4.2, the cost of fraud is always a convex function and this makes
ec a strictly concave function of yc/λ. Therefore, cost convexity – the convexity of θ(.)
– is equivalent to evasion concavity – the concavity of g(.). In this setting, taxpayers
are heterogeneous in two dimensions: One is yc which reflects the possibility of evasion;
another is g(.) which reflects the subjective costs of each taxpayer. So far, I assumed the
same θ(.) – and thus g(.) – for all taxpayers, but hereafter, I add the possibility of different
functional forms to capture the heterogeneity in cost convexity. The curvature of θ(.)
– and consequently g(.) – helps to characterize the cost of evasion for each enterprise.
In order to measure the curvature, I use a measure similar to the conventional index
of relative risk aversion (RRA).57 Specifically, γ(x) = −xg′′(x)/g′(x) gives the degree of
concavity of the function g(.) and, as a result, the degree of convextiy of cost of evasion
θ(.). Thus, higher γ means more cost convexity. In the next parts, after discussing the
57Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) indicate that tax evasion is akin to the choice of how much to gamble.
Each unit of misreporting the VAT offers a payoff but may lead to a penalty. Consider ec as the utility
of the firm and yc/λ as asset – which here is the possibility of evasion – then γ(x) = −xg′′(x)/g′(x)
is the relative risk aversion of the taxpayer toward VAT fraud: The more curved the function g(.) is,
the lower will be its certainty equivalent of a risky bundle.
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factors that help the government to estimate γ, I show how it affects the optimal visiting
audit rate of the tax administration.
4.4.2. Predictive analytics and cost convexity estimation
To estimate the heterogeneity of taxpayers in terms of cost convexity and subjective
factors, a growing literature proposes the use of predictive analytics (Hashimzade et al.,
2014). This type of analysis provides a set of tools to use historical data to predict future
outcomes and create a consistent risk ranking of individuals or firms. The application
of predictive analytics are not limited to tax administrators and it is now spreading to
other public service organizations such as police departments for crime prediction.58 In
general, there are a lot of factors that can be used for predicting the future behavior of
individuals, but in the following, I only mention a number of them that can help tax
administrations to estimate the subjective costs of taxpayers.
According to Tait (1991), VAT evasion is a concave function of firm’s size suggesting
a negative relationship between size and cost convexity. As explained above, larger
firms usually have numerous employees and often hire external accountants that might
mistakenly report the evasion or make a rational whistle-blowing (Kleven et al., 2009).
Therefore, the collusion for hiding the evasion breaks easier in a large enterprise rather
than a small one with limited workers, resulting more cost convexity for larger firms.
The ownership of the firm is another factor to predict the cost convexity. Incorpo-
rated enterprises comprise divisions with different roles and maybe conflicting incentives
(shareholders, the CEO, tax agent, etc.) and this diversity reduces the chance of a
compromise for tax evasion. Egger, Erhardt, and Keuschnigg (2014) indicate that the
entrepreneurial enterprises, run by the owner, are more likely to evade tax rather than
managerial enterprises that have an external manager.
The third factor to estimate the cost function is the age of the firm (Feinstein, 1991).
Often, younger firms are more likely to evade tax, because at the early stages the en-
terprise faces more financial constraints. Moreover, many firms are not precisely aware
about tax rules at the time of commencement of operation, and may mistakenly not pay
their true tax obligation.
58Mastrobuoni (2014) compares the performance of two police forces in Milan and shows that the
adoption of a predictive policing software in one police force has doubled the productivity of policing.
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At individual level, gender and education of the taxpayer has been revealed to be
significant determinants of tax evasion. Kastlunger, Dressler, Kirchler, Mittone, and
Voracek (2010) show that the tax compliance of females is normally higher than males.
Witte and Woodbury (1985) find a negative association between the general education
level of taxpayers and tax evasion. The occupational choice and social networks are other
factors revealing the risk behavior of taxpayers (Hashimzade et al., 2014).
Another important element of predictive analytics is taxpayer’s past reputation and
experience with respect to tax compliance. Bruttel and Friehe (2014) show that tax
compliance is path dependent in the sense that past experiences with different enforce-
ment level affects current tax compliance. When the tax administration pursues a strict
enforcement policy, taxpayers who have experienced weak enforcement early on tend to
be less compliant than taxpayers with strict enforcement experience in the past. Sim-
ilarly, under weak enforcement, taxpayers with strict enforcement experience declare
more income than taxpayers who have only experienced weak enforcement. Along the
same line, Dai, Hogarth, and Villeval (2015) show that if audits are initially regular
and systematic, taxpayers decrease their expectation for a new audit immediately after
one is carried out. In contrast, taxpayers who have experienced less frequent and more
irregular audits, maintain beliefs of new audit and less likely to show a time-dependent
noncompliance behavior. Hence, the dynamics of taxpayer’s behavior are also important
for performing predictive analytics.
4.4.3. Optimal visiting audit rate
In order to find the optimal visiting audit λ in each cluster, the tax administration seeks
to minimize evasion in sales to final consumers given visiting audit is costly. Therefore,
the optimization problem is
min
λs
esc + ηλs (4.6)
where λs is the rate of visiting audit in cluster s, η is the cost of auditing one firm,
59 and
esc is the estimation of tax administration from the evasion in cluster s. Then, FOC of
59An equivalent assumption about cost of auditing to make η endogenous is assuming the tax adminis-
tration is able to audit a limited number of firms and its objective is minimizing total evasion. Then,






s msλs = L̄, where ms is the number
of firms in cluster s and L̄ is the audit capacity of the administration. In this case, the FOC becomes
the same as (4.7) with η the Lagrange multiplier or the shadow cost of a single audit.
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Thus, the audit rate should be adjusted at the level that the marginal reduction in the
evasion of a firm is equal to the (shadow) cost of auditing. This means that at the
optimum marginal reduction in the evasion is the same in all clusters.
One important issue for the policymakers is how to overcome information asymmetries
to estimate esc. Based on Lemma 4.1, ec depends on yc and g(.), therefore to find e
s
c, the
tax administration needs an estimation of those parameters for each firm. The size of
sales to final consumer is easier to estimate and can be found by checking the information
on bank accounts and location as well as the type of activity (for instance the bulk of
costumers of a retailer or a barber shop are final consumers). Estimation of the cost
function of each taxpayer can be done by predictive analytics as discussed above in
detail.
Define ysc and gs(.) as the estimated value of tax obligation on sales to final consumers
and the functional form of g(.) in cluster s. Then, the following proposition shows how
the level of audit rate depends on subjective characteristics.
Proposition 4.2. In the presence of invoice cross-checking, if λs is the optimal choice





























Proof. Appendix 4.D. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4.2 indicates that the relationship between the optimal audit rate and
final consumption of a cluster depends on the cost convexity of taxpayer to evade ec
defined as γs. If the cost convexity in increasing in yc/λ, it means that when the taxpayer
experiences an increase in the possibility of evasion, he chooses to decrease the share of
evasion in total tax obligation on final consumptions. Figure 4.1, illustrates the optimal
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and therefore graphically find the optimal audit rate in each point. The slopes of the
tangent lines reflect g′(ysc/λs) and the distance from the vertical axis is y
s
c/λs. Thus,
ηλs, the multiplication of the two, is the height of the triangle they shape. The below
curve with an asymptote stands for higher relative risk aversion and at the optimum has
smaller audit rate. The horizontal asymptote in g(.) corresponds to a vertical asymptote
in the cost function θ(.). As mentioned in Section 4.2, many countries have implemented
harsh penalties for big tax frauds and from one angle, the asymptote in the cost func-
tion can represent the level of evasion in which the defrauder is convicted to long-term
imprisonment or life in prison. However, from different viewpoint, it reflects the sub-
jective characteristics of a large firm that have a restricted evasion opportunities or an
entrepreneur who never imagines evasion more than the asymptote due to high risk aver-
sion or fear of stigma. In the next step, I characterize the relationship between λs and









Figure 4.1: Optimal audit rate for two asymptotic and non-asymptotic cost functions.
Lemma 4.2. For all g : R+ → R+ that satisfy the conditions of Lemma 4.1, at the
government’s optimum we have
lim
ysc→0
λs = 0, lim
ysc→0
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Proof. Appendix 4.E. Q.E.D.
Lemma 4.2 shows when ysc is near zero, λs is zero but its derivative is +∞. In
this neighborhood the relationship between λ and ysc is independent of γs. However,
for a larger level of yc, the relationship becomes very sensitive to the cost convexity of
taxpayers. Using Proposition 4.4, we can distinguish between four different cases:
1. low convexity (γs < 1): λs is increasing in y
s
c .
2. medium convexity (γs = 1): λs is constant in y
s
c .
3. high convexity (1 < γs < 2): λs is decreasing in y
s
c .
4. very high convexity (γs ≥ 2): λs = 0 and esc is equal to its horizontal asymptote.
For any form of g(.) that satisfies the conditions of Lemma 4.1, at ysc = 0 the cost
convexity is zero, but it can change at higher level of ysc . For better interpretation, I
use four different functional forms for g(.) and show how they shape the link between
λs and y
s
c . The details of calculations are available in the Appendix 4.F. Figure 4.2-a




1 + x/a− 1) where
a > 0, n > 1. In this example, γs =
(n− 1)x
n(x+ a)
and ∀x > 0, γs < 1. Therefore, λs is
an increasing function of ysc and for large enough amounts of y
s
c , the optimal λs has a
corner solution equal to one.60 The second example is when g(.) is a logarithmic function
g(x) = 1
2
a ln(1 + x/a), a > 0. Here, γs =
x
x+ a
and λs is increasing in y
s





c approaches zero which means, unlike 4.2-a, λs never reaches
1. The other two cases are for taxpayers with high cost convexity such that g(.) has a







increasing ysc , at first λs increases, then reaches a maximum when γs = 1 (y
s
c = aλs),
and afterward, where 1 < γs < 2, it becomes decreasing. The last case in Figure 4.2-d is











to Figure 4.2-c, around ysc = 0, λs is increasing, and when 1 < γs < 2, it becomes




n−1 , then ∂λs/∂y
s
c = −∞ and
λs drops to zero and remains constant for higher levels of y
s
c . In this case, the amount




60In reality, because the cost of audit η is large, this hypothetical solution is reached in very large levels
of ysc that does not happen in practice.
124
The model with random invoice cross-checking
reason of the negative relationship between audit rate and final consumption in the last
two examples is the existence of asymptote in the cost function. Basically, no evasion
is possible above the asymptote and higher final consumption just makes detection of
















































, a > 0, n > 1
Figure 4.2: Government audit and firm’s final consumption. For risk neutral firms the
relationship is always positive, but for very risk averse taxpayer it may turn to be decreasing or become
zero.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the importance of subjective restrictions and beliefs of taxpayers
in shaping the optimal visiting audit rate of the tax administration. Therefore, all factors
mentioned above can play a role in determining the audit rate of a firm. Importantly,
as large enterprises are unlikely to engage in gross evasion due to organizational limita-
tions or to avoid hurting their reputation, they have higher γs than smaller taxpayers.
Therefore, when the structure of a large enterprise restricts its ability for tax evasion,
the expected return of auditing it for the administration declines. This may lead to less
optimal visiting audit rate for them specially, when invoice cross-checking is conducted
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separately. In this case, the total revenue may decline if the audit of medium and small
taxpayers is downplayed or neglected. This is in contrast with the conventional wisdom
in many developing countries to over-allocate the audit staff in larger firms (Gordon and
Li, 2009). In addition, the government should collect information about the history and
various characteristics of taxpayer firms such as ownership, age, gender and eduction of
the manager to have a better estimation of their cost convexity and risk behavior. As
discussed above, a young and entrepreneurial firm with male and uneducated manager
tends to have smaller cost convexity than a big incorporated firm. Overall, the results
of this section highlight the importance of predictive analytics in determining visiting
audit policy.
4.4.4. Optimal invoice cross-checking
The second policy instruments of the government is the cross-checking share for each
commodity. With the advanced information reporting system, the government receives
the invoice of each transaction and decides on the share of input credit invoices of each
intermediate good to be drawn for cross-checking (µi). In this case, the policymaker’s
question is finding the optimal allocation of µ1, . . . , µI . In contrast, to optimal visiting
audit policy, cross-checking policy does not depend on the subjective costs of a each single
taxpayer, because the administration randomly checks invoices irrespective of the issuer
firm. Therefore, for finding the optimal µi, the tax administration uses the cost function
of a representative firm that sells or purchases the commodity i.61 If the number of sellers
and buyers of the intermediate good i are M iu and M
i
d and the buyers have no other input








b + δµiNi (4.10)
where δ is the variable cost of cross-checking one invoice and finding its violating firm,
N̄i is the real number of firm-to-firm transaction invoices, and Ni = N̄i +Mdki is total
number of purchase invoices.
Proposition 4.3. The optimal share of invoice cross-checking µi is positively associated
61In practice the variable cost of invoice cross-checking is small, which means if such a system is imple-
mented, the level of evasion eb becomes small too. From (4.17), since θ
′(0) = 1, for small eb we can
approximate θ(eb) ≈ eb to formulate the optimal µi.
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. In addition, if the variable cost of cross-checking δ is small enough,












Proof. Appendix 4.G. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4.3 states the condition for optimal cross-checking rate of a commod-
ity, when the number of traders and invoices are known. Because all firms trading the
commodity i have the same chance of getting caught, and in case of detection of one
misreported invoice, all verifiable transactions are cross-checked, the incentive for misre-
porting is the same among them. Therefore, the higher the number of firms, the more
the overall misreporting. In addition, as the variable cost of cross-checking δ diminishes
by new technologies, the audit rate can be estimated by (4.11). This estimation is in-
dependent of the form of cost function, because small δ results in small eb, and near
zero θ(eb) ≈ eb. If δ becomes very small, then the optimal decision of the government is
cross-checking all transactions of the commodity i.
In the model, the upstream firms produce just one product and their misreporting is
limited to invoices of good i, but in (4.10) and Proposition 4.3, I assume that the buyers
also has just one intermediate good as input. In a general framework, the customer firms
may have more than one intermediate input and, as a result, decide about the evasion
of each input separately. Before studying the general case, assume that there is one
downstream which buys two differentiated inputs from two upstream activities 1 and 2
and it can over-report the purchases of either 1 or 2.
The government draws the shares µ1 and µ2 input credit invoices of the two commodi-
ties and all firms take the total number of invoices N1 and N2 as given. In this case, the
optimization problem for the upstream firms are the same as (4.2), but the probability
of not being detected for the downstream is (1−k1/N1)n1(1−k2/N2)n2 . Since N1, N2 are
large it can be approximated by 1− µ1k1 − µ2k2. Because ki = ebi/µi, the optimization
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b2) ≤ 0 (4.14)
To have nonnegative edb1 and e
d





. In this case, at
the optimum, at least one of the variables is zero and based on the amount of µ1/α1 and

























, the two FOC yield the same result eb1 = eb2 which means d is indifferent
between the two commodities and we have edb1 + e
d
b1 = eb1






d max[eb1, eb2] + δ(µ1N1 + µ2N2) (4.15)
According to Proposition 4.3, at the government’s optimum, µi is an increasing func-
tion of the number of evading firms. Besides, Proposition 4.1 indicates that for each
commodity i, eb is a strictly decreasing function of µi. Therefore, when the tax admin-
istration sets its policy from Proposition 4.3, we can write the equilibrium misreporting
of intermediate good i as
ebi = hi(Mi) (4.16)
where hi(.) is a decreasing function of Mi, the total number of firms that misreport the
commodity i. If ∃ i ∈ {1, 2} such that hi(Mui + Md) > hj(Muj ), then µ1 and µ2 are












such that eb1 = eb2. In the
general setting, the formulation of optimal policy is obtained in the same way.
Proposition 4.4. Consider a downstream activity that uses J different intermediate
goods as input. Derive the minimum number j ∈ {1, . . . , J} that can separate the goods
into two mutually exclusive sets Pj and Qj with j and J − j elements respectively, in the
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q ) (if Q = ∅ put j = J).






In addition, ∀q ∈ Qj, the downstream misreporting for commodity q is zero and the
optimal policy is determined from Proposition 4.3, given the number of other traders.
Proof. Appendix 4.H. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4.4 provides the optimal policy of the government when a downstream
activity has multiple inputs. At the optimal equilibrium, these conditions hold in all
downstream activities that have multiple intermediate commodities as inputs. The opti-
mal decision of a firm in such activities is over-reporting the input(s) that has the lowest
cross-checking probability. Therefore, the government should allocate cross-checking
rates across commodities such that a single commodity does not attract a large share
of firms for misreporting. This suggests that commodities that are the input of a lot
of other activities and have a lot of traders should be under more cross-checking than
others. Here, for simplicity, I assumed that each activity produces just one commodity,
but may use a number of inputs. In a general setting, if suppliers also have a number of
products to sell, the administration should take into account that they can also switch
between different products for evasion in the form of under-reporting the sales. Then,
Proposition 4.4 should be extended to the case that sellers can also choose which output
to under-report.
4.5. Self-assessment method without invoice cross-checking
In this section, I assume that the VAT administration uses self-assessment without invoice
reporting and at each time randomly audits a share of firms in each cluster. When a
visiting audit takes place, all VAT invoices are checked for correspondence and eb is
revealed, but the chance of detecting ec depends on the relative extent of the fraud and
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is equal to ec/yc. In this setting the optimization problem of the firms can be written as
max
eb,ec≥0

























θ(eb + ec)− θ(eb)
)
= 1 (4.19)
Condition (4.18) indicates that, at the optimum, the marginal gain of one additional unit
of eb is equal to the sum of the expected deterministic and stochastic marginal costs of




respectively. Moreover, according to
(4.19), ec results in two marginal costs: one is marginal cost of the rise in the punishment
which is λec/ycθ
′(eb+ ec) and the other is the marginal expected cost due to the increase
in detection probability of ec. At the optimum these two costs are equal to the marginal
benefit of one additional unit of evasion.
If (4.17) is a concave function, then the solutions given by FOC are the optimal
choice and they maximize the objective function. However, the concavity of (4.17) near
the critical point of FOC depends on yc, λ and the cost function.
Proposition 4.5. In the self-assessment enforcement method, if
(




2θ′(eb + ec) + ecθ
′′(eb + ec)






then the optimal choices of firm for ec and eb are found using (4.18) and (4.19). Other-
wise, at the optimum, eb = 0 and ec is found from ecθ
′(ec) + θ(ec) = yc/λ.
Proof. Appendix 4.I Q.E.D.
Proposition 4.6 states the optimal firm’s decision for evasion. When the inequality
holds, the objective function is concave, otherwise the FOC results in a saddle point where
62Here, I implicitly assumed that the amount of tax obligation on business-to-business transactions yb
is large and imposes no restriction on eb. If the solution of eb in (4.17) is greater than yb, it has the
corner solution eb = yb and the optimization is just w.r.t. ec.
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the objective function has maximum in one direction and minimum in the other. In this
case, the best decision of the firm is reallocating the evasion from business transactions
to sales to final consumers. The saddle point solution happens when θ′′(eb) is small and
yc – and as a results ec – is large. For instance, if θ
′′(0) = 0, then for small enough eb the
inequality becomes (θ′(ec)− 1)2 < 2ecθ′′(ec) which does not hold for large enough ec. (a
simple example is θ(e) = en + e). In such situations, the firm is better off by being fully
compliant for eb. Nevertheless, if θ
′′(0) is large enough, for some specific polynomial or
exponential cost functions, one can show that the saddle point never exists.
The optimality conditions of the firm, either if there is a maximum or a saddle
point, intuitively suggest that higher audit rate increases compliance, but more final
consumption reallocates evasion in favor of ec, increasing the overall amount. Formally,
we can show that the results of Proposition 4.1 are valid in this context.
Proposition 4.6. In the self-assessment enforcement method, total evasion is increasing
in transactions with final consumers yc and decreasing in visiting audit rate λ.
Proof. Appendix 4.J. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4.6 is consistent with the evidence of the positive relationship between
final consumption and total evasion of a firm suggested by Pomeranz (2013). Therefore,
this relationship is independent of the audit method of the government and is valid in
the absence of invoice cross-checking.
4.5.1. Optimal audit policy
In the simple self-assessment method without cross-checking, the optimal audit rate is
obtained similar to Section 4.4.3. Here, esb also depends on λs and consequently the FOC






In this case, define es = esb + e
s
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and ζ = yscG12/G1. In general, finding the boundaries of ζ is cum-
bersome, however if 0 < ζ < 1, the qualitative results in above about the effect of
cost convexity on the link between λ∗s and y
s
c are still valid. In an unreported robustness
check, I simulate the optimal condition for λs using two simple quadratic and asymptotic
functional forms. If θ(x) = 1
2
x2 + x and θ(x) = −1 + 1
1− x
the qualitative relationship
between λs and y
s
c are similar to Figure 4.2-a and Figure 4.2-c respectively. For the
quadratic cost function the audit rate is monotonically increasing in final consumption,
but for the asymptotic cost function the relationship is first increasing and then overturns
at a specific point.
By comparing self-assessment method with invoice cross-checking, we can simply
show that at the same rate of visiting audit, total evasion is less or equal when invoice
cross-checking is available (see Appendix 4.L). However, a more general question for pol-
icymakers is the choice between different enforcement methods. Answering this question
requires information about the fixed cost of implementing an integrated invoice system
as well as variable costs of cross-checking and visiting audit and is not in the scope of
this paper. But intuitively, we can say as new technologies reduce the fixed costs of such
system the governments are better off by utilizing it.
4.6. Conclusion
The recent developments in tax enforcement literature highlight the importance of third
party reporting and information technology on reducing tax fraud and evasion. Research
in this field, however, has tended to focus on direct taxes. This paper models how these
two instruments can be optimally utilized in the value-added tax which nowadays emerges
as the indirect tax of choice and is adopted by more than 150 countries.
The previous literature has shown that final consumption of a commodity increases
the intra-firm margin of VAT fraud (misreporting). This effect can be explained by
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the invoice system of the VAT which raises the risk of evasion on business-to-business
transaction and makes sales to final consumers more attractive for VAT fraud. Using
this variation in the detection risk, the model of this paper implies that evasion is an
increasing function of sales to final consumers and audit rate. It also shows how invoice
reporting limits the evasion on inter-firm transactions by enabling the tax administration
to do random cross-checking.
In addition to the new framework for analyzing VAT evasion, this study provides
important implications for tax administrations. First, it pinpoints how invoice cross-
checking can control VAT evasion and presents how to find its optimal rate, based on
sector and commodity characteristics such as number of traders and the level of produc-
tion. Second, the findings stress the importance of final consumption which is a sectoral
characteristic, easy to measure for the policymakers. For instance, the visiting audits
should be more focused on downstream sectors and services such as retailer shops, hotels,
and restaurants. Third, the paper underlines the significance of risk-based visiting audits
and the importance of taxpayers’ subjective measures in determining their audit rate.
Since large and incorporated enterprises have more transparent accounting system and
restricted opportunities for tax evasion, total VAT revenue can diminish if the audit of
medium and small taxpayers is neglected.
Although this paper focuses on the VAT, the results can be extended to other types
of taxes in which the tax administration faces information with different levels of accu-
racy. For instance, withholding income taxes are third-party reported and can be checked
through information reporting systems. In comparison, self-employed income tax should
be investigated by visiting audits based on the characteristics of the taxpayer. Perform-
ing predictive analytics to gauge the risk premium of the self-employed person provide
information for more efficient audit strategy
Despite the paper adds substantially to our understanding on VAT misreporting,
a number of potential limitations need to be mentioned. The present study has only
investigated one dimension of VAT fraud and tax administrations must think about other
potential evasions while implementing their policies. Keen and Smith (2006) outline a
list of VAT frauds and some practical solution. As mentioned above, a notable fraud in
developing countries is failure to register which is studied in Hoseini (2014b) in detail.
The VAT also has a big potential for cross-border frauds like missing trader (carousel)
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4.A. Relaxing the assumptions of independence of eb and ec in
section 4.4
If eb and ec are not independent and jointly determined, we can write the optimization
problem of a firm as the combination of (4.2) and (4.4).
max
eb,ec


























′(eb) + θ(eb)) = 1 (4.24)
which means that the optimal eb in this case is smaller than in (4.3). The FOC w.r.t. ec
gives
ecθ




by implicit differentiation, we can simply find the changes in the optimal level of ec when




′′(eb + ec) + θ
′(eb + ec)− θ′(eb)
2θ′(eb + ec) + ecθ′′(eb + ec)
< 0 (4.26)
Also because (1 + ∂ec/∂eb > 0) total evasion (eb + ec) becomes smaller. Therefore, by
relaxing the assumption of independence, we have a reduction in eb and an increase in
ec in the sense that total evasion declines.
The assumption about the separability of eb and ec in optimization is reasonable be-
cause in practical circumstances the two problems lead to close outcomes. As mentioned
135
Chapter 4: Misreporting in the Value-added Tax and the Optimal Enforcement
above, in reality, the variable cost of cross-checking is much less than visiting audit,
therefore at the government’s optimal µ is much larger than λ when the firm has a high
share of business customers. In this case, the second term in the left hand side of (4.24)
dominates the first term and the answer of (4.24) for eb becomes very close to (4.3). On
the other hand, when yb is small and yc is large, as a similar case to the Proposition 4.5,
the objective function in (4.23) becomes non-concave, and as a result, eb = 0 while ec is
determined by (4.5) (see section 4.5 for more details). Therefore, in either case, the two
problems lead to very similar results.
4.B. Proof of Proposition 4.1
Define f(e) = eθ′(e)+θ(e). Then, because θ(e) is strictly increasing and convex, we have



























4.C. Proof of Lemma 4.1
Similar to Appendix 4.B, define f(e) = eθ′(e) + θ(e), then according to (4.3) and (4.5)
g(x) = f−1(x). The first and second derivative of f are equal to
f ′(e) = 2θ′(e) + eθ′′(e) (4.29)
f ′′(e) = 3θ′′(e) + eθ′′′(e) (4.30)
because θ′ > 1 (this comes from the assumption that the penalty is always greater than
evasion) and θ′′ > 0, we have f ′(e) > 2. Moreover, according to (4.1), θ′′′(e) ≥ 0, and thus
we have f ′′(e) > 0. Now, according to inverse function theorem, because g(f(x)) = x,
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Therefore 0 < g′(x) ≤ 1
2
and θ′′′(e) ≥ 0 is the sufficient condition for g′′(x) < 0.
4.D. Proof of Proposition 4.2












Here, firm-level evasion esc is a function of government policy λs(y
s
c) and exogenous char-
















Based on Lemma 4.1, we can write esc = g(
ysc
λs












By differentiating w.r.t. λs and y
s
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4.E. Proof of Lemma 4.2











) = 0 (4.39)





























4.F. Finding the derivatives of Figure 4.2












































































4.G. Proof of Proposition 4.3














Proof of Proposition 4.3






















































i ) + 1 = 0 (4.45)
where µ∗i is the optimal decision of the government. Now, we can find the derivative of



























From the second order condition, the denominator of (4.47) is positive, thus because





)αi, then Bi is negligible






On the other hand, when δ – cost of an additional cross-checking – is small, the level
of evasion is small too and because θ′ = 1 near zero (see (4.17)) we can approximate












is a good approximation of µ2i when cost of cross-checking is low. But
at most µ can be equal to one and if δ is very small maybe cross-checking of all invoices
are optimal.
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4.H. Proof of Proposition 4.4
If a downstream activity uses J intermediate goods as input and over-reports k1, . . . , kJ
invoices of each input, the probability of not being detected for a firm in that activity
is (1 − k1/N1)n1 . . . (1 − kJ/NJ)nJ and its approximation will be 1 −
∑J
i=1 µiki. As a





































To have positive edb1 to e
d







least one edbi is zero. Because each upstream activity produces just one intermediate
good, its only misreporting possibility is on one commodity, but, d has different options
for misreporting. Similar to the case with two inputs, if ebi = max{eb1, . . . , ebJ}, the
downstream firm d is better off by over-reporting just the invoices of commodity i.
However, this makes the tax administration to increase the cross-checking of i, because
he knows higher number of firms are misreporting on that commodity. Then, increasing
the cross-checking rate in i may make risk of other commodities smaller for d and the
downstream firms switch their misreporting to other options.
To find the equilibrium, consider the administration makes the downstream firms
indifferent between j commodities, that comprise the elements of a set Pj, for over-
reporting their invoices and the rest of J − j commodities build up the set Qj. If
downstream firms have no incentive to evade on q ∈ Qj, on average, the share 1/j of
them over-report the transactions of p ∈ Pj. In this case, to find the total number
of misreporting firms, the tax administration adds this number to the number of the
upstream firms of each intermediate good – that have just one option for misreporting.
Therefore, at the government’s optimum, if ∀q ∈ Qj downstream evasion is zero, then
∀p ∈ Pj, we have ebp = hp(Mup + 1jM
d). On the other hand, Pj and Qj characterize a
Nash equilibrium, if downstream firms have no incentive to switch their over-reporting
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For Qj = ∅ we set j = J and the Nash equilibrium always exists, but (4.51) can hold
for j < J too. The optimal equilibrium for the administration is the one that imposes

















the optimization problem, the equilibrium with the minimum j is the optimal choice of
the administration. After finding the minimum j that holds (4.51), the optimal policy
for all p ∈ Pj is making the downstream firms indifferent for misreporting which means






On the other hand, for all q ∈ Qj, the downstream firms never decide to misreport
commodity q and the optimal policy is determined independently from Proposition 4.3
considering no downstream firm over-reports invoices of commodity q.
4.I. Proof of Proposition 4.5
By defining e = eb + ec, θe = θ(eb + ec) and θb = θ(eb) we can obtain an alternative
formulation for firm’s optimization problem
max
e≥eb≥0



























































Then, the FOC are Eb = Ee = 0, equivalent to (4.18) and (4.19). The second order
condition of partial derivatives to have a concave objective function requires
∆ = EeeEbb − E2eb > 0 (4.59)





2θ′b + (yc − ec)θ′′b
)
− (θ′e + θ′b)2 > 0 (4.60)





e(yc − ec)θ′′b + 2ecθ′′eθ′b + ec(yc − ec)θ′′eθ′′b − θ′2e − θ′2b > 0 (4.61)
θ is a convex and increasing function, thus θ′ > 0, θ′′ > 0 and θ′e > θ
′
b. In addition, from
the FOC (4.55), yc − ec = (θe − θb)/θ′b. Therefore (4.60) is equivalent to








If ∆ < 0, then the critical point is a saddle point and we have a corner solution. Since
both eb and e are positive and e ≥ eb, the corner solution that maximizes the objective
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function is either eb = 0 or ec = 0 (eb = e). In each case, we have
eb = 0 : E(e, 0) = e− λθ(e) (4.63)
ec = 0 : E(e, e) = e− λ
e
yc
θ(e), 0 ≤ e ≤ yc (4.64)
By defining θ1(e) = eθ(e)/yc, we can find the optimal decision in each case using FOC













To graphically see E(e, e) < E(e, 0), the below figure illustrates the optimal choice of eb
and ec when the other is zero. Because θ(yc) = θ1(yc) the two shaded areas are equal.
The payoff of firm from each corner solution is the area below the horizontal line at 1
and the corresponding curve. It is clearly seen that the area is bigger in case of θ′1, and







Hence, when ∆ < 0, the optimal choice of firm is eb = 0 and ec is found similar to (4.5).
4.J. Proof of Proposition 4.6
If ∆ < 0, then the critical point given by FOC is a saddle point which means at the
optimum eb = 0 and ec is found from (4.5). In this case, the proof is similar to Proposition
4.1.
If the critical point is not a saddle point and (4.62) holds, I use the notations of
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At the optimum, we have
Eb = 0, Ee = 0 (4.66)









from (4.55) and (4.66), we obtain that ∂Eb/∂λ = 0 and ∂Ee/∂λ = −1/λ, therefore from










From (4.57), it turns out that Ebb < 0. Therefore, because ∆ > 0, we have ė < 0. By
expanding (4.70), we can write the derivative of total evasion w.r.t. λ as
ėb + ėc =
yc
λ2




2 − (2θ′e + ecθ′′e )(2θ′b + (yc − ec)θ′′b )
(4.71)










From (4.54) and (4.55) we obtain ∂Eb/∂yc = −λθ′b/yc and ∂Ee/∂yc = 1/yc. Then, using















The optimal audit rate in self-assessment system


















2θ′b + (yc − ec)θ′′b
(4.74)
The left hand side multiplier is equal to ∆/Ebb and it is positive. The right hand side is
positive if
λ < 2 + (yc − ec)θ′′b /θ′b (4.75)
and it always holds because 0 < λ < 1. Therefore, when ∆ > 0 we have ẽ > 0.
4.K. The optimal audit rate in self-assessment system
Similar to above proof in section Appendix 4.D, in the absence of cross-checking, when
esb and e
s
c are jointly determined, define e
s = esb + e
s


















G1 = −η (4.77)

























Therefore, from (4.33) the derivative of λs w.r.t. y
s
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4.L. Comparing self-assessment and invoice cross-checking
methods
The equivalent problem for self-assessment when cross-checking is possible is studied in








θ′(eb + ec) + θ
′(eb)
2θ′(eb + ec) + ecθ′′(eb + ec)
> 0 (4.81)
One the other hand, the FOC w.r.t. eb in the two problems yield to (4.24) and (4.18).
Because of additional cost due to cross-checking, (4.24) gives smaller eb than (4.18).
Hence, using (4.81) total evasion is also smaller when cross-checking is available.
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Value-Added Tax and Shadow
economy: the Role of
Inter-sectoral Linkages
5.1. Introduction
According to the public economics literature, the efficiency of the value-added tax (VAT)
is tightly linked to the size of informal sector in the economy. Many developing countries,
suffering from large shadow economy,63 has adopted the VAT with a big challenge on its
optimal design and enforcement. This paper looks into the VAT evasion at the extensive
margin (non-registration of traders) and analyses the optimal enforcement strategy to
reduce the size of underground activities. Intrinsically, the VAT has a self-enforcing fea-
ture in the sense that each formal enterprise wants to get VAT credit on its inputs and, as
a result, informs the tax administration about its purchases. This incentive provides ver-
ifiable records on transactions between firms – but not with final consumers – and helps
the administration to find nonregistered firms (Keen and Smith, 2006; Pomeranz, 2013).
This feature provides an additional instrument for tax authorities to cross-check the two
pieces of information, in addition to typical investigations by auditors. By modeling this
feature in a multi-sector economy with interlinked industries, this paper analyses the
optimal enforcement across activities to alleviate shadow economy problem in a VAT
system. The great advantage of this approach is providing a straightforward rule for tax
administration to distinguish between different activities for allocating enforcement type
and spending.
As a first shot, I present a stylized fact from the Indian economy. The government
of India adopted VAT on services in 2003. Figure 5.1 illustrates tax registration rate
63According to Schneider et al. (2011), on average the size of shadow economy in developing countries
is around 40% and ranges up to 70%.
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Figure 5.1: Tax registration rate and final consumption in different service sectors of India before and
after VAT adoption in 2003. The ◦ and × symbols represents the registration rates in 2001 and 2006
respectively. The registration rate is for a representative sample of small enterprises with less than 10
employees. See section 5.5 for data details.
among firms in different services versus the share of final consumption in each service.64
The ◦ and × symbols represents the percentage of enterprises registered for tax in 2001
and 2006 respectively. It can be seen that there is negative relationship between tax
registration rate and the share of final consumption in an activity after – but not before
– VAT adoption. In other words, this figure suggests the activities with more business-to-
business (less business-to-household) transactions have more tax compliance rate when
the VAT is in place. The aim of this paper is analyzing why this pattern exist in the
VAT by modeling an interlinked economy, and how it changes the optimal enforcement
policy across different activities. In addition, it empirically tests the existence of VAT
self-enforcement using the Indian service sector data.
In order to analyze the optimal VAT enforcement policy, I start with an input-output
(I-O) model which lays the groundwork for defining forward and backward linkages.
These two sectoral indices respectively reflect the flow of intermediate products to and
from the other industries. Next, I explain cross-checking invoices – matching each input
credit claim with a corresponding output tax payment – as a distinct enforcement tool
in a VAT system and elaborate how tax administration can utilize it to reduce infor-
mality. The results suggest that in each industry, the optimal enforcement is positively
64The sample data and the sources are described in the section 5.5.
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associated with the backward linkages. Furthermore, in backwardly linked industries,
tax administrators should focus on revealing internal information of firms by visiting
audits and policies like rewards to whistle blowers. In comparison, in the forwardly
linked industries the administration should concentrate on arm-length transactions and
cross-checking the invoices with the corresponding input credit claims. In the next step,
I examine the existence of the self-enforcing feature of the VAT using tow Indian service
sector surveys. I take the VAT adoption on services in 2003 as a natural experiment to
compare formality before and after it. The results confirm a positive relationship be-
tween activity’s forward linkages and formal production share after VAT adoption. Such
a relationship is not significant for backward linkages.
The findings of the paper contribute to the tax enforcement literature in several
ways and have important policy implications specially for developing countries. This
is the first paper that uses input-output framework and the concept of forward and
backward linkages to look into the tax enforcement problem. Despite the long-established
literature on linkage analysis (which dates back to Rasmussen, 1957), its applications in
the economic theory is, for the most part, neglected by theorists. This paper utilizes two
well-known concepts of linkages analysis in economic modeling and provides measurable
industry-level indices for tax administrators to improve VAT enforcement. It shows how
with the same level of effort, tax administration can raise VAT revenue by reallocating
the level of enforcement among different activities. Backwardly linked industries that
are usually at the bottom of production chains should be the first objective for revealing
within-firms information by policies like higher audit rate and reward to whistle-blowers.
On the other hand, forwardly linked industries, normally located up the production chain,
are the best objectives for invoice cross-checking. A great advantage of the linkages
indices is their measurability using I-O tables which eases policy implementation in
developing countries. In addition, this paper test the existence of self-enforcing feature
of the VAT using a natural experiment in the second most-populated country of the
world and finds that the VAT adoption is the underlying reason of the positive effect of
forward linkages on tax compliance.
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5.1.1. Literature review
Recent studies in public economics model the VAT from different angles. Some, on a
broader level, compare the efficiency of the VAT to other indirect taxes like tariff and
RST (Boadway and Sato, 2009; Emran and Stiglitz, 2005; Keen, 2008), while others
concentrate on its optimal design of rates and exemption levels (Keen and Mintz, 2004;
Piggott and Whalley, 2001). To date, however, little research has focused on VAT
evasion and avoidance by theorists. There are a number of ways of fraud in the VAT
which are discussed in details in Keen and Smith (2006) and the focus of this paper
is on the shadow economy fraud which refers to non-registration of traders. In high-
income countries, underground activities comprise relatively smaller share in total VAT
evasion rather than the frauds by registered traders such as misreporting the transactions,
carousel fraud, etc.65 In comparison, failure to register for the VAT is a common fraud
in low-income countries. For instance, the below estimations show, during 2001-2006 in
India, only 18 percent of production in “unorganized service sectors” is produced by tax
registered firms. Therefore, the results of this paper is more applicable for low-income
countries, hurting from the shadow economy fraud.
The nexus of indirect tax policy and the size of the informal sector has been the
subject of a number of contributions in the literature. Emran and Stiglitz (2005) study
the inefficiencies of the VAT compared to tariff in an economy with a large informal
sector. They argue that, given the size of informal market in developing countries, the
standard policies to replace trade taxes with the VAT reduce welfare under plausible
assumptions. Their argument is based on the assumption that the informal enterprises
may escape from paying the VAT, but cannot avoid border taxes. The follow-up by
Keen (2008) argues that Emran and Stiglitz (2005) undervalue the power of the VAT to
absorb revenue under large informal sector by neglecting the intermediate inputs in the
production side of the economy. He explores the function of the VAT as a tax on the
inputs of the informal sector because non-compliant firms are unable to recover the VAT
paid on the inputs bought from compliant firms. However, he mentions that the existence
of a large informal sector can invalidate the conventional policies on replacing trade taxes
65 As and example, in 2001-02, VAT revenue loss in UK is estimated to be %10.2–%14.2 of total VAT
revenue, among which %0.6–%0.7 is due to non-registration for the VAT (Keen and Smith, 2006).
The misreporting fraud –understating sales and overstating purchases– by registered firms is studied
in Hoseini (2014a) in details.
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with the VAT and the ability of the tax administration to reduce informality can shift
the optimal policy toward the VAT. For modeling informality, this paper uses a same
framework as Emran and Stiglitz (2005) and Keen (2008), in the sense that the number
of formal and informal firms are given, while informal producers set their production level
according to the tax rate and enforcement policies. The empirical evidence in this field
also emphasizes the importance of an efficient design and administration of the VAT
in developing economies. Baunsgaard and Keen (2010) show in a panel study of 117
countries that recovering the loss in trade taxes with the VAT has failed in low income
countries in spite of its success in the developed world. Although this paper does not
directly discuss trade taxes, it gives straightforward policy recommendations to solve
the enforcement inefficiencies of the VAT for overcoming the problem of revenue loss in
replacing border tax with domestic sources.
On the tax enforcement side, the literature points to the close connection between tax
administration efficiency and information gaps (for a survey see Slemrod and Yitzhaki,
2002) and a growing branch studies the role of firms in facilitating enforcement. Kopczuk
and Slemrod (2006) argue that verifiable paper trails from arms-length transactions and
aggregation of information within firms considerably alleviate tax enforcement problems.
They show, in a simple model, that the VAT has a great administrative advantage to
the retail sales tax (RST) that possesses no business-to-business transactions records.
In this paper, I also emphasize the importance of arms-length transaction records as
a type of third party reporting for the VAT administration and argue that as long as
the share of arms-length transactions is not the same across activities (like Figure 5.1),
the optimal enforcement policy also differs among them. Then, I link this variation
with inter-sectoral linkages and find the optimal policies by taking such differences into
consideration.
Another role of firms in facilitating tax enforcement is providing information through
third party reporting of employees. Kleven et al. (2009) use this function of the firm to
answer why governments can tax so much nowadays. They indicate that the standard
tax evasion models like Allingham and Sandmo (1972) fail to explain the high level of tax
compliance in the developed world, given the low enforcement by governments. In order
to address this issue, they argue that generally a firm can collude with its employees to
un- or under-report its income to the tax administration, but in practice such collusion
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is fragile when the firm is big with a large number of employees. One reason for breaking
the collusion is random shocks due to unintentional mistakes or conflicts within firm,
another can be rational whistle blowing due to the rewards by the government. In this
paper, I add this type of third-party reporting to the model by linking the probability of
detection of informal firms to the number of their employees. In comparison to Kopczuk
and Slemrod (2006) who emphasize the importance of inter-firm information networks,
Kleven et al. (2009) focus on intra-firm information sources. In a general context both
of them reflect the importance of third party reporting in facilitating tax enforcement,
one by trade partners, the other by workers. The key advantage of the VAT is enabling
the tax administration to use both of these information sources for detecting fraud and
evasion. Therefore, this paper presents the optimal policy for the VAT enforcement by
putting together two instruments for revealing firms’ true information: checking arms-
length transactions and third party reporting by workers.
In a closer look into VAT evasion, De Paula and Scheinkman (2010) address the
decision of firms for being formal in a VAT setting. Their model assumes that firms
have different managerial abilities and above a cut-off production informal firms are
detected by the tax administration. In this setting, they show that low ability firms
remain small and informal, but high ability firms become formal to produce with no
restriction. Then, they indicate that under the VAT, (in)formal firms trade with their
(in)formal peers in the production chain not with the other type. Their results are
based on variation in managerial ability and are silent about the industry in which the
firm works. In comparison, this paper looks from a different point of view by assuming
the same ability for all managers, but different industries in which a firm can work.
This approach has a great practical advantage since instead of relying on unobservable
variables like ability and entrepreneurship, it addresses the optimal tax administration’s
policy for each industry based on measurable characteristics like linkages and connections
with the other industries.
In the empirical literature, most of the papers on VAT evasion are limited to cross
country or panel estimations, testing whether VAT adoption leads to more revenue (Ebrill
et al., 2001; Keen and Lockwood, 2010). One notable exception is Pomeranz (2013) who
provides micro evidence for the self-enforcing feature of the VAT using two randomized
experiments in Chile. The first experiment implies that in the absence of the VAT
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paper trail like sales to final consumers, firms respond more strongly to a rise in audit
letter message, suggesting the presence of the VAT paper trail has a preventive effect on
evasion. This is consistent with my finding that forwardly linked industries, having more
paper trail, are more compliant. In the “spillover experiment”, the Chilean tax authority
randomly sends an announcement of audit for half of the suspected firms and collects
information about their trading partners. The results show that the announcement
reduces the evasion among the suppliers of the treated firms, verifying the presence of
self-enforcement from clients to suppliers. In this paper, in addition to modeling the
findings of Pomeranz (2013) theoretically, I find the optimal enforcement policy for each
industry based on its linkages with the other industries.
Before proceeding, some caveats are in place. The model of this paper ignores the
VAT frauds by registered traders such as misreported sales, multiple rates and misclas-
sification of commodities and missing trader (carousel) fraud which are mentioned in
Keen and Smith (2006). It also dismisses benefits of formality which are stressed in the
literature like access to finance and legal institutions. Considering these issues should not
change the qualitative implications of the model, which just focus on reducing informality
in the VAT from the view point of inter-industry connections.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2, constructs the basic model and intro-
duces forward and backward linkages. Next, in section 5.3, I explain tax administration’s
enforcement instruments in the VAT, and in section 5.4, I find the market equilibrium
and the optimal enforcement policy in each industry. In the section 5.5, I empirically
examine the existence of the self-enforcing feature and finally, I conclude.
5.2. The Basic Model
Consider an economy with n = 1, . . . , N competitive industries each producing a ho-
mogeneous and unique product xn. Each product can either be used as an input of
other industries or be consumed by final consumers. The production technology of all
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αkn + αn = 1 (5.1)
where xn is the production of industry n, vn is the value-adding input,
67 and xkn is the
amount of product k as an intermediate input of industry n. The market of value-adding
input v is also competitive and I take its price as the numeraire. In equilibrium, pn is
the price by which the product n is traded. In this setting, the profit of a representative
firm in industry n becomes
πn = pnxn −
N∑
k=1
pkxkn − vn (5.2)




xn, vn = αnpnxn (5.3)











At the demand side, each product is used either as an intermediate input or for final
consumption. By denoting the final consumption of the product of industry n as x0n,
one can write total representative demand of industry n as




where the first term shows the final demand and the second term is the sum of all
intermediate demands of product n. Assume that final consumers are homogeneous with
a net income w and a Cobb-Douglas utility in the sense that the utility maximization
66 The results of the model is robust to assuming a general CES function and are available upon request.
67 For simplicity, vn represents all inputs other than intermediate goods. More general assumption
would be adding labor and other non-intermediate factors of value-added in the production function
and using la1n k
a2
n . . . instead of vn, but it does not change the qualitative results of the model.
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problem for a representative final consumer is






βi = 1, s.t.
N∑
i=1
pix0i = w (5.6)
where βi determines per-unit fraction of the consumers’ incomes used in purchasing
good i. The solution of (5.6) gives the final demand of each product n as x0n = wβn/pn.
Therefore, in equilibrium, the representative production and demand are equal in all
industries and by substituting x0n and xnk from (5.3) in (5.5), we can write









Define yn = pnxn as representative value of production in industry n. Then,




(5.8) expresses that the total value of production of commodity n is equal to the value
that is bought by final consumers who spend a fraction βn of their total wealth on it
plus the intermediate demand of other industries. The share of the value of product
n consumed as the input of k in total value of output of industry k is αnk. To find
the equilibrium value of production in each industry, I employ vectors Y and B with
dimensionality N × 1 containing yn and βn respectively, together with an N ×N matrix
A built by αkn as elements.
68 Then, (5.8) is written as
Y = wB +AY, ⇒ Y = (I −A)−1wB. (5.9)
Since wB > 0, (5.9) imposes that AY < Y . In this case, (I−A)−1 in (5.9) always exists
and there is unique equilibrium Y :
Theorem 1. Matrix A is square and nonnegative, then




68Throughout the paper, lower-case letters like x denotes a scalar, upper-case like X a vector, and bold
upper-case like X a matrix.
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for some column vector V ≥ 0.
Proof. See Ten Raa (2006), theorem 2.2. Q.E.D.
Theorem 1 states that if the technology matrix A is capable of producing a positive
output Y such that AY < Y , the inverse exists. Then, Y = (I+A+A2+. . . )wB, where
AmwB is the indirect effect of final consumption wB in rising the value of production
of Y through m intermediate goods in between.
5.2.1. Forward and backward linkages
The above model provides a simple framework to study the effect of inter-sectoral link-
ages. I introduce two types of linkages indices in this regard: forward linkage which quan-
tifies the value of products that is sold to the other industries (not final consumers), and
backward linkage, which indexes the value of products purchased from other industries.
In order to gauge these two properties, Rasmussen (1957) suggests the row and column
sum of the inverse of the industry×industry table of the economy which is computed
using the corresponding input-output transaction tables. I use the method proposed by
Rasmussen (1957) and define the following formulas for forward and backward linkages
vectors:
Forward linkage: FL = (I − Y −1AY )−1J (5.10)
Backward linkage: BL = (I −A′)−1J (5.11)
where Y is a diagonal matrix of vector Y in the sense that diag(Y ) = Y , A′ is the
transpose of A, and J is a vector of ones (summation vector). If we expand (5.10) and
(5.11) for each element, it gives the coefficient of each industry n:
















+ . . . (5.12)











αjkαkn + . . . (5.13)
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fln shows how much is the value of production that goes to the other industries (not
final consumers), normalized by yn. It includes both direct linkages (customers) and
indirect linkages through intermediate goods (customers of customers). Similarly bln
measures the amount of input that comes from other industries, directly or indirectly,
normalized by yn. Note that these two indices are independent of each other. There
may be an industry that has strong linkages in either directions or none of them. For
instance, some agricultural products are very primitive in nature and are directly sold
to the final consumers. Hence, they do not possess any forward or backward linkages. In
comparison, steel is a good example of an industry that has both types of linkages: coal
and iron ore are backward and many items like canned goods are its forward industries.
Furthermore, the two above linkage concepts cover both vertical and horizontal inter-
industry connections. The vertical linkage is a chain of industries from up to downstream
producing a final good (e.g. petroleum industries from crude oil extraction to plastics),
but horizontal linkage is between two industries exchanging their differentiated products
and none of them is necessarily categorized above or below the other (e.g. Fuels and Iron
industries). Figure 5.1 shows a simple example of a network of industries, where there are
two vertical chains 1 and 2, each including a raw material supplier (S), a manufacturer
(M) and a retailer (R) such that S is the upstream and R is the downstream industry.
In other words, in each chain S is just forwardly linked, R just backwardly and M has
both types of linkages. These two production chains are also horizontally linked from






Figure 5.1: Vertical and horizontal linkages. Industry S1 is forwardly linked to M1 (direct
linkage) and M2, R1, and R2 (indirect linkages). In comparison, Industry R1 is backwardly linked to
M1 (direct linkage) and M2, S1, and S2 (indirect linkages).
linked with M2 and R2 through M1. Similarly, the backward linkages index of R1 takes
into account the indirect effect of S2 and M2 through M1.
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5.3. Adding the VAT
Regarding taxation, consider the government imposes a uniform VAT rate t and fines all
non-registered firms who have to be registered according to the law. The ad valorem tax
in industry n is added to its market price pn, in the sense that registered firms charge tax
on their sales and issue the corresponding invoices to the buyers, who if registered can
use this invoice to refund against their own tax liability. Unregistered firms, on the other
hand, buy and sell at tax inclusive price, but they do not pay any tax to the government.
For coexistence of formal and informal69 markets, consistent with Keen (2008), I assume
that the number of formal and informal firms are given but they decide about their level
of production. The production function is constant returns to scale for formal firms,
but due to the expected fine for VAT evasion, the profit of informal firms is subject to
decreasing returns.70
As an example, consider a simple production chain for a final good R with three
stages: raw material supplier (S), manufacturer (M), and retailer (R) such that their




R−→ pR. Therefore, at the first stage, one unit of S transforms to one
unit of M and then, at the second stage, the new product changes to one unit of final
consumer good R. Table 5.1 shows the balance sheet of each industry if they register
under the VAT or not.
Table 5.1: Prices and revenues under the VAT.
industry output price input price tax payment profit























Si pS + tpS 0 0 (1 + t)pSx
i
S − cS
Mi pM + tpM pS + tpS 0 (1 + t)(pMx
i
M − pSxiS)− cM
Ri pR + tpR pM + tpM 0 (1 + t)(pRx
i
R − pMxiM)− cR
69From now on, by formal (informal), I mean registered and fully tax compliant (not registered) for the
VAT.
70I ignore the possibility of misreporting in the formal sector. However, one can assume each represen-
tative firm sells one part of its production in the formal market (xfn) and one part in the informal
(xin). In this case, as shown below, if the expected fine of producing x
i
n is the same as an informal
firm with that level of production, the results do not change. For detailed analysis of misreporting in
the VAT see Hoseini (2014a).
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The superscript f represents formal sector and i informal. The main difference be-
tween the two groups is that informal firms do not pay the tax to the government, but
instead have a risk of detection and punishment by the tax administration equal to cn.
In the general model with N industries the same pattern holds. According to Table 5.1,
tax earnings cancel out the payments of a formal firm to the government, therefore its












n ≥ 0 (5.14)
which is similar to (5.2) and gives (5.4) as equilibrium prices.
Table 5.1 shows that informal firms benefit from evading the VAT, but bear a cost cn.
This cost reflects the risk of being detected and punished by the tax administration due
to not registering for the VAT. I assume the evasion cost is a convex function of the level
of production xin (discussed below), and thus the production of informal firms is subject
to decreasing returns reflecting the expected loss from VAT evasion. This assumption
allows for the coexistence of formal and informal markets.71 Since the production of
formal firms is constant returns to scale, they may produce at any level, but informal
firms choose a specific amount based on their optimization. If the optimal production
of informal firms is higher than total demand in an industry, informal firms supply all
demand. Otherwise, they produce at the optimal level and formal firms produce the rest.
Consequently, one can easily show that if final demand is high enough in all industries,
in the presence of government enforcement the formal production is always nonzero.
Following Allingham and Sandmo (1972), the literature on tax evasion normally as-
sumes that the cost of evasion cn depends on two factors. One is the value of the fine,
reasonably proportional to the evasion level, and the other is the probability of detecting
the fraud by tax administrators – see Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) for a survey. In this
model, I enter these properties by the following simple form:
cn(en, ηn) = θenηn, 0 ≤ ηn ≤ 1 (5.15)
where en and ηn are evasion level and detection probability, respectively. θ > 1 is the
71This structure of formal and informal production is broadly the same as Emran and Stiglitz (2005)
and Keen (2008).
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punishment per unit of evasion set by the government based on legal and political con-
siderations. It should be greater than one, otherwise the marginal benefit of informality
always beats its costs. Therefore, the profit function of a representative firm in the
informal sector of industry n is written as







kn − vin − θenηn, xin ≥ 0. (5.16)
According to the Table 5.1, the amount of evasion en of a representative informal firm









Hence, we can rewrite (5.16) as











− vin, xin ≥ 0. (5.18)
Proposition 5.1. Under perfect competition, the production of a representative firm in








Proof. Appendix 5.A. Q.E.D.
According to Proposition 5.1, to compute the informal production of each industry, we
need to know the functional form of detection probability ηn. In next section, I discuss in
detail how we can mathematically define this function and link it with the self-enforcing
feature of the VAT. Computing the level of informal production in each industry enables
us to measure the share of formal production in each industry as the desired formality
index of the tax administration. For simpler mathematics and notation, I redefine xfn and
xn as the average formal and total quantity of production per representative informal





72 Similarly, we can redefine yfn = pnx
f
n and
72Here, the administrations’ objective is the share of formal production not the number of firms and this
notational change removes the number of firms in each industry from calculations. If the number of
informal and formal firms are min and m
f















n. In other words, the production quantity
of an average formal firm which is zfn/m
f




n. This change in the definition does
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yn = pnxn as the value of formal and total production in industry n respectively. Then,





5.3.1. Probability of detection
Before any further analysis, we need a reasonable assumption about the probability of
detection ηn. Broadly, there are two information sources for the tax administration to
check the business records. One is within-firm information such as profit and wages,
the other is external information, such as transactions with other businesses and banks.
Detection of within-firm information is usually done by visiting audit, but the external
information is attainable by checking the bank accounts, invoices etc. In the following, I
first explain these factors and how the administration can exploit them and then I define
a functional form for this probability.
Firm size
On the intra-firm side, a crucial factor that determines tax evasion is the firm size. Kleven
et al. (2009) show that although theoretically a firm can collude with its employees to
unreport its tax liability, in practice, if the number of employees is large, maintaining such
collusion becomes very difficult. They indicate this collusion may break for a number
of reasons. The first set is a random shock due to unplanned events such as a conflict
between employer and employee, moral concerns of a newly hired employee, or a mistake
of an employee or employer to reveal the records to the tax administration. The other
reason can be rational whistle blowing because of a rewards by the tax administration
which is common in several countries.73 If the number of employees is large, collusion is
fragile and easily breaks down by each of these reasons. Therefore, this type of third-
party reporting dramatically improves tax enforcement of bigger firms. De Paula and
Scheinkman (2010) also develop a model with a trade-off between paying taxes versus
the firm size. They show that tax registration is positively associated with the revenue
and the number of employees among Brazilian firms. To incorporate this effect in the
probability function of an informal firm, I use the size of the firm xin. To ensure that
not alter any result of the model because the production of formal firms is CRS and they are fully
compliant. Alternatively, one can enter the number of firms in the calculations and find formality by




n), which leads to the exact same results.
73Kleven et al. (2009) mention some example from OECD countries like the US and Japan.
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the probability always lies between zero and one, I define the parameter ρn as the share
of firms that are detected by the tax administration if the whole industry n is informal
and assume the chance that an informal firm in industry n is detected by visiting audit
is ρnx
i
n/xn. The variation in ρn across industries captures the industry-level differences
in use of financial sector, labor intensity, and all other factors that can ease the audit by
the tax administration for that specific industry.
Firm-to-firm transactions
The second source of information for the tax administration is arm’s-length transactions
of the firm (Kopczuk and Slemrod, 2006). These transaction records enable tax ad-
ministrators to verify them with the accounts of their business partners. This source is
especially important in the VAT because formal firms are required to keep the records of
their sales and purchases. In practice, there are different methods of VAT administration
based on the type of assessment, technology and invoice reporting, but in all types, firms
either have to keep the sales and purchase invoices for some years or send them to the
tax administration with their tax report.74 Importantly, formal traders have a strong
incentive to report their purchase invoices because they can get input credit and deduct
their VAT bill. Each purchase invoice as a third-party reported piece of information en-
ables the authority to investigate formality and registration status of the seller. In other
words, the incentive of formal clients to report the transaction for getting input credit
makes an additional risk of detection for the informal supplier. This risk also depends
on how much the tax administration puts effort on cross-checking the input credit claim
with the corresponding tax payment.
This feature of the VAT, which is labeled as self-enforcing property (Keen and Smith,
2006), is a one-way effect from formal firms to their supplier not costumers. When a
formal firm purchases an input, it requests an invoice to send to the tax administration
for input credit. Then, the administration can use the invoice to check whether the
supplier is formal or not. However, when a formal firm sells a product, it issues the
invoice irrespective of the buyer’s type. If the new buyer is a formal firm, again it uses
the invoice for input credit and the two records – formal seller’s sale and formal buyer’s
74With the new developments in electronic invoicing, in many countries firms report each single invoice
to the tax administration electronically with substantially less compliance cost. For more information
on different types of VAT administration see Ebrill et al. (2001) and Hoseini (2014a).
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purchase – enable the tax administration to cross-check them together. Otherwise, the
invoice just informs that the product is sold, regardless of whether the buyer is an
informal firm or a final consumer. Thus, in this case, the tax administration cannot
distinguish between the ones that should be punished (informal firms) and not punished
(final consumers).
To incorporate the self-enforcing feature in the detection probability, I assume that
risk of being detected by invoices is larger when the share of formal customers who inform
the tax administration about the transaction is bigger. Hence, the detection probability





nk/xn. Notice that because both markets are perfectly competitive, a
single informal firm cannot change xn by changing its own production level. Thus, each
firm takes xn as given when optimizing profit.
I now discuss how tax administrations can utilize the two above information sources
and then translate it to a mathematical probability function for ηn. Some of the enforce-
ment strategies are not specific to the VAT such as identification of non-registered firms
and the rate of visiting audits reflecting the efforts to reveal within-firm information. In
comparison, as described above, a distinctive enforcement strategy for the VAT is the
cross-checking of the invoices. Both of these strategies directly depend on tax admin-
istration expenditures and efforts for the VAT enforcement. Thus, I assume that the




is the expenditure to enforce tax in industry n and ḡ is a fixed term to ensure ϕn ≤ 1.
Altering across industries, 0 ≤ ϕn ≤ 1 is the first policy variable that the tax administra-
tion seeks to find its optimum allocation among different industries for maximizing net
VAT revenue. The tax administration also determines the share λn of the enforcement to
dedicate for invoice cross-checking versus revealing insider information in each industry.
This parameter – multiplied by ϕn – determines the level of cross-checking which means
how much the administration tries to find and check the seller of a purchase invoice that
a formal customer, requesting input credit, claims to buy from.
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risk of detection thourgh within-firm information
+







0 ≤ ϕn ≤ 1, 0 ≤ λn ≤ 1. (5.20)
When the enforcement expenditure gn in an industry n goes up, ϕn approaches one and







n ≤ xn the probability is always less than 1.
5.4. Market equilibrium and optimal enforcement
Given the two instruments to enforce the VAT, in this part, I find the equilibrium
informal production by evaluating the response of informal firms to the enforcement
policy. To reduce the risk of unintentional mistakes and whistle-blowing threat, informal
firms can control their size. Therefore, they cannot grow as formal firms and their size
in this regard depends on the detection possibilities of the tax administration which is
reflected in ρn. The second risk of detection is through invoice cross-checking of business
transactions. To reduce this risk, informal firms should pay attention to their costumers’
type. An informal firm has two choices regarding the cross-checking risk: (I) selling the
product to all business costumers irrespective of their type, (II) not selling to formal
costumers and match with informal firms. In action (I) the informal firm does not care
about the type of their clients and issues a fake invoice if necessary which results in a risk
of detection by cross-checking. The advantage of this is selling the product at the same
price as formal firms (1+t)pn and earning a money equal to tpn on each transaction. This
action can be a desirable strategy when the bulk of costumers of the firm are informal
and the invoice cross-checking rate λn is small in industry n. In comparison, action (II)
is matching with an informal client, who cannot apply for input credit, to be insured
against the cross-checking risk. However, in this case, the seller cannot sell its product
as high as tax inclusive price of formal firms and in order to persuade the informal client
to match, the firm has to suggest a lower price and share part of the VAT evasion with
the buyer. Therefore, if an informal firm in industry n chooses action (II), its sales price
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is between pn and (1 + t)pn.
The extent of reduction in the price of informal firms under action (II) depends on
the bargaining powers of the two parties. When the bulk of costumers of a product are
informal firms or final consumers, the informal seller has higher bargaining power and
the reduction in its sales price relative to (1 + t)pn is smaller (and vice versa). In other
words, the supplier has less bargaining power for matching when the bulk of clients of
its product are formal firms. This means that if the supplier decides to match, the price
would be a decreasing function of the share of formal clients. I therefore assume that
the average reduction in price, which can be interpreted as the matching cost, for each




nk/xn. Here, 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 reflects the average share of evasion





reflects the bargaining power of the informal seller in the market. Thus, in industry n,
while the sales revenue of an informal seller choosing action (I) is (1 + t)pnxn, in case it





We can find the turning point that informal firms decide between the two actions by
comparing the profit in each case. Under action (I), the detection probability ηn is equal
to (5.20) and overall profit is computed by substituting (5.20) into (5.18). Under action
(II), the cross-checking risk is removed from the detection probability and we would





from the overall profit (5.18). With straightforward calculations, we can show that the
difference in profits of action (I) and (II) is






Therefore, if µ > θϕnλn which means the average cost of matching is higher than the risk
of cross-checking, the informal firms in industry n prefer action (I), otherwise they choose
(II). In the next step, I study the pattern of formality across different industries based
on their linkages. The following proposition shows the equilibrium relationship between
formality defined as fn = x
f
n/xn, government enforcement, and forward linkages.
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In addition, F(N×1) as a vector containing f1 . . . fN , is positively associated with the
forward linkages matrix defined as FL = (I −Y −1ΓAY )−1, where Γ(N×N) is a diagonal
matrix consisting γ1 . . . γN as diagonal elements.
Proof. Appendix 5.B Q.E.D.
Since ϕn is directly associated with gn, Proposition 5.2 intuitively indicates that
the tax administration’s attempt to find informal firms reduces the size of informal
market.75 Moreover, Proposition 5.2 indicates how formality in one is linked to formality
in the other industries.76 To provide more insight, define F̃(N×1) a vector containing 1−
1
2θρn(1− λn)ϕn
which is the formality vector in the absence of cross-checking (∀n, λn =
0) and its elements are always between zero and one. Then, F = (I −X−1ΓAX)−1F̃ –
see (5.55) in Appendix 5.B for proof – and from Theorem 1, we can write
F = (I +X−1ΓAX +X−1(ΓA)2X + . . . )F̃ (5.23)
where X−1(ΓA)tXF̃ is the indirect effect of formality in other industries in rising the
formality of an industry through t intermediate goods in between. If we expand (5.23)




















formal customers through one intermediate good
(formal customers of customers)
+ . . . (5.24)
where f̃n = 1−
1
2θϕn(1− λn)ρn
. Therefore, by utilizing the self-enforcing feature of the
75Note that because formality is always between zero and one, there can be a corner solution if ϕn <
1
2θ .
76The forward linkage index is not completely the same as (5.11), because of the existence of Γ consists
of γn as diagonal elements. γn is a policy variable set by the administration and I show later that
0 ≤ γn < 1/ρn. If it is set equal to 1 in all industries, the linkages indices become the same as (5.11)
and (5.12), otherwise γ1, . . . , γN act as multipliers specifying a fixed weight to the linkages of each
industry to compute FL and BL.
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VAT, tax administration can increase the formal sector size from f̃n to fn. The particular









The left hand side of (5.25) is the direct effect of forward linkages in (5.24). Thus, we
can conclude that the forward linkages of an industry have a negative relationship with
its final demand share.77 Consequently, an activity with more final demand in total
production is more likely to be informal and has a lower tax registration rate.
5.4.1. Optimal Enforcement
After characterizing the formality of each industry, in this section, I derive the optimal
enforcement policies to control informality. To avoid mathematical complexity, in this
part, I assume the informal firms are not constrained by market demand and their
production is not a corner solution. In section 5.4.2, I analyze the problem when the
demand side determines their production. The first step for finding the optimal policy
is defining the objective function of the tax administration and its policy variables. The






















n = tαnynfn (5.26)
On the other hand, the administration faces an enforcement expense gn in each industry
which is an increasing function of ϕn. If gn approaches zero, detection becomes infeasible








tαnynfn − gn (5.27)
The next two propositions indicates the optimal share of cross-checking and enforce-
ment expenditure in each industry.
77w is the net-of-tax income, and in the presence of a homogeneous VAT, w represents gross household
income divided by 1 + t.
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Proposition 5.3. The optimal share of cross-checking in total enforcement spending of


























Proof. Appendix 5.C. Q.E.D.
Expression (5.28) states that cross-checking is optimal in industry n when it increases
detection probability at least twice higher than the firm size threat.78 In this case,
the tax administration should put effort into cross-checking as much as it does not
persuade informal firms to contract with their peers. Moreover, the right-hand side of
the inequality condition is an indicator of forward linkages – see the second term of
(5.22). Therefore, λn is positively associated with forward linkages of an industry.






where G2 and A are two N × 1 vector with elements g2n and αn respectively, A is defined




Proof. Appendix 5.D. Q.E.D.












αjγjαjkγkαkn + . . . ) (5.30)
The immediate result of the Proposition 5.4 is that the optimal expenditure to enforce
tax in each industry depends on the square root of the tax rate divided by the surcharge
rate of punishment. Also, higher ḡ and lower ρn mean that tax administration has to
spend more money to reach the same probability of detection.
78Factor 2 is due to the quadratic functional form of the cost of evasion in xin. If the cost function has
higher degree of convexity this number increases and vice-versa.
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Apart from these effects, (5.30) shows that the optimal expenditure is positively
associated with backward linkages of the industry defined as (I −A′Γ)−1. This reflects
the fact that the self-enforcement property of the VAT is from costumers to suppliers
not vice-versa. In other words, backwardly linked industries are directly or indirectly
customers of forwardly linked ones, so their compliance leads to higher compliance of their
suppliers too. Therefore, they are better cases for regular tax audit than not backwardly
linked industries. This result is of particular interest since it shows how inter-industry
linkages can affect the optimal policy.
The backward linkage index used in Proposition 5.4 is to some extent different from
(5.11), introduced by Rasmussen (1957). The first difference is weighting by the intensity
of value-adding input vector A – compare the extensive forms in (5.13) and (5.30). The
second is the appearance of 0 ≤ γn ≤ 1/ρn in (5.30). As shown in Proposition 5.3,
the optimal γn for the administration is positively associated with the forward linkages
of the industry n. Therefore, γn act as a weight for measuring backward linkages that
overstates the linkages with the suppliers that have strong forward linkages, but rules
out the linkages with industries that have low forward linkages with λn = 0.
Putting Propositions 5.4 and 5.3 together yields the implication of interest: The
tax administration should spend more to reveal within-firm information of backwardly
linked industries and make more cross-checking in forwardly linked ones. For instance,
in the simple example of Table 5.1, the administration should put more effort on the
downstream R and try to reveal the within-firm information in this industry (e.g. visiting
audit, tempting reward for whistle-blowers). But in S, it should dedicate the spending
to check the invoices and transactions.
Although in (5.30), just the positive and direct effect of backward linkages on gn is
visible, forward linkages can also rise gn through λn. In comparison to the linearity of
backward linkages, the impact of forward linkages on the optimal expenditures is non-
linear. According to Proposition 5.3, if forward linkages are big enough to hold the upper




, otherwise it does not change by the
level of forward linkages. Thus, most of the enforcement spending should be dedicated
to industries that are both forwardly and backwardly involved in the production chain.
In contrast, the least spending should be given to the industries that do not possess
any linkages. Moreover, according to (5.26) and (5.30), enforcement is not beneficial in
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small industries in which αnyn <
2ḡ
tθρn
and a convenient policy would be exempting these
industries from the VAT.79
5.4.2. Market demand constraint and assortative matching equilibrium
So far in the model, I have assumed that the informal firms are not constrained by market
demand and their optimal decisions are always found by the internal optimum of their
profit maximization problem. In this section, I want to analyze their behavior when
market demand is binding and imposes a corner solution to their decision. As mentioned
above, an informal firm can choose between two actions to deal with cross-checking: (I)
selling to all types of clients, (II) commit and match with an informal client. In each
case, I denote the internal solution of the optimal production of an informal firm (as the
case of Proposition 5.1) by xi∗n and the maximum purchase of available customers for a




n and ȳn = pnx̄n.
If yi∗n > ȳ
i
n, the market demand is binding and producing at the level of y
i∗
n is not possible
for informal firms. In order to take market demand into consideration, I assume that
final consumers are indifferent between buying from formal and informal markets such




is the value of final consumption in industry n (see (5.8)).80 Then, we can find the
production level and payoff of an informal firm from choosing each action. Given the
concavity of the profit, the actual production value of the informal firm after each action








n after choosing action (I) and (II).
Table 5.1: Outcomes of an informal firm from action (I) (selling to all types of firms)
and action (II) (not selling to formal firms) – yi∗n represents the internal solution of optimization














































Moving from (I) to (II), the value of market demand ȳin drops, but when cross-checking
79To show this, assume there is no cross-checking and ∀n λn = 0. Then, the revenue in each industry
becomes rn = tαnyn(1 − ḡ2θgnρn ) − gn and its optimal amount is r
∗




. If r∗n < 0
the administration is better off by leaving industry n out from the VAT.
80alternatively, one can assume a fixed share of final consumers for each type of firms, but as long as the
inter-firm factors does not affect the final demand of each group the qualitative results are the same.
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is optimal and λn > 0 the endogenous optimum y
i∗
n increases. The market available after
action (I) is the total demand in the industry and it is the optimal choice of informal
firms when λn = 0. On the other hand, when cross-checking is optimal and action (I)
has lower yi∗n , informal suppliers, missing the formal market demand, match with their
informal clients.
According to Table 5.1, the equilibrium point may change based on whether ȳin is
binding or not. When there is no restriction from market demand, the results are pre-
sented in Proposition 5.4 and 5.3. In comparison, when the market demand is binding,
FOC of profit maximization in proposition 5.1 and 5.2 are not valid anymore and infor-
mal production in each industry is determined by the production of the clients. There
are two equilibriums in which the market demand ȳn is binding. First, if y
i∗
n (I) > ȳ
i
n(I),
informal firms choose (I) and supply all market demand in industry n. In reality, this can
happen when market demand for product n is so small that the tax administration leaves
it out from taxation (e.g. exemption policies). The second case is when yi∗n (II) > ȳ
i
n(II)
and the optimal λn is positive. This equilibrium is an assortative matching (AM) equi-
librium, in the sense that informal firms match with the same type customers and supply
all of the informal demand while, formal firms just sell in the formal market to formal
businesses or final consumers. This equilibrium is in close relation to the results of De
Paula and Scheinkman (2010) which show under VAT each firm trades with the same
type. The below Proposition presents the optimal policy when the equilibrium in some
industries are AM.
Proposition 5.5. If AM holds in industries indexed by M + 1, . . . , N , then the optimal
policies are






















where G21 is the vector containing g
2
1, . . . , g
2
M of the M industries that are not under
AM, subscripts 1 and 2 represent the decomposition of the corresponding vector










, etc., and D = (I − Y −12 B −A22)−1A21.
Proof. Appendix 5.E. Q.E.D.
Here, we have two groups of firms: 1 ≤ m ≤ M in which AM is not the equilibrium
and M < k ≤ N which are under AM. The results 1 indicates that in the industries that
are under AM, the administration should focus only on invoice cross-checking. In this
case, the level of expenditures are such that πi∗k (I) ≤ π̄ik(II).
On the other hand, according to the result 2, the optimal expenditures for industries
1≤m ≤M are similar to Proposition 5.4, but with some changes due to AM. Basically,
AM imposes a linear relationship between informality in industries M < k ≤ N and
1 ≤ m ≤ M which is reflected in a transformation matrix D in the sense that X i2 =




1 and reduces the dimension of optimization
matrix from N toM . Therefore, in comparison to Proposition 5.4, here ΓA′ and A (both





12 and A1 + DA2 (both with M rows)
respectively. Hence, if binding constraints from demand side is added to the model,
still the results of Proposition 5.4 and 5.3 are valid with the difference that here X i2 is
indirectly affected by G1 through X
i
1 but not by G2. The role of G2 is just to prevent
firms from choosing action (I).
When AM is not the initial equilibrium, tax administration may be able to shift
the equilibrium to the point that AM holds. According to Proposition 5.5, AM can







Two factors can make AM the desirable equilibrium for the administration. First, under
AM, informal firms constrained by the market demand, produce below their optimal level





nk), the administration can spend much less in industry n to hold





can increase enforcement in the industries that buy product n as input. As an example,
if industry m is the only customer of industry n, the administration can impose AM in
n by increasing gm and choosing λn = 1. Then informality in both m and n decline with
the possibility that gn under AM is less than before. Thus, imposing AM in industry n
can be optimal if the benefits (higher fn, fm and possibly less gn) beats the cost (higher
gm). For finding the industries that AM is the desirable equilibrium, the administration
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needs to compare the overall benefits and costs with and without imposing AM in each
industry which can be very complicated to model analytically. However, looking at
the denominator of gAMn , we can say that the required expenditure to impose AM in
industries that have low forward linkages is large and if all client of an industry are final
consumers, gAMn approaches infinity and AM cannot be implemented. Therefore, AM is
more likely to be the optimal equilibrium in an industry with strong forward linkages
and large number of formal customers.
5.5. Empirical evidence
In this section, I provide some evidence about the existence of the VAT self-enforcement
from the Indian service sector. India is a good developing country to test this hypothesis
given its recent policy reform in taxation. In this paper, I concentrate on service sector
given its big policy change for VAT adoption in 2003-04. Service tax in India is levied just
by the central (not state) government. It was introduced in 1994 on insurance and stock
brokerages, but the major change happened in 2003 by introducing the VAT in service
tax rules and expanding the coverage of the rule to more than 80 activities. Before 2003,
the credit for inputs was not available. The rate of service tax also has experienced a
number of changes. Being 5% initially, the rate increased to 8% in 2003 and then 10.2%
in 2004. In the mid-2006, it again rose to 12.24%, and then reduced to 10.3% in 2009.81
Given the nation-wide service tax policy change in India, I examine the existence of
self-enforcing feature by testing whether the VAT has been more effective in reducing the
size of shadow economy of forwardly linked activities or not. As shown in Proposition
5.2, the idea behind this hypothesis is that naturally, firms with strong forward linkages
have more business customers and among them formal traders who prefer to buy from
VAT compliant suppliers. Thus, after VAT adoption, we expect more tax compliance in
forwardly linked industries. For this purpose, I use different data sources; two firm-level
surveys on services, and the I-O table of Indian economy.
The principal data I use is two surveys on “unorganized service sector” by NSSO82
81These facts are obtained from Rao and Rao (2006) and http://indiataxes.com.
82National Sample Survey Organization, which is under Ministry of statistic of India and conducts a
variety of surveys including enterprise level on unorganized manufacturing and services.
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which are carried out in 2001-02 (round 57) and 2006-07 (round 63). They have nation-
wide representative samples (330,929 in 2001-02 and 156,352 in 2006-07) of service enter-
prises and include a variety of information including the status of tax registration.83 The
services they cover consist of transport, storage, communication, hotels and restaurants,
real estate, financial intermediation (just round 63), renting and business activities, edu-
cation, health, social work, and other community, social and personal service activities.
The sample excludes government and public sector undertakings and the service sector
units registered under the Factories Act. To have a balanced sample, I drop the finan-
cial intermediation services that are just surveyed in 2006. In addition, because I am
interested in the effect of VAT adoption on formality, I drop all services that are not
under service VAT rule in 2006. In this way, I eliminate any potential selection bias for
activities that are chosen by the tax administration for service tax adoption. Finally,
hair dressing and other beauty treatment services (NIC code 93020) is dropped, because
service tax is assigned just for beauty treatment not hair dressing and decomposition
is not possible. The list of industries used in the estimation are presented in appendix
Table 5.F.2.
Having the firms’ tax registration status, enables me to estimate the size of shadow
economy at state-year-activity level using the sample weights. Tax registration status
is not specific to the service tax and it refers to all types of registration for central or
state government tax agencies. In Figure 5.1, percentage of tax registered firms in each
activity – using sample weights and separately for 2001 and 2006 – is used in the y-axis.
In order to measure the formality index, I define formal and informal production as the
level of production that is produced by firms registered and not registered under tax
respectively. Then, the formality index refers to the percentage of total production
by firms that are registered for central or state tax agencies within each state, year,
and activity. Table 5.1 shows the summary statistics of formality index for 2001-02 and
2006-07. While on average 18.2 percent of production is produced by formal sector,
83The 2006-07 survey has a specific question about tax registration and whether the firm has tax account
number (TAN). In the 2001-02 survey, among other types of registration, the enterprise is asked about
sales tax and companies act registration (which includes tax registration). To cover other types of
tax, I check whether the tax payments of the enterprise are nonzero or not. It is good to mention that
all NSSO surveys are conducted independent of tax purposes and no information about the identity
of the enterprise is supposed to go to the other agencies. As it mentioned in the manual, according to
the Collection of Statistics Act, violation of any of the confidentiality and secrecy of the information
by statistics officer or field staff is prosecuted by or with the consent of appropriate agency.
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formality increased from 12.79 percent in 2001 to 23.09 percent in 2006.84 This may
reflect that VAT adoption in 2003 had a significant effect on tax compliance of service
sector in India. Appendix Tables 5.F.1 and 5.F.2 provide the average formality across
state and industries respectively. We note a large variation in formality across states.
While over 59 percent of production is created by registered firms in Maharashtra, only
2.83 percent of production is formal in Jammu and Kashmir. Looking into activities,
we observe no firm is registered for tax in real estate of self-owned residential buildings,
whereas around 80 percent of production in cargo handling in water transport is formal.
The second data source, which is used to measure forward and backward linkages,
is input-output transaction tables of the national accounts statistics of Indian economy
published by Central Statistical Organization in 2006-07 (No report is published in 2001-
02). The I-O tables consist of 130 activities including 22 service categories85 and include
use (commodity × industry) and make (industry × commodity) matrices. Using these
two, I construct the (commodity × commodity) coefficient matrix A.86 Then, similar to
(5.10) and (5.11), I compute forward and backward linkages in each service sector as
FL = Y −1(I −A)−1Y J, BL = (I −A′)−1J (5.32)
Where Y is the diagonal production matrix and J the summation vector. The final
consumption and total demand of each service, used in Figure 5.1, are drawn from I-
O tables too. According to Table 5.1, forward and backward linkages indicators are on
average 2.133 and 1.749 respectively, and they have small variation across the two survey
years. Appendix Table 5.F.2, presents the variation in the linkages across industries.
Forward linkages index is changing from 1.02 in education (NIC 2-digit code 80) to 3.11
in business services (NIC 2-digit code 74). In comparison, backward linkages index varies
84These numbers are estimated for the sample of “unorganized service sector” that described above and
does not cover all service sectors and public enterprises. Therefore they do not reflect the aggregate
formality in the whole service sector in India.
85Railway transport, Land transport, Water transport, Air transport, auxiliary transport activities,
Storage and warehousing, Communication, Trade, Hotels and restaurants, Banking, Insurance, Own-
ership of dwellings, Education and research, Medical and health, Business services, Computer &
related activities, Legal services, Real estate activities, Renting of machinery and equipment, Com-
munity, social and personal services, Other services, Public administration.
86The methodology for calculating matrix A from use and make tables are available in the Appendix
2 of the manual of Input-Output Transaction Tables: “Mathematical expression on the methodology
of construction of associated matrices”, which is available at: http://mospi.nic.in/Mospi_New/
upload/report&publication/ftest10/appendix202.pdf
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from 1.21 in education (NIC 2-digit code 80) to 2.33 in freight transport.
To investigate the effect of linkages on shadow economy after service VAT adoption
in India, I also utilize the state level variation in tax buoyancy. Although service
tax adoption in India has been nationwide and the revenue directly goes to the central
government, there is a large heterogeneity between states in terms of tax capacity and
effort. Rangarajan, Prasad, and Srivastava (2004, Ch.6 p.383) provide tax buoyancy
estimates for 28 Indian states, measuring the percentage response of tax revenue to a one
percent change in the tax base (proxied by GDP), holding constant all other parameters
of tax policy. Their estimates are for a period ending to 2003 which is year of service
VAT adoption. Appendix Table 5.F.1 shows the variation is in tax buoyancy is between
1.1 to 1.35 across states. We expect service VAT adoption in 2003 is more effective in
reducing shadow economy in state with higher level of tax buoyancy.
Table 5.1: Summary statistics—The numbers show the summary statistics average across state
and activities.
Sample 2001-02 2006-07 The whole sample
Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE
Formal share of production 12.79 (26.09) 23.09 (35.39) 18.20 (31.73)
Forward linkages index 2.208 (0.697) 2.064 (0.720) 2.133 (0.713)
Backward linkages index 1.768 (0.334) 1.733 (0.333) 1.749 (0.334)
To estimate the effect of service VAT adoption on the relative size of formal sector,
I use the following regression setup
fist = a0 + a1VATt × TBs + a2Xist + Ii + Ss + Tt + εist (5.33)
where fist is formality index in Industry i, state s and time t, VATt is equal to one in
2006-07 and zero otherwise, TBs is tax buoyancy estimate of state s as given in Table
5.F.1, and Xist is a vector of control variables including the average number of workers –
to capture the effect of firm size and third party reporting by labor – and total number
of firms – to control for the fixed firm-level enforcement costs – at activity, state, and
year level. In addition, Ii, Ss and Tt are vectors of activity, state, and time fixed effects.
In the sample, there are 69 industries and 28 states, but some industries do not exist
in a number of states and total observation is 1901 in the regressions. To control for
underestimation of standard errors, the error terms are clustered at state level.
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Column (1) of Table 5.2 illustrates the estimated coefficients of (5.33). The results
suggest a positive and significant impact of service VAT interacted with tax buoyancy
on formality. The economic effect of the impact is also significant. Formality in Punjab
(tax buoyancy=1.35) is 42.27 × 0.25 = 10.57 percent more than Arunachal Pradesh
(tax buoyancy=1.1) after VAT adoption. The sign of the average number of workers is
positive and significant, suggesting higher formal production in bigger firms with more
employees. This is consistent with the third party reporting hypothesis of Kleven et al.
(2009) which I used in section 5.3.1. The effect of total number of firms is negative and
significant which can reflect more difficult enforcement in the presence of large number
of firms and fixed firm-level administrative costs (Dharmapala, Slemrod, and Wilson,
2011).
In the next step, I utilize the following regression setup to estimate the effect of
forward and backward linkages after VAT adoption on formality
fist = b0 + b1VATt × TBs × Li + b2Xist + Ii + Ss × Tt + εist (5.34)
where Li is the linkages index of activity i and the rest of variables are defined in the same
way as (5.33). By including state×year fixed effects in (5.34), I control for all state-level
time-variant variables and focus on the effect of forward and backward linkages inter-
acted with VAT dummy and tax buoyancy on formality. Column (2) to (4) of Table
5.2 present the results of the estimation of (5.34) for specifications with only forward
linkages, only backward linkages, and both types of linkages. Column (2) shows that in-
dustries with higher forward linkages in state with higher tax buoyancy experiences more
formality after VAT adoption. For example, after VAT adoption in 2003, formal pro-
duction of accounting activities (forward linkages=3.11) in Punjab (tax buoyancy=1.35)
increased by 11.72 percentage point more than formal production of education (forward
linkages=1.02) in Arunachal Pradesh (tax buoyancy=1.1).87 However, column (3) im-
plies no significant relationship between formality and the interaction term of backward
linkages. If we include both linkages indices in one regression, forward linkages remains
significant and backward linkages is still insignificant with a sharp reduction in its co-
efficient (column 4). Moreover, similar to column (1), the average number of workers
87The economic effect is computed as (3.11× 1.35− 1.02× 1.1)× 3.811 = 11.72
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and the number of firms appear with positive and negative signs respectively and their
coefficient is significant at 5% level in all specifications.
In sum, the empirical evidence confirms a positive and strong impact of forward link-
ages of an activity on formal share of production when the VAT is conducted in the
economy. This self-enforcing feature of the VAT provides a novel tool for tax adminis-
trations to move to a more efficient tax enforcement policy.
Table 5.2: Difference-in-difference regressions for the effect of VAT adoption and linkages
on formal production. The estimated regressions are (5.33) for column (1) and (5.34) for column
(2)-(4). The dependent variable is share of production by firms registered for tax at each activity, state,
and year. VAT adoption is a dummy equal to one after service VAT adoption in 2003. State-level tax
buoyancy for 2003 is drawn from Rangarajan et al. (2004). Forward and backward linkages are estimated
using I-O tables of Indian economy in 2006. The standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at
state level. The ∗ and ∗∗ show significance at 10% and 5% respectively.
Formal share of production (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VAT adoptiont× Tax buoyancys 42.267*
(21.755)
VAT adoptiont× Tax buoyancys× Forward linkagesi 3.811** 3.769**
(1.804) (1.785)
VAT adoptiont× Tax buoyancys× Backward linkagesi 4.303 0.162
(3.069) (2.764)
Average No. workers 0.314** 0.288** 0.287** 0.288**
(0.123) (0.127) (0.128) (0.127)
Number of firms (in thousands) -0.047** -0.047** -0.049** -0.047**
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Observations 1901 1901 1901 1901
R-squared 0.261 0.284 0.282 0.284
Activity fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes




The main contribution of this paper is providing the insight that for optimal VAT en-
forcement, tax administration should take account of the linkages between different ac-
tivities. Many developing countries have moved toward replacement of border taxes with
the VAT and the optimality of this reform crucially depends on VAT collection efficiency.
The administrative advantage of the VAT is that in addition to common tools to reveal
intra-firm information, it provides a unique inter-firm information source via its invoice
system. This intrinsic feature makes evasion of forwardly linked activities dependent
on their customers’ informality. Consequently, tax administration can utilize this unique
tool to improve enforcement by spending more on backwardly linked firms to reveal their
internal information. In comparison, tax administrations should spend extra expenses in
forwardly linked activities to cross-check invoices with the corresponding credit claims.
Empirical evidence from Indian economy shows that the self-enforcing feature among
forwardly linked activities increases formal share of production.
However, the underlying model has some limitations. Generally, this paper neglects
some other VAT enforcement issues, as stressed in Keen and Smith (2006), like under-
reported sales and over-reported purchases, multiple rates and misclassification of com-
modities, self-consumption and carousel fraud. In an accompanying paper (Hoseini,
2014a), the misreporting in the VAT is studied in detail, but international aspect of
VAT fraud like missing trader (carousel) fraud, need more attention of theorists. In spite
of these limitations, the findings of this paper have an important implication for the VAT





5.A. Proof of Proposition 5.1




kn), we can write (5.18) as
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Next, by substituting vin and x
i






+ (1 + τn)pn = pn(1 + τn)
1−αn (5.40)
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and by substituting (5.42) into (5.40) and rearranging the expression, it turns out
∂τn
∂xin
xin = −(1 + τn)
(1 + τn)
αn − 1
(1 + τn)αn − 1 + αn
(5.43)
Since, 0 ≤ τn = t(1− θηn) < 1, and τn is small, I am able to simplify (5.43) by using the
linear approximation of (1 + τn)
αn as 1 + αnτn.
88 By doing this, we get
∂τn
∂xin
xin = −τn (5.44)




xin = 1− θηn (5.45)
5.B. Proof of Proposition 5.2
From Proposition 5.1, at the informal firms’ optimum, we have
1
θ































88Notice that the tax rate is between 0 and 1 (around 0.2 for many countries) and when it multiplies
by 0 < 1 − θηn < 1, it becomes even smaller. Therefore, the higher powers of τn are negligible
for the approximation. For instance, if τn = 0.1 and αn = 0.5, the true value and the first order
approximation become 1.0488 and 1.05, respectively, with only 0.1% error.
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If µ < θϕnλn and action (II) is chosen, then cross-checking risk is removed from





subtracted from the profit of informal firms. By applying both of these changes the profit
of a representative informal firm can be written in the same form as (5.35) with a change
in the definition of τn such that















































Next, I employ vectors F , Φ−1 and J with dimensionality N × 1 containing fn,
1
ϕn(1− λn)ρn
, and ones (summation vector) respectively; and Γ as a diagonal N × N
matrices with γi as diagonal elements. Then, (5.53) is written as
F = (J − 1
2θ
Φ−1) + Y −1ΓAY F (5.54)
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and we immediately get
F = (I − Y −1ΓAY )−1(J − 1
2θ
Φ−1) (5.55)
Since γn ≥ 0, according to Theorem 1 (replace V by ΓV ), F always has a unique solution.
5.C. Proof of Proposition 5.3
From Proposition 5.2, when µ > θϕnλn, at equilibrium we have









Since xin = xn − xfn, by rearranging (5.2), we can write
















































n is increasing in λn and the best choice to reduce informality






nk, the derivative is negative and the tax
administration should focus on cross checking as much as possible (λn = 1). However,
according to Proposition 5.2, if λn increases such that µ < θϕnλn, the informal firm
start matching with their peers to eliminate the cross-checking risk from their detection
probability. The turning point that makes an informal firm indifferent between matching
and not matching is λn =
µ
θϕn
. Hence, if λnθϕn > µ the administration gains nothing















is always smaller than 1 and thus λn is never equal to 1. When cross-








ϕn − zn = 0 (5.60)



































Finally, using (5.49), we obtain (5.28).
5.D. Proof of Proposition 5.4






















































αkγkαkjγjαjm + . . . )− gm (5.65)
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and Γ is defined as Proposition 5.2.
5.E. Proof of Proposition 5.5
If λn = 0, informal firms are always better off by choosing (I) and AM is not the
equilibrium. Thus if AM is the equilibrium λn > 0. Moreover, as shown in Proposition
5.3, because the profits are monotone in λn, its optimal level is either zero or one. Under
AM, the administration does not need to make the firm indifferent between yi∗n (I) and
yi∗n (II) (since y
i∗
n (II) ≥ ȳin(II)), thus λn is not constrained by the corresponding search
cost µ/θϕn and at optimum λn = 1.
On the other hand, holding AM requires πi∗n (I) ≤ π̄in(II) ≤ πi∗n (II). This indicates
that for imposing AM in industry n, the administration has to set the efforts such that
the informal firms are indifferent between actions (I) and (II) while the market demand
is binding. When λn = 1, we always have π
i∗
n (I) ≤ πi∗n (II), and under AM the demand
constraint yields π̄in(II) ≤ πi∗n (II), thus AM will be the equilibrium if gn is chosen such
that πi∗n (I) ≤ π̄in(II). By substituting (5.41) and (5.42) in (5.35), we obtain the profit
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after action (I) as






where τn = t(1−θηn). With a first order approximation similar to Proposition 5.1, (5.70)
becomes








nk/xn –see (5.20). This means that τn is independent
of yin and if 1 + τn > 0, the optimal production tends to infinity. Therefore, the level of
enforcement expenditure gn that holds π
i∗










In the next step, I want to derive the optimal policy when AM is the equilibrium
in some industries. Without loss of generality, I divide the industries into two groups:
Industries 1, . . . ,M that the AM is not the equilibrium, and M+1, . . . , N in which AM












(5.73) gives no answer for the industries that possess no forward linkages (
∑
k αnkyk = 0
and yn = wβn) since they do not have any business customers. Therefore, the industries
with no forward linkage are indexed among 1, . . . ,M . The informal firms that work in
industries 1, . . . ,M get the same payoff as before, and the optimal cross-checking for
them can be obtained from Proposition 5.3. Now, if I decompose vector Y into Y1 and
Y2 consisting of y1, . . . , yM and yM+1, . . . , yN respectively, and A into four corresponding




, we can write (5.73) as









where Y 2 is a diagonal metrics consisting of yM+1, . . . , yN respectively. From (5.74) we
can find
Y i2 = (I − Y −12 B2 −A22)−1A21Y i1 , (5.75)
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so by knowing Y i1 , Y
i
2 is obtained from (5.75). Now, we can use this results to find the






n − gn (5.76)
which can be rewritten in matrix form as
r = tA′Y f − I ′G (5.77)
where G is a vector of gns. From (5.75), define D = (I − Y −12 B −A22)−1A21, then
Y f2 = Y2 − Y i2 = Y2 −DY1 +DY
f
1 (5.78)
Then, we can decompose r for the two groups of industries as






2(Y2 −DY1)− I ′G (5.79)
Define Λ and Y as diagonal matrices containing yn
ρn(1−λn) and yn as elements respectively,
then we have Y f = Y F and similar to (5.54) we can find










where G−11 is a M × 1 vector comprising 1/g1, . . . , 1/gM . Using (5.78), it turns out
Y f1 =
(










Substituting (5.81) in (5.79) yields
r = r0 −
tḡ
2θ
HG−1 − I ′G (5.82)












Thus, if hm is the m
th element of H



















Which yields to (5.31).
5.F. Data Appendix
Table 5.F.1: Tax Buoyancy (TB) and formality estimates for Indian states – TB measures
the percentage response of tax revenue to a one per cent change in the tax base, holding constant all
parameters of tax policy. Formality index measures the percentage of production by tax registered firms
averaged across services activities as listed in Table 5.F.2. TB data is drawn from Rangarajan et al.
(2004, Ch.6, Page.383). Formality is estimated by the author using representative NSSO surveys.
state TB formality state TB formality
Andhra Pradesh 1.2 33.52 Maharashtra 1.25 59.52
Arunachal Pradesh 1.1 25.14 Manipur 1.1 23.06
Assam 1.2 20.32 Meghalaya 1.2 19.29
Bihar 1.2 8.45 Mizoram 1.1 27.17
Chattisgarh 1.2 11.10 Nagaland 1.1 27.19
Goa 1.35 19.75 Orissa 1.2 8.54
Gujarat 1.3 43.54 Punjab 1.35 15.11
Haryana 1.25 16.55 Rajasthan 1.2 18.81
Himachal Pradesh 1.3 14.73 Sikkim 1.2 21.75
Jammu and Kashmir 1.2 2.83 Tamil Nadu 1.2 19.68
Jharkhand 1.2 14.46 Tripura 1.1 9.38
Karnataka 1.3 29.92 Uttar Pradesh 1.2 15.45
Kerala 1.3 23.18 Uttarkhand 1.2 5.35
Madhya Pradesh 1.2 24.43 West Bengal 1.35 41.25
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Table 5.F.2: Summary statistics at industry level—The sample includes the services under tax
rule before 2006, and is chosen based on various notifications of service tax rule, Government of India
(for details see http://www.servicetax.gov.in). Services under financial intermediation and trade
categories are not sampled in the round 57 of NSS survey and are not listed here.
NIC Description formality (%) FL BL
55204 Activities of caterers 4.27 1.34 2.23
60231 Freight transport by motor vehicles 23.39 1.90 2.33
60232 Freight transport other than by motor vehicles 4.77 1.90 2.33
61100 Sea and coastal water transport 37.50 1.96 1.89
61200 Inland water transport 1.03 1.96 1.89
63011 Cargo handling, incidental to land transport 34.03 2.07 1.98
63012 Cargo handling, incidental to water transport 79.99 2.07 1.98
63013 Cargo handling, incidental to air transport 51.02 2.07 1.98
63021 Warehousing of agricultural products without refrigeration 17.16 3.00 1.94
63022 Warehousing of agricultural products with refrigeration (i.e. cold storage ) 34.62 3.00 1.94
63023 Storage and warehousing n.e.c. 22.76 3.00 1.94
63031 Supporting services to land transport 7.34 2.07 1.98
63032 Supporting services to water transport 21.91 2.07 1.98
63033 Supporting services to air transport 33.33 2.07 1.98
63040 Activities of travel agencies and tour operators n.e.c. 30.94 2.07 1.98
63090 Activities of other transport agencies 35.80 2.07 1.98
64110 National post activities 23.90 2.66 1.58
64120 Courier activities other than national post activities 31.51 2.66 1.58
64202 paging, e-mail, cellular phone, videoconferencing, internet 16.15 2.66 1.58
64203 Maintenance of telecom network 27.10 2.66 1.58
64204 Activities of the cable operators 31.04 2.66 1.58
70101 Purchase, sale letting of leased residential buildings 12.18 1.40 1.48
70102 Purchase, sale letting of leased non-residential buildings 19.69 1.40 1.48
70103 Operating of real estate of self owned residential buildings 0.00 1.40 1.48
70104 Operating of real estate of self owned non-residential buildings 20.17 1.40 1.48
70105 Developing and subdividing real estate into lots 38.10 1.40 1.48
70106 Lessors of real property 11.07 1.40 1.48
70109 Real estate activities with own or leased property n.e.c. 9.75 1.40 1.48
70200 Real estate activities on a fee or contract basis. 10.27 1.40 1.48
71110 Renting of land transport equipment 10.35 2.57 1.29
71301 Renting of tents, electrical appliances, furniture, table ware, crockery and utensils. 6.11 2.57 1.29
72294 Web-page designing 25.20 1.22 1.54
72295 Software maintenance 40.22 1.22 1.54
72400 Database activities and distribution of electronic content 15.93 1.22 1.54
72501 Repair & maintenance of computers and computer based systems 27.33 1.22 1.54
72502 Repair of office, computing and accounting machinery 20.00 1.22 1.54
72901 Activities of cyber cafe 18.32 1.22 1.54
72909 Other computer related activities, n.e.c. 21.59 1.22 1.54
73100 Research and experimental development on natural sciences and engineering 51.09 1.02 1.21
74120 Accounting, book-keeping and auditing activities; 28.90 3.11 2.12
74130 Market research and public opinion polling. 37.34 3.11 2.12
74140 Business and management consultancy activities. 23.78 3.11 2.12
74210 Architectural and engineering activities 25.71 3.11 2.12
74220 Technical testing and analysis. 29.64 3.11 2.12
74300 Advertising. 30.25 3.11 2.12
74910 Labour recruitment and provision of personnel. 17.40 3.11 2.12
74920 Investigation and security activities 27.51 3.11 2.12
74930 Building-cleaning and industrial cleaning activities 27.48 3.11 2.12
74940 Photographic activities. 10.51 3.11 2.12
74950 Packaging activities. 4.86 3.11 2.12
74991 Auctioning activities of self employed auctioneers. 28.57 3.11 2.12
74994 Fashion design 1.49 3.11 2.12
74996 Interior decoration 22.98 3.11 2.12
74997 Secretarial activities 19.40 3.11 2.12
80902 Coaching centres 14.42 1.02 1.21
80903 Activities of the individuals providing tuition 8.59 1.02 1.21
80904 Activities relating to training/ education/ conduct of specialised course 14.03 1.02 1.21
91990 Activities of other membership organizations n.e.c. 31.16 2.12 1.72
92111 Motion picture production 44.85 1.80 1.51
92113 Video production and distribution 9.54 1.80 1.51
92115 Sound recording studios 12.89 1.80 1.51
92131 Radio activities 0.00 1.80 1.51
92132 Television activities 19.26 1.80 1.51
92411 Operation and maintenance of sports facilities 15.98 1.80 1.51
92412 Activities of sports and game schools, 8.12 1.80 1.51
92413 Activities relating to organisation and operation of indoor / outdoor sports 1.16 1.80 1.51
92490 Other recreational activities 2.81 1.80 1.51
93010 Washing and (dry-) cleaning of textile and fur products 3.88 2.12 1.72
93030 Funeral and related activities 2.71 2.12 1.72
190
Bibliography
Aghion, P. and P. Bolton (1997). A theory of trickle-down growth and development. The
Review of Economic Studies 64 (2), 151–172.
Allingham, M. G. and A. Sandmo (1972, November). Income tax evasion: a theoretical
analysis. Journal of Public Economics 1 (3-4), 323–338.
Alok, S. and M. Ayyagari (2014). Politics, State Ownership, and Corporate Investment.
SSRN Working Paper (March 27, 2014).
Andreoni, J., B. Erard, and J. Feinstein (1998). Tax Compliance. Journal of Economic
Literature 36 (2), pp. 818–860.
Angrist, J. D. and J.-S. Pischke (2008). Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist’s
companion. Princeton university press.
Arcand, J.-L., E. Berkes, and U. Panizza (2012). Too much finance? International
Monetary Fund.
Ayyagari, M., T. Beck, and M. Hoseini (2013). Finance and Poverty: Evidence from
India. CEPR Discussion Paper 9497.
Baldwin, R. (2007). EU VAT fraud. http://www.voxeu.org/article/
vat-fraud-part-1.
Banerjee, A. V. and A. F. Newman (1993). Occupational Choice and the Process of
Development. Journal of Political Economy 101 (2), 274.
Baum, C. F., M. E. Schaffer, and S. Stillman (2007). Enhanced routines for instrumental




Baunsgaard, T. and M. Keen (2010). Tax revenue and (or?) trade liberalization. Journal
of Public Economics 94 (9), 563–577.
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